


JPRS-UMA-93-019  
16 June 1993




**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

19971229 084



**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2**

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-93-019

### CONTENTS

16 June 1993

#### CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

##### CIS: POLICY

Deputy Minister Gromov on Internationalist Servicemen [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 May] .....	1
Deputy Minister Gromov on Ukraine's Nuclear Status [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 22, Jun] .....	3
Troops Find Housing Via Private Real Estate Group in St. Petersburg [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Apr] .....	5
Cabinet Decree on Personal Insurance for Military, Internal Troops [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr] .....	7

##### CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Mobile Launchers Replacing Silos [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 15 May] .....	8
--	---

##### CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Kasatonov Comments on Black Sea Fleet Situation [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	9
'TAKR Kuznetsov' [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	12
'Official Department' .....	17
1992 Changes in Russian Navy Ship Order of Battle [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] ....	17
Assignments [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	18
Early Promotions [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	18
Collection for Hero's Monument [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	19
Information on Russian Higher Naval Schools [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	19
Solving Problem of Noise in Nuclear Submarines [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	19
Missile Patrol Boat Designs [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	23
'Laser Against Aircraft' [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	28

##### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Budget, Finance Chief on Social Protection of Servicemen [ARMIYA No 21-22, Nov] .....	29
MoD Nonreimbursable Funds for Housing [FEDERATSIYA No 59, 29 May] .....	34

#### STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

##### INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Armenian Advantage in Nagorno-Karabakh Seen [NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL No 18, Apr] .....	36
Russian Naval Command: Ukrainian Actions Endanger Black Sea Fleet [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 27 Apr] .....	37

##### UKRAINE

Col-Gen Morozov Fires Personnel Chief for not Halting Bribery [NARODNA ARMIYA 26 Mar] .....	38
'Ukrainian National Assembly' for Nuclear Ukraine, Arms Capacity [NARODNA ARMIYA 25 Mar] .....	39
Uneven Pilot Assessment in Air Force [NARODNA ARMIYA 30 Mar] .....	40
Alleged Ukrainian Yalta Breaches Rebutted [NARODNA ARMIYA 28 May] .....	41
Ukraine 'Not Cause' of Black Sea Tensions [NARODNA ARMIYA 1 Jun] .....	43

## BELARUS

Col-Gen Chaus on Belarusian Problems with Unit Manning [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 23 Feb] .....	44
Belarus Military Personnel Take Oath [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 13 Jan] .....	46
Belarusian Servicemen's Group Seeks 'Slavic Democratic Forum' [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 29 Jan] .....	46
Significance of Associate Membership in NATO Viewed [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 19 Feb] .....	47

## BALTIC STATES

Structure, Aims of Latvian Armed Forces Detailed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 May] .....	48
--	----

## GENERAL ISSUES

### ARMS TRADE

Rubin Designer Makarov on Arms Sales [MORSKOY SBORNIK No 2, Feb] .....	51
X31 and X35 Anti-Ship Missiles for Export [AIR & COSMOS/AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL No 1417, 15-21 Mar] .....	53

## MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Profile of AH-64A Apache Helicopter [TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE Mar] .....	54
---	----

## SECURITY SERVICES

Federal Courier Chief Gen Andreyev on Work of His Service [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Apr] .....	56
--	----

## CIS: POLICY

### Deputy Minister Gromov on Internationalist Servicemen

93UM0546A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 May 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Aleksandr Oliynik: "Soldier-Internationalist—A Rank Which One Should Not Repudiate"]

[Text] "Soldier-internationalist"... No matter how many years have passed since the withdrawal of the 40th Army from Afghanistan and no matter how many changes have occurred in Russia and the other CIS states, these words have already securely entered into our history. Now there is a certain legal status after them, not only hundreds of thousands of Afghan veterans-soldiers but also those representatives of our Armed Forces who were sent on an international missions to dozens of other countries of the world and who, based upon the order of the Homeland, carried out missions in a situation that required selflessness and courage.

A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent discusses the people from this cohort, the problems of the soldier-internationalist social movement in the troops, their social protection, and the perpetuation of the blessed memory of those who have fallen with Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Boris Gromov.

[Oliynik] Boris Vsevolodovich, the press has already reported that the All-Army Conference of Russian Federation Armed Forces Soldier-Internationalists is occurring in Moscow. Tell me more about its goals and missions.

[Gromov] At the present time, more than 30,000 servicemen who underwent the crucible of the decade long war in Afghanistan are in the Russian Army's combat formations. While taking into account those who in various years were sent on international missions to Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and other countries (altogether, our military advisors and specialists were in nearly 50 of the world's states, according to General Staff data), that number is still larger. Generals, officers and warrant officers who received their combat experience in the fire of engagements, who endured deprivations, the lost of combat friends—that is the gold fund of our army. Our duty is to preserve it. Today I think it is appropriate to remember that bitter price which our officers and soldiers paid while carrying out the Homeland's order and while defending its interests abroad. As we all know, the 40th Army's fate is the most tragic. In Afghanistan, 18,833 servicemen were killed or died from their wounds, 293 men are listed as missing in action, and more than 50,000 were wounded or crippled. No changes

whatsoever in the political life of society should shade the blessed memory of the people who honorably carried out their military duty.

It is that understanding that defines the tasks which will be resolved at the All-Army Conference. Perhaps the primary task is the precise definition of the place and role of soldier-internationalist councils, the consolidation of their efforts to resolve military reform issues, the reorganization of the Russian Army with emphasis on its professionalism; rendering assistance to commanders, staffs and military commissariats in the conduct of the patriotic education of personnel, strengthening military discipline and order at a new level. And, finally, development and realization of the state social policy with regard to soldier-internationalists. In my view, today we need a law on the status of soldier-internationalists as participants of war.

[Oliynik] Will not the issues raised at the impending forum remain on paper, just like the majority of the decisions adopted at a similar All-Army Conference that occurred in Moscow two years ago?

[Gromov] Actually, the resolutions of that conference of soldier-internationalists unfortunately were not carried out, although they are timely even today. They are first of all proposals on the development and legislative formulation by parliament of the legal status of the soldier-internationalist and on the institution of a Day of Memory for those soldiers who have fallen and activation of efforts directed at the search for and return home of servicemen who became prisoners of war and clarification of the fates of all servicemen who are missing in action in Afghanistan, consolidation and implementation of combat experience in troop practice, etc. The causes of the breakdown are also obvious—the collapse of the USSR, the division of the Soviet Army and those radical changes in all spheres of our lives and activities that followed after them. We think that a coordinating working organ is needed for the consistent implementation of a state social policy with regard to soldier-internationalists and for realization of those decisions which I previously discussed.

[Oliynik] How do you assess the short duration of the activity of the soldier-internationalist councils that were created on a voluntary basis in military units, headquarters and institutions two years ago?

[Gromov] In different ways. Analysis has shown that, in those places where commanders of various ranks themselves participated in the Afghan war, they themselves sensed that combat brotherhood there, as a rule, the councils respect them and the councils are listening to their opinions and taking them into account while organizing the training process. In this context, the activity of the Air Assault Troops Afghanistan Veterans Committee, which by the way was registered at the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice, is seen as instructive. Here are just a few of the directions of its activities. With

the participation of the VDV [Airborne Troops] commander, here assistance is being rendered to officers and warrant officers, and right now even to soldiers who have begun service on contract, in the transfer from nearby foreign countries to Russia and the reverse. Without red tape, officers and warrant officers who served in Afghanistan, are provided with housing, plots of land are being allotted for them, cottages and dachas are under construction and, jointly with city and rayon Afghan veterans organizations, they are conducting job placement of those servicemen who have been released into the reserve and the family members of those who were wounded or who received serious injuries are being provided with sanatorium-resort treatment, etc., gratis. Similar councils of the Western Group of Forces and Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division which, incidentally is commanded by former Afghan Veteran Major-General Valeriy Gennadyevich Yevnevich, and the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the Military Engineer Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev are responsible for many useful beginnings... Unfortunately, soldier-internationalist councils in a number of division-sized units exist only on paper and some commanders and superiors are simply not interested in their activities. The conference's participants will certainly express their opinions on the causes of that attitude toward the new social organizations.

[Olyinik] Quite a few public associations have appeared in Russia in recent years which, to some degree or other, are involved with the problems of Afghan veterans, their family members and disabled Afghan veterans. What is your attitude toward them and with whom is the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense primarily cooperating?

[Gromov] The democratic changes in Russia permit society to more fully carry out its duty to the young and already graying veterans of the Afghan war, especially to disabled veterans and to the families of the deceased and missing in action. This is truly our pain and also a great concern of the Ministry of Defense that maintains close contacts through its own structures with many organizations that are involved with the problems of soldier-Afghan veterans. Of course, first of all with those that, not in words but in deeds, in fact protect the good name of the Afghan veterans and help them to the maximum extent possible in the difficult, both spiritually and materially, time. This is first of all—the Committee for Soldier-Internationalists Affairs under the Commonwealth Heads of Government-State Council. This interstate organ has done much to develop the policy itself with regard to soldier-internationalists and has raised it to the state level. The committee also resolves the tasks of searching for and returning to the Homeland our servicemen who ended up prisoners of war in Afghanistan and is involved with investigating the locations of the deaths of the fallen.

The Ministry of Defense has working contacts with many social organizations and associations of former servicemen who participated in armed conflicts as advisors and specialists in the armies of the countries of

Southeast Asia, Asia, Africa, South America and in the Middle East. I must also say that the Union of Afghan Veterans (SVA), that has approximately 300,000 men in its ranks, is one of the largest Afghan veterans social organizations.

However, I must state with regret that certain Afghan vets social organizations are involved only with purely commercial activities, while losing sight of patriotic education of the younger generation and rejecting philanthropy.

[Olyinik] As before, the issue of the return of our prisoners to the Homeland rouses society. In your view, what ways are there to resolve this painful issue? Why has the problem of U.S. citizens who are missing in action from the times of the Korean and Vietnam wars been raised to the state level not without the assistance of the highest officials of our country; by way of illustration, the Russian-American Commission is aggressively working where Presidential Advisor Dmitriy Volkogonov is the co-chairman and the Russian MB [Ministry of Security] and MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] have been very active in this direction. It seems like the Russian authorities are manifesting much less attention to our prisoners of war.

[Gromov] I don't see anything wrong with Russia now being involved in a humanitarian mission like the search for American prisoners of war. But I am surprised that the search for Russians who are missing in action is not being conducted as aggressively. And I can understand Russians, especially the parents of prisoners of war (I often receive their letters) who still have not received any news whatsoever with regard to the fates of their sons. The lists of those who are alive but who do not desire to return home have not even been publicized even though we ought to and should do that.

In my view, the problem consists of the fact that the work for the search for prisoners of war is sporadic and random in nature and is not being directed by a single official organizing center. The interdepartmental commission created several years ago under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has ceased to exist and no one has created a new one. That is largely why a total of 15 people, that is 3-4 people per year, have been released during the time since the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. It's obvious that it's time to put this issue in order and to coordinate the efforts of all of the former republics and to create an interstate organ for this purpose. I remember that the Agreement on the Coordination of the Search and Return of Individuals Who Are Missing in Action in Afghanistan and in Other Countries Where Combat Operations Were Conducted was signed at a meeting of the Commonwealth heads of government and state in Minsk on 28 April 1993. Now the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is faced with developing a mechanism to realize it and henceforth will support in every way possible those departments and social organizations whose activities are directed toward the most rapid return of our prisoners of war.

[Oliynik] One more very painful topic—on the social protection of soldier-internationalists. Despite well-known benefits, many Afghan vets have still not been provided with housing or with proper medical services... Will these problems certainly also be discussed at the conference?

[Gromov] Certainly. There are quite a few problems here. Many issues associated with the award of military ranks and the promotion of servicemen within the service are being resolved at the Ministry of Defense in a personal manner. A special group has been formed to review the letters that are arriving from councils and from officers and warrant officers from the troops. The Russian Federation Presidential Edict "On Measures for the Social Protection of Servicemen, Former Servicemen and Their Family Members" (No. 1,659 dated 28 December 1992), and also the package of "military" laws that have been adopted by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet are facilitating the work. However, we still need to do many things in the context of preparing and issuing sub-law acts in order for the normative acts to start working.

Work continues in other directions. The Legion Interstate Association, that is called upon to direct earned resources to the social protection of servicemen, former servicemen and their family members, has been created. They plan to create a commercial specialized bank and specialized privatization investment funds on behalf of servicemen. The Russian Federation government has been tasked to monitor the realization of this Edict. But how will servicemen utilize the commercial bank if servicemen are prohibited from conducting commercial activities? Obviously, blessed and authoritative explanations are required here.

I also cannot avoid paying attention to this aspect of the problem. As a rule, some organs of power or other, Russian social organizations or interstate organs prepare draft edicts of the Russian Federation President and other legislative organs on the issues of social protection of servicemen, soldier-internationalists, disabled veterans of war, and the families of deceased servicemen. I think that the time has come to resolve the issue on a single state service for the affairs of veterans, disabled veterans and the families of the deceased. The building of a new, in spirit and content, Russian army must be based on the solid confidence of the serviceman that, after completing service or in the event of death or serious injury, both he and his family will be under the reliable protection of the state.

[Oliynik] The Afghan war, of which we were participants, is increasingly moving away from us. The point of view on it is changing with time. But I think that, no matter how many years have passed, those who underwent that severe test cannot forget their deceased friends nor forget what they lived through. Boris Vsevolodovich, do you often recall those years?

[Gromov] They remind me about themselves in some way or other nearly every day. I was in Afghanistan three times and I spent a total of five and a half years there. Right now, I am completing a book about that. While consciously returning to the war years, I become convinced over and over again that it is there that I acquired the truest friends. Unfortunately, not all of them returned home alive. The All-Army Conference of Soldier-Internationalists is one more way to remember the blessed names of those who have fallen in battle. Our Russia was and will always be strong in her devotion to her sons.

#### Deputy Minister Gromov on Ukraine's Nuclear Status

934K1339A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 22, Jun 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with B.V. Gromov, deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, by N. Zhelnorova; place and date not given: "General Gromov"]

[Text] He is an enigmatic person. He never says all that he knows. He is always "out of the frame," but his influence and authority among army men and Afghan veterans are enormous.

#### The Army

[Zhelnorova] Shaposhnikov is advocating a Combined Armed Force (OVS). And you, Boris Vsevolodovich, as Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, are opposed. Truly, a cause for scandal.

[Gromov] Combined armed forces are needed, but now is not the time. First, many states do not have their own armed forces. Whence they have nothing to allocate to the OVS. Second, there are no national military doctrines but there is legislation banning the allocation of a military contingent outside of one's own state and its participation at flash points. There are many other reasons which realistically do not today permit us to have OVS.

Creating the OVS "double quick," we would be forced to rely on ourselves. For it could so happen that, as a result, the entire collective responsibility would lie with Russia alone. We are for the creation of OVS in the transitional period only at a time of threat or war.

[Zhelnorova] Ukraine, it seems, wants to become a nuclear power.

[Gromov] So it seems. All that there was and is now in Ukraine from the former arsenal of the Soviet Army—176 launchers, 43 strategic bombers—the Ukrainians consider their own. And this is not the case. But so be it.

Ukraine's politicians gave written undertakings in Lisbon that they would delegate to Russia all their authority in respect to nuclear weapons, now they are refusing. This could lead to several Chernobyls if the present state of nuclear safety is taken into account.

Even the Ukrainians themselves do not know that several facilities with nuclear munitions are located alongside big cities.

[Zhelnorova] What is to be done?

[Gromov] The negotiations are yielding nothing as yet, but we should continue them and seek compromise. If, on the other hand, we were to help Ukraine, we would be considered in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty inasmuch as Ukraine is a nonnuclear state. And then our assistance would be seen as connivance at the appearance of one more nuclear country.

[Zhelnorova] What is the Russian Army's budget?

[Gromov] Considering the constant increase in inflation, citing a specific figure is impossible, but the budget is not tending to increase (approximately 1.8 million men serve in the Armed Forces at this time).

[Zhelnorova] What is the mood among the troops currently? What do polls indicate?

[Gromov] A year ago these polls showed an indifferent mood on account of the uncertainty—about the troop groupings, about the districts, about the status of the Army. Now much has been determined, and the mood has, naturally, improved. More housing has come to be built, and servicemen's pay has increased considerably.

[Zhelnorova] Why, then, are there so many suicides in the Army? It is monstrous in peacetime losing young men on account of hazing and loutishness.

[Gromov] Mainly for social, economic reasons. Fortunately, the number of suicides has declined threefold in the Russian Army compared with the situation in the former Union Army. Everything here depends on the attitude toward the soldier and officer as a man or as a "cog." It has become somewhat easier for us now. National "showdowns" have ceased in the Army (although area "showdowns" continue). Previously we would bawl out the commanders for the total number of violations. Whoever was more honest in showing them would catch it. The commanders drew their own conclusions: They began to cover up violations. We no longer talk about this now but are tightening the demands on the commanding officers in order that the latter display more concern for their subordinates.

[Zhelnorova] How many generals are there in the Russian Army now?

[Gromov] Incomparably fewer than there were in the Union Army.

[Zhelnorova] The generals build themselves stylish country cottages—at the soldiers' expense?

[Gromov] This should not happen, but if there is theft at a high state level and in the country as a whole, there is such in the Army also, to our shame. I shall not excuse but explain. If a person has no inner "Stop" sign, if he is

not ashamed before people, the inhibitions are removed. Look what palaces are being built out of town along the Rublevsko-Uspenskoye Highway! Whose are they? Not the generals', that is clear. But the generals are building also. Let them, if this is with their own money, in accordance with the law.

### Politics

[Zhelnorova] Afghanistan is a country of narcotics. And our soldiers "indulged" in these potions there and even dealt in it. Officers were involved in this also. And, if we are being logical, the commander in chief, that is, you, also, most likely.

[Gromov] However much filth is spoken about Afghanistan, I have preserved the fondest memories from the five and a half years there.

Of course, in the 40th Army there were drugs and theft and treachery—but in single figures, not as a general phenomenon. Narcotics were purchased from locals: sniffed and smoked, but shipped across the border in large quantities—this can be ruled out. And as far as the combination "Gromov and narcotics" is concerned, we will consider this elementary humor.

[Zhelnorova] You maintain that the best memories are linked for you with Afghanistan. But the war in Afghanistan was for us a disgrace, a kind of aggression! What feelings speak in you: of a soldier or of a citizen?

[Gromov] Both of a soldier and a citizen. We were not fighting the Afghan people. We did not go independently but at the request of officials of Afghanistan—not for aggression but for assistance. It is for this reason, evidently, that the Afghans now have good memories of us, not of someone else. And we knew that when our Army pulled out, a fratricidal war would begin. And it has.

[Zhelnorova] Might not our present events develop according to the Yugoslav version? You have, after all, just been there and seen everything.

[Gromov] They cannot, I believe, the time has passed. Following the country's disintegration, there was no normal division of the Army there. Plus the territorial demands. The Yugoslav experience teaches that nothing can be decided by force, by the stick.

### Character

[Zhelnorova] You are called a man of the command-administrative system: You go unquestioningly to Afghanistan, you come to terms with "service" in the MVD....

[Gromov] I had many "outstanding" teachers. For 18 months there would appear each time before the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program one and the same person, who held a high position in the Army and who "washed" servicemen's brains to strengthen love for Leninism and communism, without which no people would, allegedly, live. Time passed, and now this person says entirely the

opposite. But my values and ideals have remained. As far as the command-administrative system is concerned, I am one of the millions of its representatives.

[Zhelnorova] You commanded Rutskoy and Grachev, now they are your superiors. Is this not offensive? What are your relations with them?

[Gromov] Good, Afghan-veteran relations. Grachev has in the year grown and become a really capable defense minister.

[Zhelnorova] And Rutskoy—as vice president, as a pilot-politician?

[Gromov] As a military man and organizer, I value him highly.

[Zhelnorova] Are his surprise political steps not at odds with his cast of mind?

[Gromov] No, he is a man of whom something decisive could always be expected.

[Zhelnorova] Your political face?

[Gromov] I do not have one. I am resolved to involve myself only in what is authorized me in accordance with my status. And I speak little about politics. I consider myself a person for whom it is necessary to fulfill the Constitution and the laws.

[Zhelnorova] You also, theoretically, could have been vice president, had Ryzhkov won the presidential election. Could you have acted in relation to your running mate in the same way as Rutskoy?

[Gromov] It all depends on the people, on their characters, and I believe that had our “team” been chosen, the situation would have been somewhat different.

[Zhelnorova] If the Communist Party is revived, would you join it?

[Gromov] No. Nor any other either.

[Zhelnorova] Do you have a happy home life?

[Gromov] Yes, I have a fine wife and children.

[Zhelnorova] Do you fear for your children's future?

[Gromov] A total unknown awaits them. I have two twin daughters—they are eight. I have a 13-year-old son, Andrey, and he is just starting to understand what is happening around him. And the oldest, Maksim, is already the father of two small boys.

[Zhelnorova] Who are your friends?

[Gromov] I have enough. They include Kobzon, Rozenbaum, Glazunov, Tsereteli.

[Zhelnorova] Do they also consciously distance themselves from politics?

[Gromov] They are taken up with their work. Glazunov is reviving the Russian Arts Academy, Kobzon fights for morality, helps two children's homes, and supports many people.

[Zhelnorova] What could your soldier's heart not tolerate?

[Gromov] Treachery.

[Zhelnorova] What horrifies you most?

[Gromov] The loss of normal human good sense in people invested with power and one people's hatred of another.

[Zhelnorova] What was the happiest period of your life?

[Gromov] The withdrawal from Afghanistan, I was fortunate enough to have gotten through the war and to have kept people safe—this was our main mission.

[Zhelnorova] Do you have many sins?

[Gromov] I have sins, of course. In 1963 my mother died, in 1964, my elder brother, and I did not say goodbye to them. I was at school in Leningrad, they lived in Saratov. But I was unable to go. This is a sin which will remain with me whole life.

#### **Troops Find Housing Via Private Real Estate Group in St. Petersburg**

93UM0507B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 93 p 4

[Interview with Igor Berezovskiy, general director of the “Nevskiy Prostor” Joint Stock Company, by Valeriy Streltsov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: “Nevskiy Prostor”: Housing for Many”]

[Text] “Nevskiy Prostor” Joint Stock Company, Building 8, Galernyy Proyezd, St. Petersburg—quite a number of letters from servicemen of the Leningrad Region have been coming to this address lately.

People in uniform, learning that they will help get them housing here, are rushing to get an appointment to see Igor Berezovskiy, general director of the joint stock company.

*Igor himself throws up his hands:*

[Berezovskiy] Since we announced the start of implementation of the housing program by “Prostor,” there has been no end to the clients. Very many people without apartments have turned to our joint stock company, particularly officers and warrant officers. If they were from St. Petersburg alone, they would leave the capital. They even come from Nizhniy Novgorod, Murmansk, deep in Russia. But it has not been so simple for many of them to take advantage of the services of “Nevskiy Prostor”...



*Your correspondent initially did not want to interrupt the general director's story with questions. There was something to be heard:*

[Berezovskiy] Obviously, readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA are primarily interested in what our sources are for acquiring apartments. Above all, it is direct purchase and sale of housing that we have been engaged in for some time now and with some success. We have more than 200 apartments of various size that were acquired in this way. Certainly, this is not the only source. In time, construction of housing on our orders using contract organizations will become a primary source.

We direct funds to these purposes through investment of already available capital in highly profitable new technologies and through commercial activities. And this pertains not just to "Nevskiy Prostor" but also to all subdivisions of the holding corporation of which we are a part.

[Streltsov] Are there other sources?

[Berezovskiy] Yes, "Nevskiy Prostor" concludes contracts with single pensioners who have a critical need for material support. By willing their apartment to our company, these people receive a monthly allowance for life. Its amount increases in proportion to the increase in prices. At the same time, we also take care of privatization of his housing.

Incidentally, legally our actions are not much different than guardianship of people needing support as they get old and receiving help from relatives and sometimes simply friends and neighbors. By willing their apartment as an expression of thanks for this, they are actually doing the same legal act which we provide for. The "Blagovest" [Church Bells] Society of the Orthodox Church helps to care for the elderly. As you know, the prestige of the church has been growing lately, and the conscientiousness of people who are sincere believers is widely known. For us, this is sort of a test of honesty. With such a partner, you will not do questionable things... Incidentally, the activities of "Nevskiy Prostor" are still in the "sights" of its founders—the city administration of St. Petersburg, the "Nevskoye" Planning and Design Bureau, and a holding investment company.

[Streltsov] What about prices for housing, most likely they are pretty high?

[Berezovskiy] Our housing prices are by no means exorbitant. We accept any form of payment, as long as it is convenient for the customer: non-cash, cash, lump-sum, annual, monthly, in rubles or convertible currency. In addition, if our business were questionable, it is not likely that the Moscow insurance company LEFKO would have undertaken to insure each of the contracts concluded by a client with "Nevskiy Prostor."

[Streltsov] Well, what if I pose the question in another way. Say, I do not like what you have. How will we part company in this case?

[Berezovskiy] The client has the right of initiative to abrogate the contract before he receives an apartment, for two weeks after submitting a statement of such an intention. He is guaranteed a refund of all investments of personal funds. As far as the funds invested by the Ministry of Defense are concerned, they are also refunded to the organization making the payment (military unit).

[Streltsov] Igor, here we have come to the problem of free financial assistance in the construction and purchase of housing by the Ministry of Defense. Incidentally, we have received quite a few letters to the editor from servicemen whose attempts to become clients, including of your joint stock company, and receive such assistance have been unsuccessful. What is the matter here?

[Berezovskiy] In accordance with the edict of the president of Russia of 21 July of last year and Order No 100 of the minister of defense of 13 August of that same year, those without apartments and those in need of improved housing conditions and who have served 10 year or more are granted free financial assistance for construction of cooperative individual housing. The recently passed Law on the Status of Servicemen confirms and clarified this benefit. But there is one "catch." Servicemen have the right to conclude contracts for construction and acquisition of cooperative housing only with housing construction and housing cooperatives. That is to say, the existing legal and legally binding acts do not take into account the structures that has been formed recently (joint stock companies, limited liability partnerships, and others) and also engaging in housing construction and trade on a par with others. This has proved to be enough that some commanders have imposed a ban on concluding contracts with us.

[Streltsov] And there is no solution?

[Berezovskiy] Why, a solution will always be found. For example, our clients are creating their own housing construction cooperatives or housing cooperatives so they can come to us later on to conclude a contract with "Nevskiy Prostor."

Certainly, servicemen of the Leningrad Military District are in a more favorable position. Here more than 200 of them have become our clients. That cannot be said about other regions where they have been knocking on doors of various levels for months. But the response is the same: "Conclude contracts with a housing construction cooperative." However, the traditional housing construction cooperatives today are collapsing, and none of the existing cooperatives agree to build and sell apartments below the market price, much less at the price we have set.

[Streltsov] Let us hope that these difficulties will be overcome soon. But when can we tell KRASNAYA

ZVEZDA readers about the first lucky persons for whom homes have been built with the help of "Nevskiy Prostor"?

[Berezovskiy] Despite the fact that the first contracts with clients are meant for five years, we hope that there will be results in one and a half to two years. And the first new tenants obviously will share their joy. For the time being, we are waiting to hear from new clients. Our contact telephones in St. Petersburg are: 352-05-69 and 352-05-79.

### **Cabinet Decree on Personal Insurance for Military, Internal Troops**

93UM0507A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Decree of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation, 5 April 1993, No 295, Moscow: "On the Procedure for Mandatory State Personal Insurance of Servicemen, Citizens Called up for Active Duty Training, and Rank-and-File and Supervisory Personnel of Internal Affairs Bodies"]

[Text] To implement the Russian Federation Law on Status of Servicemen of 22 January 1993 and to ensure social protection of servicemen, citizens called up for active duty training, and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies, the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To establish that henceforth until passage of the corresponding legislative acts on mandatory state insurance, servicemen, citizens called up for active duty training, and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies are subject to mandatory personal state insurance in case of death, injury (wound, trauma, contusion), or illness during performance of duty (active duty training) in the manner and on terms specified by this decree.

Mandatory state personal insurance of these individuals is accomplished using funds allocated for this purpose from the republic budget of the Russian Federation to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and other ministries and departments in which military service is provided for by law, and also using funds received based on contracts from ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations. In addition, this insurance of rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies may be accomplished using budget funds of nation-state and administrative-territorial formations.

2. To determine the sums of insurance subject to be paid to officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, female service members, servicemen serving under contract, rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies, and their family members based on salaries for position or for military or special rank

(hereinafter referred to as base pay and allowances) of these service members and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel, and the sums of insurance subject to be paid to servicemen performing military service under the draft, citizens called up for active duty training\*, and their family members—based on the individual amount of wages established by legislation as of the date of the insured event.

3. To establish that the sums of insurance are paid in the following amounts, determined taking into account the provisions of paragraph 2 of this decree:

a) in the event of death of the insured during performance of duty (active duty training) or within one year following discharge from service (active duty training) as a result of wounds, trauma, contusion, injury, or illness that occurred during performance of duty (active duty training)—25 times the base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage) for each family member. Family members having a right to receive the sum of insurance include: the wife (husband) at the time of the insured event in a registered marriage with the insured; the father and mother of the insured; and also his children under the age of 18 years (students under the age of 23 years), or over this age if they became disabled before reaching the age of 18 years;

b) in the event of establishing the disability of the insured during performance of duty (active duty training) or within one year following discharge from service (active military training) as a result of wounds, trauma, contusion, injury, or illness that occurred during performance of duty (active duty training);

for category I disability—75 times the base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage);

for category II disability—50 times base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage);

for category III disability—25 times the base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage);

c) in the event the insured receives a serious wound (contusion, trauma, injury) during performance of duty (active duty training)—10 times the base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage), a slight wound (contusion, trauma, injury)—5 times the base pay and allowances (monthly minimum wage);

d) if a serviceman performing military duty under the draft or a citizen called up for active duty military training is considered unfit to perform further duty (active duty training) for health reasons as a result of a wound, trauma, contusion, injury or illness that occurred during performance of duty (active duty training)—5 times the monthly minimum wage.

Payment of the insured sums specified by this paragraph is made with a deduction of previously paid sums for the same insured event. In so doing, the insured sums are

paid regardless of payments for other types of insurance and payments as reimbursement of damages.

When the insured's death, wound, contusion, injury, or illness occurred during the commission of illegal actions or as a result of alcoholic, narcotic, or toxic intoxication, or self-mutilation, the insured sums are not subject to payment.

4. To establish that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, and other ministries and departments concerned provide mandatory personal insurance for servicemen, citizens called up for active duty training, and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies through the Military Insurance Company, the Russian State Insurance Company, and other insurance organizations.

These ministries and departments shall accomplish measures to implement this decree within one month.

5. To stipulate that to compensate for the expenditures of insurance organizations for providing mandatory state personal insurance for servicemen, citizens called up for active duty training, and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies, funds in the amount of up to 6 percent of the insured sums paid are to be allocated using appropriations stipulated for their payment.

Insurance payments not used in the current year for payment of insured sums are set off against regular payments, and missing funds are paid by the insured.

6. To consider invalid paragraph 4 of Decree No 422 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 23 June 1992 "On Additional Benefits for Servicemen on Active Military Duty on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova and Their Family Members."

To implement this decree on 1 March 1993.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation

#### Footnotes

\*Servicemen, civilians called up for active duty training, and rank-and-file and supervisory personnel of Internal Affairs bodies hereinafter are referred to as the insured.

### CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

#### Mobile Launchers Replacing Silos

93UM0595A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 15 May 93 p 10

[Article by Aleksandr Stukalin, under the rubric: "Russia Is Removing Combat Missiles From Alert": "Mobile Launchers Will Replace the Old Silo-Based Systems"]

[Text] Despite the serious problems with financing of the army and the significant reduction of purchases of combat equipment for its own armed forces, Russia continues to carry out priority programs for their modernization. Yesterday, four strategic missile forces regiments ceased performing alert duty. Forty obsolete types of silo-based missiles were dismantled—instead of them the troops will be equipped with the latest mobile strategic missile launchers.

In accordance with Ministry of Defense plans, 30 SS-11 (RS-10) "UR-100K" intercontinental ballistic missiles and 10 SS-13 (RS-12) missiles that were deployed in four basing regions were removed from the inventory. The first type of delivery system was developed at the beginning of the 1960's and was deployed in 1966-1976. Created to counter the American Minuteman-II, this missile could have exceeded it in a number of the most important specifications and became one of the Soviet "light" missiles that was designed for prolonged storage directly at the combat position in a fueled state in an all-purpose transport-launch canister. At the present time, operation of these combat systems has become unsafe because plant guarantees for missiles of this type expired eight years ago. In the event of new delays, specialists predict possible leaks of super-toxic dimethylhydrazine—the fuel that was loaded into the missiles.

The SS-13, the first Soviet series-produced solid fuel missile, was developed at the end of the 1960's and was deployed in 1969-1970 at a single base near Yoshkar-Ola. The reasons the missile has been removed from combat alert—is obsolescence and exhaustion of guaranteed life.

According to the Russian military department statement, the missile troops will receive the latest "Topol" SS-12M (RS-12M) solid-fueled, mobile missiles to replace the systems that have been removed from the inventory, the deployment of which has been conducted since 1985. Mounted on a wheeled chassis, they have the capability to be relocated within combat alert areas that are significant in size, while remaining invulnerable to an enemy first strike and can literally be launched from the wheels, while being shifted from the transport to combat position in several minutes. Like their predecessors that were described above, "Topol" missiles carry a single warhead. However, while it weighs less, it is three times as accurate and can destroy small targets at maximum range—10,000 kilometers. It is noteworthy that the United States has still not developed intercontinental missiles of a similar class, although their development has been conducted there since the middle 1970's.

The unprecedented, during the last five years, replacement of old missiles with new ones was accompanied by an official commentary of Strategic Missile Forces Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev. The general repeatedly stressed the planned and extremely necessary nature of the replacement and simultaneously rejected any connection of it whatsoever with realization of the not yet ratified Russian-American SALT-II

Treaty. According to a number of experts, the general did not want to contradict either the Russian parliament that considers this agreement to be a "concession to imperialism" or the American Senate which began to review SALT-II at the beginning of this week and in this connection is painstakingly analyzing the Russian side's latest steps in the defense sphere.

It is interesting that the Russian military partially explained its approval to the radical reductions of groundbased strategic missiles by the need to write them off due to significant technological obsolescence. However, recent events have shown that even under conditions of the severe economic situation, Russia seriously intends to maintain the combat capability of its strategic forces.

### CIS: NAVAL FORCES

#### Kasatonov Comments on Black Sea Fleet Situation

93UM0549A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK  
in Russian No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93)  
pp 8-13

[Interview with Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov, first Deputy CinC Navy, by MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent Captain 1st Rank B. Tyurin, occasion, date and place not specified: "Situation Around Black Sea Fleet Remains Complicated"; photo of Kasatonov included]

[Text] *Not just navymen are troubled over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, its problems of today, and its future. The difficult task of preserving combat readiness of Black Sea Fleet forces with disintegration of the USSR as well as the task of defending its interests in preparing for and conducting interstate talks between Russia and Ukraine fell to the lot of Admiral I. V. Kasatonov, former CinC Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. At the editors' request, Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov, now first deputy CinC Navy, answers our correspondent's questions.*

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Comrade Admiral, if you recall, this is not MORSKOY SBORNIK's first attempt to interview you. Our meeting in Sevastopol in August of last year, back when you were CinC Fleet, turned out to be more than brief because of circumstances. Now, having turned over the Fleet to your successor (appointed for the first time, by the way, by agreement between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine), you have begun performing duties as first deputy CinC Navy. The change in surroundings probably facilitated a calmer interpretation of what was occurring in the Fleet. But before asking you a few questions, I would like to pass on to you the thanks expressed by journal readers in letters and meetings for your firm course toward keeping the Black Sea Fleet unified and combat-ready.

[Kasatonov] Many thanks. In the post of CinC Black Sea Fleet I constantly felt support not only of Black Sea Fleet personnel and residents of Sevastopol and Crimea, but

also of the navymen of our other fleets as well as of citizens of the former Soviet Union.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Igor Vladimirovich, the first question from among those most often encountered in the editorial mailbag: "Has Fleet combat readiness managed to be preserved at the requisite level in the very complicated situation which has formed?"

[Kasatonov] It always was difficult to serve in the Fleet, but last year was distinguished by being especially difficult. The Black Sea Fleet accomplished combat training and combat patrol duty missions in a tense situation artificially whipped up by destructive forces. I recall I managed to emphasize at the last meeting that the main detriment to combat readiness was the interruption of our ties with Odessa Military District by such forces. Unfortunately, the people who took over the District as well as those in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense are unfriendly toward the Commonwealth Black Sea Fleet and clearly are taking nationalist positions. They are not interested in preserving mutual understanding and coordination with the Fleet command, and that state of affairs remains to this day. Moreover, in a number of questions they attempt to play the role of overseers of Fleet staffs, formations and units. This is especially manifested toward shore troops: the units of coastal missile and artillery troops, naval infantry, and coast defense.

As a result the Fleet mobilization readiness system and its interworking with maritime and river shipping companies as well as with other Republic organizations and establishments ended up essentially destroyed. But what is most surprising, our own former Fleet counterintelligence and its special departments acted as one of the most actively operating Fleet enemies. They began collecting compromising material on the Fleet command element, formation commanders, and individual officers and were directly opposing us in leadership of formations and units. I say this with all responsibility. They used "their own information channels" for this and attempted to obtain information comprising military secrets in order to be in the picture even for what they are not authorized to know.

The position of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense also was not distinguished by friendliness. This was especially manifested after the Yalta meeting of presidents of Russia and Ukraine when the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, interpreting it as granting comprehensive rights of control over the Black Sea Fleet, began to intervene incompetently in the prerogatives of the CinC Fleet and formation commanders. Obstacles also were put in our way both in performing humanitarian missions and in evacuating the civilian population from the Abkhaz coast. Attempts were made at exerting a mass psychological effect on our servicemen and brainwashing them.

Destruction of the Fleet infrastructure on the coast of Georgia and Abkhazia in the eastern Black Sea also was

added to all the other "negatives." But—and this must be stressed—I constantly sensed that the Black Sea Fleet remained controllable as before, with admirals and officers of the Fleet staff and directorates and formation commanders conforming to their positions, and with the overwhelming majority of officers, warrant officers and the personnel dedicated to the idea of our peoples' unity and ready to defend the homeland. Therefore, despite the situation which formed around the Fleet, it is fully possible to employ it for its operational purpose even now should it be required.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** How do you assess the 1992 Yalta Agreement?

**[Kasatonov]** I believe it is nonstandard in essence. Its implementation will be unique. This probably is the only opportunity under present conditions to establish a Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian Navy, and perhaps even a unified Black Sea Fleet with a joint [obyed-inennoye] command, since only by that method can political stability be preserved in the given region.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** By the way, what is Ukraine doing to establish its naval fleet?

**[Kasatonov]** As the CinC Ukrainian Navy announced in one of his interviews published in the Crimean press in December of last year, it is proposed that the Ukrainian naval fleet be made up of surface ships, submarines, naval aviation and shore troops as well as units of special troops—rear services, naval educational institutions and scientific establishments. With around 100 ships, their numerical strength is expected to be within the range of 40,000 navymen. Even today (as he declared) the command ship Slavutich (a special vessel which was intended for the Northern Fleet) is undergoing trials, the patrol ship Getman Sagaydachnyy is expected to be commissioned, and construction of a Zubr-Class air cushion landing ship is being completed in Feodosiya. The Navy also is expected to be augmented with other patrol and ASW ships and support vessels. The possibility of completion of a guided missile cruiser (Admiral Lobov) and air-capable cruiser (Varyag) for the Ukrainian Navy also is not precluded. Sevastopol has been chosen as the main base, and those ports from Izmail to Mariupol, where there already is an appropriate infrastructure, as basing facilities. At the same time, the commander in chief noted that although their Navy's primary mission is defense of its shores, there also are those areas, including outside the Black Sea, where Ukrainian navymen will have to defend their state's interests in the form of a temporary presence.

True, for now no one is saying whether or not the new state will be able to independently support the functioning of a fleet.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** Igor Vladimirovich! The fact is, it is known that establishing such a fleet—building ships and aircraft, producing other armament, preparing bases, training personnel—requires a large amount of money and, most important, time. Moreover, a large part of the

naval arms nomenclature simply is not being produced in Ukraine. It turns out they can implement their plans only by privatizing the main Black Sea Fleet personnel and assets and also by bringing navymen serving here into their own Navy.

**[Kasatonov]** Yes, that is just what they are doing. It must be said that immediately after formation of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, purposeful efforts began to impose the Ukrainian oath on Black Sea Fleet personnel so as to transfer, as it is now fashionable to say, a large portion under their own jurisdiction on a legitimate basis and divert them from Russia. Incidents even were provoked contributing to destabilization of the Fleet situation for the purpose of its disintegration and seizure of property belonging to it. Suffice it to recall organization of the theft of the SKR-112 to Odessa and seizure of the military commandant's office in Sevastopol.

But the destructive forces did not manage to achieve the main goal, although it is true that a certain small portion of Fleet officers, warrant officers, petty officers and seamen gave in to their brainwashing under pressure of circumstances and took a second oath.

Agreements between Ukraine and Russia made in 1992 also did not bring stabilization in these matters. Without awaiting all political and organizational decisions which were to be made in accordance with them, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense continued to breach the understandings reached, thereby not only complicating problems of today's Black Sea Fleet, but also exacerbating its own difficulties in the legally substantiated, lawful formation of the foundations of its Navy. There are a lot of examples of this.

The process of interworking with the Ukrainian Navy command element (more precisely, with an organizational group formed for the Navy's formation) is extremely strained, difficult and nonconstructive. The Black Sea Fleet staff and other command and control entities (I remind you that in contrast to Ukraine, Russia has not yet established a similar command structure for organizational development of a strictly Russian Black Sea Fleet) presently are literally drowning in the enormous number of various coordinations and agreements with the Ukrainian side, usually on trifles and small points. This very much interferes with normal work, introduces quite unnecessary nervousness and does not serve the common cause of resolving the problems which arise.

In forcing the events, the Ukrainian military leadership took steps just from March through November 1992 to transfer Navy units of central subordination to its jurisdiction in violation of understandings: two Naval Aviation personnel training centers, four air regiments, two higher naval schools, a number of ship repair yards, aircraft repair plants and armament repair plants, the special installation work directorate, a warrant officer school, a test range and oceanarium, a division of support vessels of the scientific research base of the

Ministry of Defense 1st Central Scientific Research Institute, a separate design-technological bureau, as well as the Peschanoye Rest Home and "Sevastopol" Military Tourist Base. Now attempts are being made to resubordinate Black Sea Fleet units to itself as well: its command and control system, four air regiments, a Fleet Air Force training center, an aircraft repair facility, a fuel transshipment point, four naval hospitals, the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Central Polyclinic, two sanitary-and-epidemiologic detachments, officer courses, a junior specialists school and so on.

Thus, of 120 units of central subordination, 97 with a numerical strength of more than 11,000 persons already have gone over to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense jurisdiction. But this number can increase by another 7,390 persons with implementation of present unilateral decisions that have been made to resubordinate units of Fleet subordination. That is how the Ukrainian Navy is acquiring around 20,000 persons at once along with 327 units, subunits, establishments and so on. These are the realities of the present Fleet situation.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** It turns out that there are facts of a direct violation of the moratorium on unilateral actions despite agreements reached in Yalta about a transition period in the Black Sea Fleet up to 1995?

**[Kasatonov]** Yes, indeed. And the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense intends to obtain arms, equipment, and engineering, medical and a number of other kinds of supplies which it does not have for these and other units of its Navy through existing Black Sea Fleet structures, and without coordinating this with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Here is another example. As you know, housing remains one of the sorest questions for Black Sea Fleet personnel, especially in Sevastopol. It has not been resolved completely even today, although of course steps always were being and are being taken now in this direction. Well now, by order of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 1993 housing construction and distribution both for the Ukrainian Navy as well as the Black Sea Fleet, and also approval of lists for occupying it are being made the responsibility of the Ukrainian Navy command. With a ratio of around 500 Ukrainian Navy officers and warrant officers to 21,000 Black Sea Fleet officers and warrant officers, there is no question that situation will engender mistrust and frictions, which can lead to a sharp exacerbation of the Fleet situation or even become the impetus for a social explosion among servicemen.

When I failed to resolve the question myself in the post of CinC Black Sea Fleet, I briefed not only the Navy command, Russian Minister of Defense and CinC CIS Combined Armed Forces, but also the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet about all actions aimed at undermining Fleet combat readiness and about illegal actions of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and also sent protests to the Ukrainian Armed Forces leadership.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** Now you have approached a very important question—the situation among Fleet personnel under present conditions. How is it affecting navymen and their families? How is it reflecting on their performance of official duties?

**[Kasatonov]** The following fundamental circumstances must be noted here.

First is the instability and often also contradictoriness of the political, economic and social situation in the region where Fleet forces are stationed (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova). Black Sea Fleet personnel are personally experiencing all the perniciousness of the break in economic ties which had formed and of the course toward isolation from the Commonwealth. The sharp decline in economic production which occurred in that same Ukraine and in the Crimea in particular was a painful blow to the population and minimized its already low standards of living, including for Fleet servicemen. It is on this soil that social tension is growing in the midst of officers and warrant officers.

Second. Vagueness of the situation on the Fleet's status and on prospects for its existence and development and the delay in making specific decisions psychologically exhausts people and engenders pessimism. This has a negative effect on the on-the-job mood and working ability of no small number of servicemen, and often on entire military collectives.

Unfortunately, the impression is created that practical implementation of the agreements signed by presidents of Russia and Ukraine in Dagomys and Yalta is being deliberately slowed by the Ukrainian side, and its attempt to somehow torpedo the understandings which were reached is even discerned.

Third. The pernicious influence of inter-ethnic conflicts (and the Black Sea Fleet ended up being drawn into them involuntarily), based until most recent times on the territory of the five republics of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, also does not add stability. Moreover, continuance of the Crimean Tatar problem also is having its effect.

Thus, in my view never before in all the 210 years of Black Sea Fleet history have its navymen fallen into such a difficult situation, save perhaps in years of the Revolution and Civil War. It is the more gratifying that the Fleet held out despite this. It is unified, combat-ready and controllable. I can declare with full responsibility that the moral and psychological state of its servicemen throughout my time in this Fleet has been satisfactory. Over 95 percent of officers and warrant officers displayed self-control and staunchness, preserved allegiance to the oath once given and did not give in to promises and persuasions.

At the same time, one cannot fail to note that there has been a general rise in the number of crimes and incidents in the Fleet. Thus, the number of evasions of military service and of AWOL from units rose almost 1.2 times;

the number of cases of state and military property theft increased 1.3 times; there were instances of individual officers being involved in commercial activity; and non-regulation relationships were not eradicated in military collectives. Further, there was a significant decline in officer and warrant officer job activeness, initiative and responsibility in certain units and subunits after repeat taking of the oath. Not having received promised career prospects, many are withdrawing from performing official duties, from supervising personnel, and from educating subordinates. The moral and ethical atmosphere in a number of such collectives is characterized by heightened tension.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** And what is the situation now in units which have gone over to Ukrainian subordination, such as in Sevastopol military schools?

**[Kasatonov]** Unfortunately, it has deteriorated sharply. According to an enormous number of reports coming to me from school officers and cadets, after the schools were subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense last fall, essentially without any resistance on Russia's part, and were consolidated in the so-called "Military Institute of Ukraine," there began an immediate, purposeful, methodical destruction of the cadet training and education system which had formed there. A difficult moral and psychological atmosphere formed in both schools. As the first act the command elements of the schools were replaced by "loyal" personnel. All officers who did not take the Ukrainian military oath were sent before the military medical board for the purpose discharging them to the reserve before January 1993. A monument to V. I. Lenin at the School imeni P. S. Nakhimov was removed from its base and demolished before the eyes of officers, cadets and employees, generating an extremely negative cadet reaction. They tried to do the very same thing at the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School, timing this for the arrival of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, but were rebuffed. Displays telling about Navy combat and day-to-day activities are being removed and destroyed. In that atmosphere the process of degradation of military discipline is strengthening and a split is occurring in school officer collectives. Cadet class attendance has dropped sharply and quality of instruction also has fallen.

First-course cadets who did not wish to take an oath to Ukraine were expelled from the schools. A number of senior course cadets also submitted requests and left for other schools at this same time. And although all were transferred to other (Russian) naval educational institutions and they will not have to part with the dream of becoming navymen, they probably will not succeed for now in receiving the specialty for which many of the boys specifically traveled to Sevastopol.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** Then in your view just what awaits the Black Sea Fleet in the next few years?

**[Kasatonov]** It is difficult to predict the further course of events. There remains a lack of coincidence of a number

of positions taken on Black Sea Fleet problems. But I see positive resolution of its fate along a civilized path built on the firm, legal basis of a solution to all political, military and socioeconomic problems which will satisfy both Russia and Ukraine. And most important, stop forcing people to make a difficult choice and preclude factors contributing to reinforcement of confrontation.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** And the final question. In your view, are the Russian and Ukrainian mass media objectively covering the situation in the Black Sea Fleet, in Sevastopol and in the Crimea as a whole?

**[Kasatonov]** Although both Russian and Ukrainian mass media give our problems constant attention, there is a very, very great deal that remains "outside the picture," as they say. Journalists of the newspapers PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, DEN, MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESSA and certainly KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and our FLAG RODINY have written most promptly and truthfully. Other Russian central press organs have published only fragmentary articles, making no attempt to delve deeply into the essence of events which are occurring. I must say to you that even MORSKOY SBORNIK took a rather long time in sizing up this burning topic. Speaking of the Ukrainian press, lack of objectivity and bias predominated in it, and this was displayed most in the Ukrainian Navy newspaper FLOT UKRAINY, in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense organ NARODNA ARMIYA, and also in the newspaper GOLOS UKRAINY.

In concluding our talk, I wish to sincerely congratulate the editorial collective on the journal's approaching jubilee, its 145th anniversary, and wish further creative successes, especially in prompt, truthful coverage of events occurring today in our state and its Navy.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993

**'TAKR Kuznetsov'**

93UM0549D Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 41-46

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Ye. Privalov with commentary by Vice Admiral A. Gorbunov, Deputy CinC Navy, chief of Navy Combat Training Directorate: "Heavy Air-Capable Cruiser Kuznetsov: Small Problems of a Big Ship"]

[Text] When I finally managed to get to Ura Inlet, station of the air-capable cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuzu Kuznetsov, the first thing I saw there was a file of seamen carrying bags, boxes and other loads to the side of the ship from vehicles standing on shore: provisions were being loaded under the direction of ship senior watch officer Captain 3rd Rank A. Tsekhovskoy.

"What you see is only part of the problems connected with supplying the ship with expendable stores," explained Aleksandr Georgiyevich. "The absence of



heavy equipment, the specifics of the ship's design, and the presence of only one ship crane requires detaching a large number of personnel weekly, which negatively affects their quality of training. And how many other problems arise for the crew and the Fleet in connection with such a ship's arrival?"

It was not difficult to imagine this standing beside the ship, which was overwhelming in her bulk. Seamen scurrying here and there, paint knocked off the side in places, and an empty flight deck—this entire picture involuntarily gave rise to the thought that it was premature to speak now about planned use of the new air-capable cruiser (about which it was initially planned to write the article). As the command element subsequently confirmed, the important thing for the crew today is to rehearse all prescribed measures and introduce the ship to the permanent readiness forces. But it would appear that it will be very, very difficult both for the Northern Fleet and even for the entire Navy to accomplish this task under present conditions...

#### Looking Back

In our view, far from every state can undertake to create a ship of this type, since it requires a developed industry and colossal material costs, which is within the capability only of a great naval power such as Russia has without doubt remained. And this is not a private opinion. The heavy air-capable cruiser (initially named Riga) was laid down at the Nikolayev Black Sea Shipyard Production Association on 1 September 1982. Involved in her creation were 169 ministries and departments and over 3,500 basic enterprises. The ship was on the building ways for over three years and was launched in December 1985 for fitting out afloat. The cruiser began to be "settled" in the fall of 1989. Her first commander was Captain 1st Rank Viktor Stepanovich Yarygin.

Seamen know that the presence of an experienced, cohesive crew is one condition for quality acceptance of a ship from industry, and experience shows that concern for people charged with this very responsible task comes first. This concern must be traced not only in the Fleet or even the entire Navy, but also in the state itself, since the decision to build a warship is made by the government and is a rather complex task.

What it means to be in the first crew and accept a sophisticated, modern ship from industry is known only by people who have gone through new construction.

"This period in the life of a ship is one of the most difficult for officers," said Captain 1st Rank V. Chaplygin, sharing his thoughts. "It means an unaccustomed rhythm of service and separation from base and, of course, from families. Therefore in my opinion those seamen who along with the ship went through all hardships connected with the ship's creation deserve some special distinction. Why not introduce ranks for officers for this period one level above the authorized category or why not raise position pay, for example, by a construction factor?"

Viktor Leonidovich knows what he is talking about. He had occasion to serve on the cruiser from the moment the crew was formed, and in the position of executive officer at that. True, it cannot be said that this ship's navymen were not recognized by the command element and the country's leadership. A number of officers were presented with government awards and promoted ahead of schedule for mastering equipment new for the Navy.

The Kuznetsov became the pride of domestic shipbuilding. The majority of people with whom I spoke emphasized this point. It is the pride that helps them overcome all burdens and adversities which have been connected with service aboard the ship since the day she was begun.

*OUR REFERENCE. The Kuznetsov is intended for giving strategic missile submarines, groupings of surface ships and submarines, and naval missile-armed aircraft combat stability in combat mission areas.*

*Displacement over 55,000 tonnes, length 306 m, beam 71 m, draft 10 m, speed 30 knots, range at economical speed over 8,000 nm.*

*Armament. Aircraft: SU-27K fighter-interceptors, MIG-29K fighters, KA-25 and KA-27 helicopters, and KA-27PS rescue helicopters. Missile: 12 missile system launchers for firing cruise missiles against naval targets; 2 short-range SAM systems. Gun: 6x6 30-mm guns. Endurance 45 days. Seaworthiness unlimited.*

Here is what was written about the ship in the U.S. Navy journal PROCEEDINGS, No. 8, 1988: "Capabilities of ships of this class allow the USSR to support submarine operations. The carrier will provide significant area-control capabilities in the Mediterranean. A distinguishing feature of the ship is the installation of an NTDS on her which is close in characteristics to the U.S. Aegis system."

An event occurred on 1 November 1989 whose significance is difficult to overestimate: for the first time in the Navy's history an SU-27 aircraft flown by Honored Test Pilot of the USSR Viktor Pugachev made a landing on the cruiser's deck. That same day USSR Test Pilot Takhtar Aubakirov took off from the ship for the first time in a MIG-29 aircraft. This completed the lengthy work of thousands on thousands of people. The ship was transferred to the Navy in late 1990 and went on her first interfleet transit in December 1991 with the goal of checking the operation of her machinery and systems under conditions of ocean deployment and lengthy separation from bases. And when the cruiser approached Motovskiy Bay less than three weeks later after having successfully undergone the planned trials, the weather arranged an additional test both for equipment and crew. Because of the wind it was necessary to ride out a storm for an entire 24 hours and only on the following day did the Kuznetsov moor safely at a new berth built especially for her.



### The Cruiser Today

Initially it was planned to outfit the berth with all necessary power for the cruiser's anchorage, but this had not been done by the time the ship arrived. There are several reasons here. It seems to me the main one is financial, and the Navy is incapable of resolving it alone. The most troubling thing here is the fact that the Kuznetsov may repeat the sorry fate of her sisters, the cruisers Kiev and Minsk: because of the unsettled nature of the problem of supplying steam and power, they had to produce it themselves, thereby using up their service life. (These ships subsequently were decommissioned earlier than planned.) The fact is that the outlays necessary in both cases are incommensurate.

It was learned that there was purpose-oriented granting of funds for building a berth, power station and boiler room for the Kuznetsov, but the Fleet was unable to complete what was planned due to economic difficulties. Only a floating landing stage at which the cruiser now is moored was completely built and an adjacent fixed berth was partially built. And the old problem remained: to support vital ship activities it is necessary to constantly "drive" two boilers, thereby using up their service life.

Just how does the command element assess the situation at hand?

"Of course, with the arrival of such a ship in our formation it was necessary to solve many problems," was how Rear Admiral Vladimir Fedorovich Bessonov, formation commander, began the conversation. "The cruiser became the flagship of the squadron as well as of the entire Northern Fleet. Both the CinC Fleet and CinC Navy, who has been aboard her repeatedly, are concerned about her. Our main attention today is given to her.

"The ship began planned rehearsal of combat training missions and the concluding phase of state official testing. But the ship is very complex," continued Vladimir Fedorovich, "the equipment is of a high class (a portion of it has not yet been completely mastered—experimental models are being studied) and there are problems with the crew: morale has dropped. Today it is not very simple to get such a ship going. Nevertheless, officers and warrant officers were found in the Fleet who expressed the desire to go serve aboard the cruiser. Although there are very few of them, they exist. Among them is the commander, Captain 1st Rank Ivan Fedorovich Sanko. Usually in assigning officers to the cruiser we simply have to persuade many of them. It was different with the present commander: he himself applied for the cruiser, and this after a calm, promising position on the Fleet staff. Ivan Fedorovich is a born seaman. He understands what such a large ship means and sees what responsibility he shouldered, for before this he commanded a gun-firing cruiser."

The main task now facing the navymen is to introduce the ship to the permanent readiness forces. Despite the

multitude of unresolved problems, the crew is performing all tasks facing them with reliance on the experience of many specialists. In this sense the last sortie proved especially successful, although many believed that for a number of reasons it would be impossible to conduct certain tests, especially design-flight tests, last year. But industry and the Fleet accommodated each other in this matter. From the moment she was built, counting the last sortie, SU-27K's have taken off from the ship's deck 214 times, MIG-29K's 60 times, SU-25UTG's 34 times, and helicopters more than 900 times, during which time the ship covered more than 37,000 nm. Disintegration of the USSR broke many ties between the Fleet and industrial enterprises, as a result of which deliveries of many kinds of reserve property and materials stopped. And some sophisticated systems and instruments under warranty cannot be completely adjusted inasmuch as they were made in nearby countries. (Major economic and industrial centers ended up there whose potential now is inaccessible to Russia.) This can be said, for example, with respect to the Beysur ship navigation system and the Nord Scientific-Production Association located in Baku.

There also are complaints about other industrial enterprises, especially aircraft equipment manufacturers. It is no secret that aircraft are the ship's main armament, and they are of a new generation for our naval aviation—with a classic take-off and landing formula. But I will not be revealing a military secret if I say that the cruiser presently is armed with them essentially only by tens of percentage points, and this only if all SU-27K and MIG-29K aircraft fabricated as of the present time and capable of taking off and landing on the cruiser are assembled aboard her. She can take only the helicopter fleet aboard at full strength. At the same time, for a number of reasons (degree of ship development; basing location; reduced strength of air regiment personnel, where officers have to perform duties of first-term seamen because of financial and other difficulties) it does not appear possible to bring the cruiser up to full strength in rotary-wing craft. Yes, as we see, the question of aviation remains very complicated for the Kuznetsov. That is what many of those with whom I spoke believed. Trying out new ship equipment under northern conditions is fraught with a certain risk. The crash of an SU-25UTG aircraft late last year serves as sad confirmation of this.

But it is not only the question of equipment deliveries that is acute. Personnel questions, particularly the ship's manning with first-term personnel, whose training in many cases leaves much to be desired, have no less and perhaps even greater importance. It seems to me this proves once more where the policy of relieving certain categories of youth from first-term service led. In my opinion the reduced term of service also does not meet Navy needs, for it is no secret that changing a quarter of the personnel every half year has a negative effect on combat readiness of ships. At the present time around 600 (!) young seamen are undergoing development in the

Kuznetsov's crew. Perhaps it makes sense for state leaders and parliamentarians to heed the Minister of Defense proposal for changing the age of call-up into the Army from 18 to 21 so the Navy can receive educated, skilled specialists.

But even this still will not solve the problem, since there remains the problem of training rank-and-file personnel. The main burden here falls on the shoulders of team leaders and warrant officers, and they are specifically the ones who are lacking: at the present moment around half of these positions are vacant on the ship.

"There are several reasons for this: low ratings, a considerable extent of the area of responsibility, a large number of subordinates, remoteness of the basing location," said Warrant Officer T. Ragimov, sharing his thoughts. "After comparing working conditions and pay of seamen of the Murmansk Shipping Company (and not just of this department) with what they themselves have, some warrant officers submitted requests for discharge to the reserve or for transfer to a new duty station.

"Unfortunately, the lack of social protection and the deteriorating financial position of servicemen prompts many to take such steps. And we all understand that it is easier and more advantageous to save specialists so needed by the country than to train new ones..."

Persons who wished to serve under contract possibly can improve the question of personnel preparedness to some extent, but at the present moment for some reason people are not lining up to draw up contracts. For example, only around 40 persons in the Kuznetsov's crew are serving under contract. Since the first of December of last year this category of servicemen has been paid a monetary remuneration amounting to R7,000-9,000. Is this a lot or a little? In conversing with me, young lads from among those who had not yet decided on their career once and for all named an amount from R30,000 to R70,000 for which they would agree to sign a contract.

The problem of manning personnel afloat with officer cadres also is no less significant, and not just for the ship. The formation commander already spoke about this. Here are a few of its aspects. One is pay. Thus, Captain 3rd Rank A. Dorofey, an excellent officer and a promising specialist, refuses to go study in the Naval Academy inasmuch as he loses the "gifts" earned by difficult work, without which the pay of the officer, a subunit commander of the largest ship in Russia, is equated to the pay of a cleaning woman who works only a few hours a day in a capital establishment. Or here is another example. The position of engineering department head is one of the most troublesome in the Fleet. For example, the Kuznetsov's engineer officer has over 500 persons, hundreds of spaces and thousands of pieces of machinery in his area of responsibility, but his rank category is captain 2nd rank and the pay is approximately R20,000. And this when such a department with its machinery and assemblies is capable of supplying electrical energy and power to a city with a population of over 200,000...

### A Parade of Problems

The ship's last sortie in October of last year highlighted a large number of these problems. Thus, the crew had to "fight" snow while conducting design-flight tests. Under existing instructions, joint efforts of people and equipment must ensure removal of snow 1 cm thick from the flight deck in one hour. Nature "let them down" here, however: snow continued falling and after some time its thickness reached 14 cm. But trials had to be completed, since dozens of ships and aircraft, shore units and subunits, and thousands of people had been put to work in them and millions of rubles had been spent on all this.

"The personnel continued a maximum of efforts and worked essentially nonstop," related cruiser commander Captain 1st Rank Sanko. "We tried to have the ship avoid the flurries, but snowfall intensified. Snow removal equipment was not shut down and the heating system did not prove its value."

Certain design deficiencies also showed up in those days. Unfortunately their unresolved nature hampers maintenance of necessary combat readiness for an air-capable cruiser of such displacement.

*OUR REFERENCE. There are 27 "floors" on the ship on which 3,857 spaces are located. Among them are 387 cabins of four classes, 445 companions [tambur], 370 blower rooms, 134 bunk rooms, 120 storerooms, 50 shower rooms and 6 mess rooms. There are more than 6,000 m of through corridors, the flight deck area is 14,700 m<sup>2</sup>, there are around 12,000 km of lines for everyday and production purposes, 138,000 km of calculated length of electric cables, and over 80,000 m of cross paths [perekhodnyy put]. The anchor chain is 350 m long, weighs 3,200 tonnes, and the caliber of each link, made of steel rod of special strength, is 82 mm and weighs 30 kg.*

The formation commander let me in on a curious detail. It turns out that if, for example, as a comparison the volume of internal spaces of a minesweeper and of the cruiser is divided by the number of personnel, the value obtained for the Kuznetsov would be twelve times larger. The ship's dimensions (even if a person spent only one minute in each space, inspecting the ship would require more than two and a half days of net time!), the number of spaces, and the absence of heavy equipment necessitates, for example, a significant increase in time of field days for caring for the ship's hull and everyday and working spaces, for it takes 25 minutes just for organized removal of garbage! Some officers propose to solve the problem by increasing the number of personnel, but in my view this will entail additional difficulties... The command element sees a solution to the situation in establishing special subunits which would accomplish secondary matters such as servicing, as is the practice in many world navies. By the way, it would be advisable to organize the Kuznetsov's supply by the container method because of the remoteness of basing, difficulty of delivering expendables to the berth, their large volume

and number of descriptions, and absence of her own motor transport equipment.

A step forward in establishing special subunits, such as for cruiser security, is the presence of a security company on the ship.

"The mission of our subunit is to secure especially important spaces of the cruiser where there is special communications gear, the arsenal, and certain battle stations, and to maintain prescribed order," its commander, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Ivanov, told me. "There are more than enough who wish to come serve with us, since in addition to standing a special watch the seamen are constantly engaged in sports, they master techniques of Eastern single combat, and they undergo psychological training."

In my opinion, the experience of establishing such a company deserves a certain amount of attention.

With all the ship's technical sophistication, a number of design deficiencies, especially under northern conditions, are leading to premature aging of the cruiser, corrosion of decks and bulkheads, and disabling of certain instruments, systems and spaces.

"Our library suffered especially heavily from this," Lieutenant V. Panochko, editor of the ship newspaper *POD FLAGOM RODINY*, told me. "Because of low temperatures and high humidity and the absence of special heaters, books began to mold, rot, and warp. They had to be shifted to another space not equipped with special shelves. You know, we have a very rich library put together from acquisitions from many ministries, departments, enterprises and organizations which took part in building the ship."

In the opinion of psychologist Captain 3rd Rank A. Berezyuk, some personnel quarters, especially those situated at the ends of the cruiser, are poorly heated and the temperature in them does not rise above 10-12°.

"The burdens of service on the cruiser also are aggravated by superficial information about the country's life and events occurring in the world," said Aleksandr Petrovich, sharing his thoughts. "Judge for yourself: newspapers and journals come aboard ship with a 2-3 day delay, and *MORSKOY SBORNIK*, which is respected by us, even with a 4-5 month delay. We also were unlucky with television: because of surrounding terrain relief, only the first channel is received aboard ship, and then with heavy interference. The radio, which can be listened to regularly, comes to our aid. Ship television also helps in the work—there is a television set in each bunk room and the blue screen attracts many in hours of evening leisure or on days off."

...Returning to Severomorsk two days later, I encountered one more problem. It was Saturday, a field day was under way, and seamen were removing snow from the berth (for which, in my opinion, it is advisable to assign a tractor). By this time a group of officers and warrant officers who had received the "okay" for going on liberty had assembled here.

Everyone had to get to Severomorsk. The cruiser commander's only jeep-type vehicle could take only three of them. The ship has no other motor transport...

The vehicle had not yet managed to depart when Zil's carrying expendables appeared from behind the turn. Preparation was beginning for the next sortie, which is not getting by without difficulties. But I am sure they will be successfully overcome by the crew like all previous ones. The ship has a great, long life, long and short deployments, and serious combat training ahead of her. But about this another time.

#### Commentary

The author of the article raised an important problem for the Navy—the establishment of our country's first heavy air-capable cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov. Mastery of the modern ship and her systems and armament and creation of a full-fledged basing facility for the cruiser is impossible without purposeful, interconnected, precisely planned work of all Navy directorates and services.

Fulfilling directions of the CinC Navy, in December 1992 the Main Staff of the Navy held a session of the Navy Military-Technical Council, which examined problems facing the ship during completion of state official tests, mastery of the ship, her introduction to the permanent readiness forces, and organization of the entire basing and supply system under present conditions. Many issues raised by the author in the article have been reflected in briefings heard in the Military-Technical Council as well as in the decision adopted based on its results.

But conducting the planned measures with quality and consequently giving specific assistance to the cruiser's crew is possible only on condition of understanding the importance of missions facing the Navy, all interested ministries and departments of military and state structures, and directorates and services of the Navy and especially of the Northern Fleet.

It is difficult to imagine that Russia has no loaders, transporters and other equipment which already today would permit considerably facilitating loading and unloading operations or snow removal at the basing point. The problem concerning transportation of crew members from the duty station to the place of residence and back as well as many other problems facing the ship concerning support of her day-to-day activity also can be solved.

This is possible if greater incentive, initiative and responsibility are shown, which we expect of commanders and officers in charge at all levels. Implementation of the Military-Technical Council decision has been placed under stringent control of the Main Staff of the Navy.

The Kuznetsov really is the country's pride; everything must be done to place her in formation in the shortest possible time and ensure performance of all missions assigned her.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993

**'Official Department'**

**1992 Changes in Russian Navy Ship Order of Battle**

93UM0549B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 20-22

[Unattributed article]

[Text] Despite the great difficulties being experienced by Russian naval shipbuilding following disintegration of the USSR, in the past year of 1992 the Russian Navy and Russian naval units of the Border Guard Troops were augmented by 28 new ships, small combatants and auxiliary vessels. Among them were 5 nuclear powered submarines, 1 diesel-electric submarine, 2 destroyers (Bespokoy-nny and Nastoychivyy), 2 Yakhont-Class coastal minesweepers, 1 Albatros-Class small ASW ship, 1 Zubr-Class small air cushion landing ship, 4 missile craft and 1 landing craft, as well as 3 support vessels. Naval Border Guard personnel received 6 patrol ships and 1 patrol craft from shipbuilders.

At the same time the planned decommissioning from the order of battle of fleets, the Caspian Flotilla and Leningrad Naval Base continued for ships, small combatants and auxiliary vessels which have served prescribed time periods or have not been supported by repairs. During the past year of 1992 they numbered 116: 21 submarines, 62 surface combatants and auxiliary vessels, as well as 33 small combatants.

Among the decommissioned submarines were design projects 670 and 675 nuclear powered missile submarines and their modifications, design projects 659-t and 671 nuclear powered attack submarines, Design Project 651 diesel powered missile submarines and design projects 641 and 633 attack submarines.

Among those removed from the order of battle of fleets were the following first rank ships: Northern Fleet—gun-firing cruiser Murmansk and large ASW ships Admiral Makarov, Admiral Yumashev, Admiral Isachenkov and Marshal Timoshenko; Pacific Fleet—large ASW ships Khabarovsk, Nikolayev and Tashkent.

Decommissioning of certain second rank ships took place in three fleets: Northern Fleet—large ASW ship Soobrazitelnyy and patrol ship Doblestnyy; Pacific Fleet—large ASW ship Sposobnyy and patrol ship Raz-yashchiy; Black Sea Fleet—destroyer Svedushchiy and large landing ship Krymskiy komsomolets.

The largest group numerically among those removed from the order of battle of fleets, the Caspian Flotilla and Leningrad Naval Base consisted of third rank surface combatants as well as small craft. Among the former were the small missile ships Briz and Groza, 8 patrol ships, 13 ocean minesweepers, 3 coastal minesweepers and 5 small ASW ships as well as 15 landing ships. The second group includes 12 harbor minesweepers, 3 gunboats, 3 torpedo boats and 2 landing craft.

Two of the auxiliary vessels and support vessels were decommissioned in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet and one in the Black Sea Fleet.

\*\*\*

The question of forming the ship order of battle of navies of Azerbaijan and Lithuania through the transfer of certain combatant ships and small craft from the Russian Federation Navy was in the decision stage as of the end of 1992. It is planned to transfer eight ships and seven small craft to the Azerbaijani Navy—the patrol ship SKR-16 (Design Project 159-a), coastal minesweepers BT-16, BT-103 and BT-155 (all Design Project 12650), small landing ships MDK-107 (Design Project 771) as well as MDK-36, MDK-37 and MDK-68 (all Design Project 770), missile craft R-173 (Design Project 205-u), gunboats AK-234 and AK-374 (both Design Project 205-p) and AK-55 (Design Project 1400-m), landing craft D-603 (Design Project 1785) and two harbor minesweepers RT-473 and RT-136 (both Design Project 1258).

It was decided to transfer two Design Project 1124 small ASW ships (MPK-44 and MPK-108) as well as two Design Project 206-m torpedo boats (T-117 and T-72) to the Lithuanian Navy from Baltic Fleet forces. Two ships had been transferred to Lithuania as of the beginning of December 1992.

\*\*\*

Renaming of a number of Navy ships, small craft and vessels continued last year. In addition to previously announced change in names of the nuclear powered missile cruisers Kirov, Kalinin, Frunze and Yuriy Andropov to Admiral Ushakov, Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Lazarev and Petr Velikiy respectively, renaming of a large group of submarines, surface combatants, small craft and vessels whose prior names had a direct or indirect relationship with the CPSU or Komsomol also was completed in 1992.

In connection with this the patrol ship Komsomolets Litvy (Baltic Fleet) was renamed Neukrotimyy and the patrol ship Leningradskiy komsomolets (Baltic Fleet) was renamed Legkiy; small missile ships XX-y syezd VLKSM (Pacific Fleet) and Komsomolets Mordovii (Black Sea Fleet) were renamed Iney and Shtil respectively; and ocean minesweepers Kharkovskiy komsomolets and Kurskiy komsomolets (both of the Black Sea Fleet) were renamed Radist and Navodchik.

A large group of nuclear powered and diesel submarines, surface combatants, small craft and vessels which previously had borne names honoring CPSU and Komsomol congresses, anniversaries of the USSR and Great October, and Komsomol organizations of USSR republics, krays, oblasts and cities became "purely numbered."

At the same time, previous names were retained for certain nuclear powered submarines—50 let Komsomol-sku-na-Amure (Pacific Fleet) and Leninet (Northern Fleet); the minesweeper Novgorodskiy komsomolets

(Northern Fleet); and the Black Sea Fleet missile craft Minchurinskiy komsomolets.

#### Assignments

93UM0549B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 20-22

[Unattributed item; photo of Baltin included]

[Text] In accordance with a decision of presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Vice Admiral Eduard Dmitriyevich BALTIN was appointed CinC Black Sea Fleet.

Born 21 December 1936 in Smolensk. Completed Caspian Higher Naval School imeni S. M. Kirov in 1958.

Began service in the Black Sea Fleet in the position of patrol ship torpedo department head. Became group officer of a medium submarine in 1960 and then submarine senior watch officer. After completing the Navy Higher Specialized Officer Classes in 1968 he became executive officer and commander of a diesel submarine. In 1969 he became executive officer and in 1971 commander of a Northern Fleet nuclear powered missile submarine. After completion of the Naval Academy in 1975 he was appointed chief of staff of a nuclear powered submarine formation and was appointed formation commander in 1980 after studying at the General Staff Military Academy. He headed up a submarine flotilla in 1983. From 1987 through 1990 he was first deputy CinC Pacific Fleet. Before being appointed to the position of CinC Black Sea Fleet he headed the chair of Navy operational art at the General Staff Military Academy.

The Hero of the Soviet Union title was conferred on him in 1981.

#### Early Promotions

93UM0549B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 20-22

[List of Russian Federation naval officer promotions]

[Text]

#### CAPTAIN 1ST RANK

ZHDANOV, Anatoliy Pavlovich OBERTINSKIY, Nikolay Valeryevich POMAZAN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHAPLYGIN, Viktor Leonidovich

#### COLONEL

SHAKALOV, Yuriy Mikhaylovich

#### CAPTAIN 2ND RANK

SAMSONOV, Nikolay Ivanovich KHABAROV, Vladimir Vasilyevich

#### LIEUTENANT COLONEL

LASHCHINSKIY, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich

#### CAPTAIN 3RD RANK

BRASTOVSKIY, Dmitriy Borisovich KRUTTSOV, Konstantin Vyacheslavovich KULAKOV, Valeriy Alekseyevich LAMBROZO, Gennadiy Pavlovich

#### CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT

BUT, Andrey Anatolyevich GURYEV, Oleg Alekseyevich LELYANOV, Igor Vyacheslavovich RAKAYEV, Abdulay Izmailovich TUMILOV, Oleg Alekseyevich FEDORUK, Sergey Vasilyevich CHERNOUS, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich

#### CAPTAIN OF MEDICAL SERVICE

PERERVA [Translator note: could be PERERVE], Aleksandr Nikolayevich

November 1992

#### CAPTAIN 1ST RANK

VOYTOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich GLUSHCHENKO, Vasily Nikolayevich POGADAYEV, Vladimir Gennadyevich

#### COLONEL

IVANOV, Mikhail Ivanovich

#### CAPTAIN 2ND RANK

KOLESNIKOV, Gennadiy Isaakovich KULISH, Aleksey Mikhaylovich BURGIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich

#### LIEUTENANT COLONEL

SEREGIN, Mikhail Alekseyevich

#### CAPTAIN 3RD RANK

BOYTSEK, Andrey Vladimirovich GURSKIY, Mikhail Valentinovich KULAGIN, Yuriy Alekseyevich SIDOROV, Andrey Viktorovich

December 1992

#### CAPTAIN 1ST RANK

SAMOKHVALOV, Valeriy Mikhaylovich

#### CAPTAIN 2ND RANK

YAKOVLEV, Ivan Aleksandrovich

#### SENIOR LIEUTENANT

AKHMADULLIN, Aydar Ildusovich

SOBINA [Translator note: could be SOBINYA], Nikolay Mikhaylovich

December 1992

### Collection for Hero's Monument

93UM0549B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 20-22

[Unattributed item: "Monument to Submariner Hero"]

[Text] The Kaliningrad Council of War Veterans and the Marinesko Committee confirm the opening of an account to collect funds for a monument to A. I. MARINESKO which was laid down on A. I. MARINESKO Quay in Kaliningrad (oblast) in 1990.

Funds can be sent or transferred to the following address: 236000, Kaliningrad-100 (oblast), ul. Karla Marksa, d.49, Central Department of Savings Bank No 7329, current account No 1288, with notation: "For MARINESKO monument."

### Information on Russian Higher Naval Schools

93UM0549B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 20-22

[Unattributed item: "Attention School-Leavers!"]

[Text] In connection with the transfer of certain naval schools to the jurisdiction of newly formed sovereign states and with changes which have occurred in specialization of a number of Russian higher naval schools, information about schools preparing specialists for the Russian Navy with their addresses, acceptance rules and training profile will be published in the next issue of the journal.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoj sbornik", 1993

### Solving Problem of Noise in Nuclear Submarines


93UM0549C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 36-40

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Parkhomenko, doctor of technical sciences, professor]

[Text] Concealment is a very important tactical quality of nuclear powered submarines, giving them combat stability and enabling them to employ weapons suddenly. Therefore their entire development history has been accompanied by an acute rivalry between equipment for detecting submarines and the set of diverse measures for reducing their signature. The main efforts of such opposition are concentrated in the area of hydroacoustics, although work also continues for implementing and upgrading methods of detecting submerged submarines by magnetometric, radiometric, optical and other means which identify the effect of submarines on various physical fields. Based on the above, we will limit ourselves here to examining factors affecting the acoustical signature of submarines,<sup>1</sup> especially as we still lag behind U.S. Navy nuclear powered submarines in this parameter. But it must be noted that our specialists have no uniformity of views on the level or magnitude of such a lag. One group of experts believes the noise level of our submarines is comparable with that of American submarines, and another group believes we are lagging significantly. For example, Academician I. D. Spasskiy asserts that our submarines are inferior in noise level to American submarines by tens of times.<sup>2</sup>

The reasons for such a divergence of opinions lie in the difference of the scientific-technical approach in conducting expert evaluations. For the very same reason it is also impossible to acknowledge as indisputable the data cited in material published abroad on a comparison of the dynamics of a reduction in noise level of our nuclear powered submarines and those of the U.S. Navy (Fig. 1).<sup>3</sup>

Fig. 1. Assessment of overall noise emission levels of U.S. Navy and Russian Federation Navy submarines



But the author believes that the actual lag situation corresponds approximately to data shown in this figure.

Our Navy began paying significant attention to questions of lowering physical field levels of submarines and their underwater noise levels above all in the early 1960's. Basic work in this direction was regulated by four government decrees which came out every six years from 1968 on. They supported financing of work in this direction and the involvement of leading scientific institutes, planning organizations, industrial enterprises and naval establishments. While paying due respect to domestic science and industry, whose efforts are creating modern, quiet nuclear powered submarines, it is also impossible not to note the services of navy men. Many associates of the Ministry of Defense 1st Central Scientific Research Institute and of Navy Central Directorates held fundamental positions in defending naval interests: Ya. F. Sharov, V. D. Boyarskiy, N. S. Solomenko, A. V. Avrinskiy, V. N. Burov, M. M. Budayev, N. V. Kapustin, V. L. Petrov, P. F. Tomchuk, V. M. Solovyev, D. A. Gidasov, A. V. Romanenko, O. M. Shamrayev, Yu. V. Timofeyev, V. A. Dobrodeyev, O. N. Maslov, V. V. Reznikov, I. B. Kolton, G. L. Gromak, Yu. V. Molotov, Ye. M. Vasilyev and others. The contribution of now deceased Admiral of the Fleet N. I. Smirnov to increasing the concealment of submarines is especially significant. He was first deputy CinC Navy in that period. The admiral's profound knowledge of the subject and great personal authority also obligated naval officers to keep their knowledge in the area of ship physical fields at a rather high level. At his initiative, questions of noise level were repeatedly examined in the Military-Technical Council and Military Council of the Navy. Problems of ship physical fields also were being intensively worked on in those years in the Naval Academy and Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy in chairs headed by V. B. Yartsev, N. Ya. Lavreychuk, and V. M. Plotnikov, and officer positions were introduced in fleet formations for monitoring the status and fulfillment of measures for keeping ship physical fields within normal range.

The steady drop in our nuclear powered submarines' noise level, not just from design project to design project, but even from ship to ship during series construction, was the main result of the work performed. There were instances where the underwater noise of series nuclear powered submarines turned over in subsequent years managed to be reduced by approximately 6-10 db compared with the noise level of lead submarines, which is noted in writings of foreign specialists.

But even with guaranteed financing of this program, the principal task in noise reduction of our nuclear powered submarines (eliminating the lag in noise level behind U.S. Navy nuclear powered submarines) was unable to be accomplished. This was a result of the fact that not one of the aforementioned decrees (whose positive significance is without question) was fulfilled to the full extent, and following ones were adopted with preceding ones not fulfilled. This led to where submarines were received in the

Navy order of battle that did not meet Navy noise level requirements or these requirements were "refined" by relaxing them, often considerably. Also having a negative effect on work to improve submarines' acoustic signature was the appeal which leading specialists of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry addressed to state leaders in 1984 which substantiated and proposed the establishment of "softer" limits on reducing underwater noise of future submarines. As a result, engineering solutions adopted for Navy ships aimed at reducing noise level still are inferior to American ones.<sup>4</sup>

In the author's opinion, the methodology of noise reduction of our submarines is becoming less and less promising under existing conditions, since its basis contains principles of evolutionary stages with the aim of reaching the U.S. level.

Three stages in reducing underwater noise levels adopted in the Navy can be denoted arbitrarily:

- attainment of given underwater noise levels<sup>5</sup> at slow speeds (6-8 knots) with a limited set of machinery operating to support motion of nuclear powered submarines under steady-state conditions;
- attainment of given underwater noise levels at slow speeds (6-8 knots) with an expanded set of machinery operating to support motion of nuclear powered submarines under nonsteady-state conditions (changing heading and submergence depth, accelerating and decelerating, turning) as well as to support prelaunch preparation of weapons;
- expansion in range of quiet speeds and also control of hydroacoustic field parameters according to a given algorithm in the process of submarine operation.

Work in the first stage both here and in the United States can be considered completed with a certain difference in values of given underwater noise levels. Work in the second and third stages continues, but the Americans began it approximately ten years earlier, with consequences stemming therefrom.

The essence of our adopted noise reduction methodology (along with a gradual improvement in acoustic characteristics at the source) consists of successively covering underwater noise sources of nuclear powered submarines by means of acoustic protection as the sources appear and are identified in spectral characteristics of hydroacoustic fields. The effectiveness of these means is being gradually upgraded and their nomenclature is being built up. That methodology is evolutionary in nature with a pronounced tendency toward saturation.

The physical nature of a hydroacoustic field's formation is such that as its levels drop, the number of "new" sources forming the field grows. After underwater noise of propellers and autonomous turbogenerators (the main noise emitters on first-generation nuclear powered submarines) was reduced, a large number of noises from auxiliary machinery and systems appeared in the underwater noise spectra of subsequent nuclear powered submarine design projects. A subsequent improvement in



their vibration and noise characteristics dictated the appearance of broadband propeller noises as well as "low-intensity sources" of mechanical and hydrodynamic origin and airborne noise in compartments. The ineffectiveness of evolutionizing also lies in the fact that the noise level of sources which were identified as "new ones" in lead submarines far from always can be lowered to requisite values during series construction. Greatest apprehension in this regard presently is caused by vibrations (including combined vibrations) of the outer and pressure hulls of double-hull nuclear powered submarines. If underwater noise directly generated by them plays a determining role in the submarine's aggregate emission, then abatement of this noise may become ineffective not just within the scope of one series or generation of nuclear powered submarines, but even within the framework of our adopted concept for designing submarines.

The presence (even at slow speeds) of a large number of sources of hydroacoustic fields of comparable intensity, where the underwater noise level of each substantially exceeds background levels, is characteristic at the existing stage of reducing the noise level of nuclear powered submarines. The aggregate noise level of such sources ( $L_n$ ) [sic] is determined by the familiar relationship:

$$L_n = L_i + 10 \lg n$$

where  $L_i$  - noise level of each source,  $n$  - number of sources

It follows from this that noise reduction of all sources is necessary in order to reduce noise level to values close to background values, since even a slight reduction in noise of the majority of them can turn out to be ineffective due to preservation of the noise level of remaining sources. For example, if with background noise levels of 60 db nine noise sources out of ten, each with a level of 100 db, are reduced to a level of 50 db, then the tenth source will exceed the background by 40 db. The decrease in overall noise emission here will be 10 db. After noise reduction of the remaining tenth source to 50 db overall noise emission levels will drop by 47 db and will exceed background values by 3 db. In my view this necessitates a revision of our accepted methodology of reducing the noise level of nuclear powered submarines and a revision of its aim.

It is advisable to pose the task of total compensation both of the primary as well as secondary hydroacoustic field as the principal task of the distant future in the area of acoustic concealment of submarines with the aim of "surpassing without catching up to" the most developed countries in this area.

The fundamental possibility of total compensation of the hydroacoustic field by using active vibration and noise suppression methods, theoretically proven by Soviet scientists over two decades ago, can be made the basis of

a final solution to the problem of hydroacoustic concealment of submarines. But active audio signal suppression systems based on fundamental theoretical research have been developed at the present time only in the direction of compensating for sound emitted by individual sources in the low frequency band. Creation of systems for total compensation in cases of practical interest surpasses the capabilities of modern equipment. Therefore work both of a fundamental, exploratory nature as well as of an applied nature should be continued in this area.

The task of the nearer future is to ensure necessary concealment for our submarines in specific operating areas with consideration of hydrology, background characteristics of the environment, operating regimes, and the probable enemy's sonar system capabilities. Given underwater noise levels should be set exclusively by the Navy based on special operational-tactical evaluations. The task can be accomplished within the scope of the aforementioned stages.

Finally, today's pressing task is the most complete and qualitative introduction of all possible noise reduction means and methods on future submarines. This work must be done based on the comprehensive acoustic designing method developed at the initiative and with the involvement of specialists of the Ministry of Defense 1st Central Scientific Research Institute and Navy Central Directorates—L. B. Mitreykin, L. Yu. Khudyakov, B. G. Konstantinov, V. P. Bilashenko, V. A. Dobrodeyev, V. M. Kryltsov, N. A. Neverov and others.

Inasmuch as the most dangerous low-frequency oscillations have the property of encompassing vast areas of ship structures, a search for engineering solutions on the scale of the ship as a whole is necessary above all.

It is impossible not to note that in contrast to ours, all quiet American nuclear powered submarines have a single shaft, low-rpm machinery plant and single-hull architecture.

Already in the early 1960's the acoustic advantage of single-shaft over double-shaft submarines was convincingly proven in the scientific research of associates of the Ministry of Defense 1st Central Scientific Research Institute [and] Navy [Central Directorates] Ya. F. Sharov, V. D. Boyarskiy, A. K. Kvashenkin, A. I. Trilesnik, M. Ya. Pekelnny and others. But "common sense," which affirmed that "it is better to have two legs than one," held up a broad transition to single-shaft submarines for two decades.

The high rpm of our nuclear powered submarine machinery plants is connected first of all with the desire to give them greater full speed. For a long time people did not wish to notice the serious contradictions between the desire "to sail faster than all" and the need "to sail quieter than all," and in case the question was stated as alternatives, preference was given to speed and noise level, although for a long time now it has been necessary to proceed the other way around.



Matters are somewhat more complicated with the number of hulls. Single-hullness in itself is no guarantee of quietness. It is possible to create single-hull submarines that are noisier than double-hull submarines as a result of making acoustically nonoptimal decisions, but such decisions should not be allowed and measures for noise reduction of nuclear powered submarines should be taken with consideration of their architectural merits. The advisability of a transition to single-hull architecture in order to reduce noise level is confirmed by many specialists in the field of ship acoustics, but the transition from double-hull to single-hull nuclear powered submarines signifies a radical break with the entire concept of designing them. The need for this has matured, but the decision is being delayed by conservative designers who are taking advantage of the insufficiently principled position of naval specialists here. The lack of desire to create single-hull submarines is reinforced on a number of grounds: introduction of terminology substituting for concepts (it is proposed to regard submarines with large reserve buoyancy as double-hull and with small reserve buoyancy as single-hull); possibility of accommodating additional acoustic protection between pressure and outer hulls; proposals to increase thickness of outer hull plates, and so on. In this connection it must be noted that the proposed approach to the concept of hull architecture (although it does not impede proof of the advantages of single-hull nuclear powered submarines in noise level at slow speeds) seems unjustifiably simplified, since it does not provide for taking into account [the effect of] combined oscillations of the outer hull and pressure hull on forming the hydroacoustic field. It is more correct to consider submarines whose external lines are formed by the pressure hull for the greater part of their length as single-hull. This concept, which has spread, should be concretized. The single-hull part of U.S. Navy Los Angeles-Class nuclear powered submarines and Ohio-Class missile submarines is approximately 65 percent of their overall length. It is possible to take this figure in the first approximation as a criterion of single-hullness. The possibility of accommodating additional acoustic protection means between the two hulls generates no doubt. The problem is that there are no such means (of necessary nomenclature and effectiveness), none are anticipated in the foreseeable future, and each hull is a powerful additional noise source. Proposals for creating considerably thicker outer hulls are nothing more than an unsubstantiated attempt to create submarines with two pressure hulls.

It is impossible to perform a design evaluation of the effect of hulls on expected hydroacoustic field levels because of the absence of methodologies. The creation of correct methodologies involves conducting acoustic tests of single-hull submarines which we do not have. The solution to this "closed circle" lies in a decision to build a single-hull submarine or at least her self-propelled acoustic model.

Various submarine hull constructions have their merits and shortcomings not connected with noise level. Much

has been written in the foreign press about advantages of double-hull submarines, but under present conditions double-hull nuclear powered submarines have lost, and evidently will not be able to regain, the age-old right to be called "secret ships."

A reduction in underwater noise created by ship machinery is the traditional direction of work for nuclear powered submarine noise reduction. The need for it is obvious if only because quietness is a very important qualitative criterion of power equipment, but to expect us to reduce ship machinery vibration and noise characteristics to world standards would be precipitate, since this involves an increase in production sophistication at machinebuilding enterprises to a level unattainable in the near term. Under these conditions a search for nontraditional methods and technologies for noise reduction of submarine power equipment is especially urgent. A comprehensive approach to designing the acoustic protection of power equipment must become the methods basis of work in this area. Along with a maximum possible improvement in vibration and noise characteristics, this approach envisages the following:

- creation of a balanced set of acoustic protection means encompassing all possible sources of a submarine's underwater noise (not already identified), all vibrational energy propagation paths into the outside medium, and the entire frequency band of its manifestation;
- assurance of supplementary acoustic effect of integration through combined use of means of protection compared with their separate use;
- creation of conditions for the capability of controlling spectral characteristics of the noise level of ships during their operation both by changing parameters of the means of protection as well as by using special manmade emitters.

It appears promising to gang all vibration-active equipment into shock-absorbed field assemblies and units with an optimum reduction in the number of elastic contacts with load-bearing hull structures and a reduction in natural oscillation frequencies in these contacts.

The idea of ganging power equipment, acoustic protection means and hull structures of a nuclear powered submarine into a single low-noise complex can be realized most effectively in the form of a monoblock. One of its most realistic versions was proposed by A. Ya. Alpinyy. That nuclear powered submarine configuration envisages strengthening dynamic interrelationships among all vibration-active elements included in the monoblock; optimizing [the monoblock] according to the minimum noise level criterion using the principle of mutual compensation of oscillations; rationally combining means of vibration isolation and vibration damping with wide use of damping materials at places of greatest concentration of vibrational energy; limiting the number of monoblock contacts with the pressure hull; transferring propeller thrust directly to the monoblock,

which has large mass and low-frequency, flexible isolation from the pressure hull; using effective means for reducing airborne noise in compartments and using methods of active suppression of vibration and noise.

To ensure high effectiveness of vibration isolation (especially when perturbations with a "dense" frequency spectrum are acting on a shock-absorbed vibrational system), by selecting the rigidity characteristics of shock-absorbing mountings one should ensure concentration of the system's natural frequencies of oscillations in local frequency zones with maximum separation of frequencies along the axis.

The external stage of vibration isolators must be mounted where possible in areas of nodal points of load-bearing structure oscillations at base frequencies of sources' perturbing forces. Double-level and double-stage (with an intermediate mass) shock-absorbing mountings must be designed with consideration of optimum effectiveness criteria with respect to the most pronounced signals of given frequencies and with observance of the condition of "cutting off" wave resonances in intermediate supports.

Double-stage shock-absorbing mountings with frequency-tunable intermediate supports must have linear mass, flexural rigidity, and geometrical dimensions which (in combination with rigidity of base shock absorption and intermediate shock absorption) will ensure that antiresonance frequencies of base supports at places where they are mounted to noise-emitting structures (to the submarine hull) coincide with frequencies of main discrete perturbing effects.

To ensure increased effectiveness of the set of means for reducing vibration and noise of ship power equipment, it is advisable to further combine means of vibration isolation and vibration damping with a significant increase in volume of vibration-absorbing coatings (especially in places of greatest concentration of vibrational energy).

Ship acoustic protection must be chosen and integrated with consideration of the fact that effectiveness of the most widespread means of vibration isolation and vibration damping has a tendency to decline with a decrease in frequency. In contrast to this, means and methods of compensating for vibration and noise have an inherent property, very important to practical work, of increased effectiveness with a decrease in frequency of the damped signal. Such means include passive and active vibration dampers, phase synchronization of the operation of nearby machinery, frequency tuning of structures and lines, and active signal damping systems. Unfortunately, these means and methods have not yet found proper application.

Thus, by the mid-1980's, at the expense of great material costs and efforts by scientists, designers and builders, the country created an S&T reserve for successfully solving the problem of a varying reduction in underwater noise levels of our advanced submarines. It is a matter of

creating qualitatively new technologies using the aforementioned proposals. Basic, exploratory and applied work in this area should be elevated to the rank of priority work, and the most qualified cadres of the Russian Academy of Sciences, sectorial institutes, industry, and the Navy should be involved in it with a sufficient amount of appropriations.

#### Footnotes

1. The signature is understood to mean a ship's property of emitting and reflecting energy of physical fields and distorting their parameters, which acquire values differing from background characteristics of the environment (natural and manmade).

2. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 29 November 1992.

3. T. Stefanik, "Strategicheskaya protivolodochnaya voyna i voyenno-morskaya strategiya" [Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy], 1984, Monograph, Izd-vo Instituta issledovaniy v oblasti oborony i razoruzheniya SShA [Defense and Disarmament of USA Research Institute].

4. V. Parkhomenko and Yu. Pelevin, "Features of Acoustic Protection of U.S. Navy Nuclear Powered Submarines," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 7, 1988.

5. Given underwater noise levels are understood to mean Navy requirements. Their essential shortcoming is that requirements are accepted in coordination with industry and are set not so much in the course of operational-tactical assessments as based on industry's capabilities to improve ship acoustic and vibrational characteristics and on foreign achievements in this area; as already noted, the reliability of their assessment remains a subject of disagreement.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993

#### Missile Patrol Boat Designs

93UM0549F Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 66-71

[Article by Ye. I. Yukhnin, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize laureate, former chief designer/chief of USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau, under rubric "Ships of Postwar Design Projects": "Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau Missile Craft"]

[Text] Experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 confirmed the high combat effectiveness of motor torpedo boats in our Navy inventory, achieved because of their high speed, small hull size, high maneuver qualities and good selection of torpedo and antiaircraft machinegun weapons. Therefore development of this type of Soviet Navy combat asset continued after the war, but intensive introduction of radar acquisition equipment to the inventory of world navies also

demanding creation of a new small combatant class which would possess the capability of engaging enemy ships from distances exceeding ranges of its detection. Such ranges of engagement could be ensured at that time only through employment from the small craft of the first models of ship cruise missiles or, as they were then called, guided missile weapons, which appeared in the USSR in those years.

#### **Missile Craft Based on Design Project 183 Motor Torpedo Boats**

RDT&E aimed at creating the first missile craft in our country was begun in the early 1950's and was completed in 1956. First such craft were designed through efforts of specialists of the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry TsKB-5 (subsequently the Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau). Ye. I. Yukhnin was appointed chief designer of the first Soviet missile craft design project and M. A. Zhuravlev was appointed Navy chief observer. Designers chose as a base prototype "for hull and power engineering" the Design Project 183 motor torpedo boat which had given a good account of itself in operation and which had been built in a large series for our Navy since 1949. P. G. Goynkis was chief designer of the Design Project 183 motor torpedo boat.

The absence of analogues which could be used (both in our own as well as foreign naval small craft building) necessitated a considerable amount of RDT&E. At the time designing of the first Soviet missile craft began there were no standards or methodologies for calculating the structures, machinery and armament of small craft having that combat purpose. Problems involving the effect on the craft's hull structures of the operating missile engine gas jet during launch and also involving personnel safety in performing missile launches generated special concern among designers.

Scaled and full-scale tests were conducted at one of the ranges using a specially fabricated midsection of hull and superstructure and of the launcher—prototypes of the future missile craft design—for working out and checking design solutions. Wooden decking on this "mock-up" was protected from the effect of the gas jet by duralumin plates, and the wheelhouse was made of steel.

Launches of weighted missile mock-ups equipped with standard launch engines from this range arrangement showed that wooden structures of the craft hull do not burn or receive damage as a result of the brief effect of the gas jet, but everything in this zone is subjected to dynamic effect, which means it requires additional strength analysis and a minimum presence, where possible, of protruding structural elements, which tests showed create significant drag.

In addition, underdeck spaces, the wheelhouse and the superstructure in which craft personnel are located during missile launch must be reliably protected against a pulse (essentially instantaneous) build-up of pressure at the moment of their launch. As a result, such structural

protection of the hull was created, consisting of a composition made of a strong metallic shell, an elastic cellular plastic (of the sponge rubber type), an air layer and decorative sewing.

It was especially necessary to work on ensuring protection of the human body against the dynamic effect of the pressure differential arising with missile booster operation. For this, tests were carried out on animals, above all rabbits, which are most sensitive to such effects. As a result such a structural protection of spaces managed to be achieved, which together with special gas-deflecting structures (installed on the upper deck behind the launchers for diverting booster gas jets away from the craft) allowed missile craft personnel to get by during missile launches even without helmets with built-in headsets and microphones.

Before the beginning of series construction, two missile craft initially were created which differed slightly from each other. The first sea trials took place in the Black Sea in 1957. The first launch of P-15 antiship cruise missiles especially created for use from small craft was planned for 16 October. Both missile craft were anchored 0.3 nm from each other. Personnel were removed from the craft which performed the missile launch. Missile preparation and launch control system cable runs were transferred to this craft from the other one on floats. Project chief designer Yukhnin directed the tests. But the planned work procedure was interrupted by adverse weather; then the test director together with volunteers—TsKB-5 associates G. V. Kaufman and A. D. Kergeles, chief small craft builder N. I. Martynychev and delivery engineer Buyenkov (unfortunately, the author of these lines did not retain his initials)—transferred to the "firing" craft.

In addition to this group of five testers, experimental animals (rams) were placed on the small craft in the wheelhouse and underdeck work and living spaces. By the way, there were many volunteers who expressed a desire to take a personal part in preparing and conducting the first missile launch from a small craft, but the Navy command and building yard leadership forbade their representatives to be on the tested object during this time.

Although the successful range tests did inspire confidence in success of the launch and its safety for those aboard, some doubt nevertheless remained. A wheelhouse with windows unprotected by armor shields, a light two-ply wooden deck under which testers were located at battle stations, and a missile prepared for launch at a distance of around 1.5 m from the wheelhouse—all this was for the first time!

After necessary preparation the craft weighed anchor, turned to the desired heading and approached the launch point marked on the chart. But the missile launch did not take place this time for reasons independent of the testers, and the maneuver had to be repeated. Finally the first small-craft missile blasted off from the craft's

launcher with a roar and departed toward shore. All calculations were brilliantly confirmed; true, some light structures of the craft and items which were not fastened firmly enough (protective casings, a life raft, some ventilation caps on deck) were blown into the sea by the gas jet.

The small craft's combat capabilities, effectiveness of missiles and reliability of systems servicing them also were checked during the trials. They confirmed the correctness of the chosen course as well as calculations of the craft's small signature, the brief time she was in the zone of fire of the attacked enemy ship, and high probability of destroying the chosen target with the P-15 missile. The success of the experimental missile craft trials became the basis for a decision on the question of building a series of missile craft according to engineering design 183-r.

This design project was approved in August 1957 and provided for using the hull, main systems and arrangements, as well as the power plant of its prototype, the Design Project 183 motor torpedo boat, in their previous form. Changes affected the type and makeup of armament and equipment: two single nontrainable deck torpedo tubes were replaced by two missile hangars with launchers, and a new surface search radar as well as missile control gear were accommodated. Only one of the two twin 25-mm open-type deck guns (2M-3M) with which Design Project 183 motor torpedo boats were equipped (the forward gun) was retained.

Small craft with the new combat tasking were included in the classification of combatant ships and auxiliary vessels of the USSR Navy as "missile" craft. They had the following principal specifications and performance characteristics: standard displacement 66.5 tonnes, full displacement 77.5 tonnes, full speed 38 knots, cruising speed 26 knots, range at cruising speed around 480 nm, and endurance based on stores of water and provisions 5 days. Combat employment was unrestricted with a sea state up to 4.

A total of 112 small craft of Design Project 183-r were built in the USSR at Leningrad and Vladivostok ship-building enterprises beginning in December 1959 and through the end of 1965. Some later were transferred to navies of Warsaw Pact countries and African and Asian

states friendly in those years. It must be emphasized that the first foreign-built small combatants equipped with missile weapons appeared only almost ten years later! And it should not be forgotten that we are obligated for this success above all to specialists of design and planning organizations headed by A. Ya. Bereznyak (for the missile system), V. A. Kucharov (for the search, identification and target tracking radars), and A. A. Moshkov (for prelaunch control and missile launch control instruments), as well as to all those specialists of the Navy and defense sectors of industry directly involved in creating these small craft and their weapons.

#### Design Project 205 Special-Construction Missile Craft and Modifications

The experience of building and operating Design Project 183-r missile craft as well as principles realized in their design permitted shifting to development of a new special-construction missile craft with a stronger makeup of missile armament, increased seaworthiness and qualitatively improved specifications and performance characteristics. TsKB-5 specialists began work along this direction in 1955 after coordination and approval of preliminary specifications for development of the new design project back before the lead first-generation missile craft was commissioned in the Navy. Yukhnin was appointed chief designer and Dmitriyev the Navy observer. Time periods for fulfilling the conceptual and detail designs were set for 1957 and 1958 respectively. Modification of the missile system, which subsequently permitted increasing the missile employment range from 40 to 80 km, was done in parallel, and creation of a new system also was under way.

The Design Project 205 missile craft's hull and power plant were being created with consideration of the possibility of their use both for a new motor torpedo boat as well as for possible modifications. This craft "received" a steel hull with special lines: round-bilge in the forebody and hard-chine in the afterbody. Experience showed that this helped increase their seaworthiness and also enabled using missile weapons with a sea state up to and including 4 without a speed restriction and up to 5 with a speed up to 30 knots.

The Navy's adoption of new M-503 and M-504 high-power diesels contributed considerably to success of

Fig. 1. Plan view of Design Project 183-r missile craft





Fig. 2.



## Key:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| a. Side view   | 10. Companion  |
| b. Plan view of configuration of superstructure spaces with cover in place                                 | 11. P-15 antiship missile system hangar and launcher (aft, port) |
| c. Design drawing of general layout of weapons and technical equipment of Design Project 205 missile craft | 12. Missile prelaunch check station                              |
| 1. AK-230 30-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun system   | 13. Inner bottom   |
| 2. Wheelhouse and charthouse   | 14. After machine room   |
| 3. Whip antenna  | 15. Gas exhaust muffler of main engine (of one of diesels)       |
| 4. Radar antenna   | 16. Engine control station                                       |
| 5. Nixhrom-RR identification radar antenna   | 17. Forward machine room   |
| 6. Rangout radar antenna   | 18. Officers' head   |
| 7. I-ON antenna  | 19. Companion  |
| 8. Induction trunks of forward and after engine rooms  | 20. Fresh water tank   |
| 9. MR-104 radar antenna  | 21. 14-place and 10-place personnel bunk rooms                   |
|  | 22. Shower room and washroom                                     |
|  | 23. Forepeak   |

mission performance. In their principal specifications and performance characteristics and weight-size characteristics, these engines had no equals in those years either among our own or foreign diesels with a similar purpose.

Design Project 205 missile craft were built in a large series from 1957 through 1970. In addition to them, shipyards in Leningrad, Vladivostok and Rybinsk built various design project modifications—205-a, 205-k, 205-e, 205-et, 205-ch, 205-u, 205-m, 205-mr, 205-er—and a number of other missile craft based on Design Project 205. The USSR built a total of over 400 missile craft under these design projects for our Navy as well as for transfer or sale abroad in those years. A certain number of craft were created in small series and even singly as prototypes used for research or for working out new design approaches in practice.

The detail design provided for equipping the missile craft initially with hangar-type launchers, but missile launchers of a new type (container) subsequently began to be installed. There also were provisions for replacing diesels of base types—M-503 and M-504—with more improved modifications—M-503-A and M-504-B.

Missile craft on which the last two types of diesels were installed had the following specifications and performance characteristics respectively: standard displacement 184 tonnes (missile craft with M-504-B diesel) and 172 tonnes (missile craft with M-503-A diesel); full displacement 226 and 209 tonnes; principal hull dimensions—length 37.5 m, beam 7.6 m, draft 3.8 m; full speed 40 and 38.5 knots respectively; range at 30-knot cruising speed 800 nm; endurance 5 days based on stores of provisions and water. There was a crew of 28 and 26 persons respectively.

Missile equipment of the craft included four antiship missile system launchers with fire control system, as well as radars for surface search and for issuing target designations to missile weapons. Gun armament included two twin 30-mm automatic antiaircraft guns and their control systems. Being "closed-type" mounts in design, they permitted employment under conditions of enemy use of mass destruction weapons.

The power plant of Design Project 205 craft and its modifications was triple-shaft. Each propeller shaft was operated by "its own" diesel. The electrical power system of these craft had an overall output of 200 kw and functioned on 220 volt dc. Design Project 205-ch missile craft, where the electrical power system operated on 400 Hz ac, were the exception. The lead Design Project 205 missile craft was commissioned in the Soviet Navy in 1960, just one year after the first Design Project 183-r missile craft was accepted by the Navy.

Soon after this a large group of shipbuilders, above all TsKB-5 specialists, as well as contracting parties were awarded the Lenin Prize for involvement in creating Design Project 205 missile craft. In particular, Design Project 205 chief designer Yukhnin, project deputy chief designer A. P. Gorodyanko, TsKB-5 department chief V.

P. Gusev, chief designers A. Ya. Bereznyak (for the missile system), V. A. Kucharov (for the radars), A. A. Mashkov [sic; previously spelled Moshkov] and D. P. Pavlov (for fire directors), as well as responsible delivery official N. I. Martynychev and Navy chief observer V. V. Dmitriyev were recognized with the Prize.

The wide spread of missile craft here and in countries friendly with us led to where the West also hastily began work to create similar combat assets.

In order to retain leadership in creating missile craft, the Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau began developing a new design project of a small craft codenamed Molniya in 1973 in accordance with a USSR Council of Ministers decree.

#### Design Project 1241 Missile Craft

Missile craft of this design project were supposed to replace their predecessors in the Navy in the 1980's. Development of a new, more advanced antiship system already had been completed for them which did not find an opportunity to be accommodated on Design Project 205 missile craft because of its weight-size characteristics. The new antiship missile was characterized by a long flight range and high cruising speed. This necessitated installing new, more advanced target designation equipment on the antiship missile system platform craft and more effective means of collective protection and self-defense than on Design Project 205 craft.

This craft was developed by a group of specialists headed by project chief designer Yukhnin. Navy observation and control over progress of creating this design project were exercised first by Yu. M. Osipov and later by V. I. Litovskiy. After modification of the Molniya Design Project, these craft began becoming operational with our Navy during 1979-1980, and their export analogues also were built somewhat later.

These missile craft were characterized by a displacement of around 500 tonnes and hull length and beam (maximum) of 56.1 and 10.2 m respectively. They had significant range and endurance and good seaworthiness, which brought them close to fast small-displacement surface ships. They were distinguished from the 205's by the type, makeup and principles of accommodation of combat and technical equipment. The antiship missile system also included four quad container launchers (on each side in the craft's midsection near the superstructure). Based on requirements for providing the most favorable horizontal and vertical angles of fire, a single automatic 76.2-mm gun was mounted in the middle of the forecastle and the 30-mm automatic antiaircraft guns were retained at the stern, but in a new modification. Together with the forward gun, they performed missions of self-defense and destruction of fast airborne targets and unarmored surface targets within range of fire.

Outfitting of the new missile craft with a combination diesel-gas turbine power plant was a difference, and a rather significant one, from Design Project 205 craft.

With the development of full speed, it allowed supporting simultaneous operation of the propeller shaft both by the diesel as well as the turbine. In that version of the choice of power plant type, designers succeeded in reducing specific consumption of diesel fuel by more than a third at economical speed and because of this reducing its requisite reserve and consequently also the amount of full displacement.

Each gas turbine had full power of 12,000 hp and each diesel 4,000 hp, which gave the missile craft a full speed of 40 knots.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993

### 'Laser Against Aircraft'

93UM0549G Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 77-78

[Article by Senior Lieutenant D. Konev]

[Text] The evolution of existing offensive air weapons and the appearance of new ones always necessitated an upgrading of ship air defense and antimissile defense in turn. The loss of a number of British ships to Argentine air attacks in the 1982 Falkland conflict as well as heavy damage received by the U.S. Navy guided missile frigate Stark in the Persian Gulf proved once again the great vulnerability of surface ships to the effect of an air enemy, and the adoption of highly maneuverable, supersonic antiship missiles expected in the near term will make traditional ship air defense even less effective.

In the opinion of specialists, one of the main problems in combating low-signature, low-flying, high-speed targets is to reduce the reaction time of air defense systems by a minimum of three times. This is hampered by the increasing overloads of systems and mechanisms of SAM and attack aircraft systems as well as the considerable reload time. In connection with this it is believed that existing air defense weapons will not be able to oppose advanced cruise missiles and a need will arise to replace them with fundamentally new ones by the end of the current century.

Laser weapons being developed within the framework of the SDI Program by firms of leading foreign countries are one such means. Their positive qualities include insusceptibility to the effect of existing EW assets; the capability of engaging targets essentially instantaneously, with their subsequent destruction; a rapid retargeting capability; short reload time; and small dead space. But they also have inherent deficiencies, one of which is considered to be direct dependence on the state of the atmosphere, which presumes certain specifics of their employment.

Believing that in the future directed-energy weapons will be able to become an effective means of combating supersonic antiship missiles and small, low-flying targets, specialists of TRW (USA) began comprehensive RDT&E to create a high-energy laser for installation on

ships. The destroyer Decatur, earlier brought out of the U.S. Navy reserve to conduct tests of the RAM SAM and new modifications of the Vulcan-Phalanx CIWS, was chosen as the experimental ship. The MIRACLE gas laser being used in the SDI system was adopted as the base model. After working to interface the emitter with the SLBD (Sea Life Beam Director) system, consisting of a mirror 1.5 m in diameter and IR target tracking gear, the firm conducted a number of successful test firings against the Talos SAM. These tests demonstrated the laser beam's capability of "locking on" to targets moving at high speed and causing their structural damage.

Subsequently, in February 1989, a beam from this laser shot down a supersonic Vandal drone. In the course of numerous experiments specialists determined that a beam with a wavelength of one micron was most stable to atmospheric interference. But obtaining such a beam requires high-output power plants, which are planned to be installed on advanced surface ships.

The firm's next development is the HEL (High Energy Laser), which occupies a volume equal to that of a 127-mm gun mount. Its unit of fire is several tens of rounds, which are chemical components including ethylene, hydrogen and high-molecular substances contained in high-strength, sealed volumes. It is believed that storing such components aboard is no more dangerous than storing ammunition. They are inert and will be easy to neutralize if necessary. The laser system's modular design provides for the possibility of its installation on the ship in the course of modernization or refitting. The reserve of components will increase severalfold with modules accommodated in volumes occupied by vertical launchers.

The HEL system is proposed to be used as a self-defense system for combating low-flying antiship missiles in the terminal phase. Its range depends on target flight altitude, state of the atmosphere and the installation's emissive power. The time the beam is fixed on the missile airframe will be from a fraction of a second to several seconds, which is considered sufficient for its destruction. According to preliminary assessments, the cost of engaging one target will be around \$10,000.

The question is being studied of the possibility of interfacing the system with the Aegis system SPY-1D radar installed on Burke-Class guided missile destroyers and Ticonderoga-Class guided missile cruisers. TRW asserts that in the future laser systems will take an intermediate place between the Standard SAM and Vulcan-Phalanx CIWS.

Active work to create laser systems is being carried on by firms of Great Britain, France, FRG and Japan in addition to the United States. Thus, during the 1982 Falkland conflict the British Royal Navy used experimental, low-power, manually trained laser systems on



Sheffield-Class guided missile destroyers and Leander-Class frigates. They were intended for combating low-flying aircraft in the dead space of Sea Wolf and Seacat SAM systems. The beam's effect on an aircraft canopy caused fluorescence and led to temporary blinding of the pilot. At a low flight altitude the danger of falling into the sea forced the pilot to climb sharply and as a result the aircraft entered the envelope of ship air defense weapons. Subsequently a more sophisticated laser system was installed on the guided missile destroyer Coventry, the flagship in the Persian Gulf. According to a statement by a UK Ministry of Defence representative, this system is most effective at ranges up to 1,600 m. Similar systems also are being installed on a number of other British surface ships. Possibilities of their installation on U.S. Navy ships as well are being studied.

Despite the presence of various means and methods of countering laser weapons, American specialists believe that there will be a qualitative leap in methods of naval warfare with their appearance.

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1993

### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Budget, Finance Chief on Social Protection of Servicemen

93UM0473A Moscow *ARMiya in Russian* No 21-22, Nov 92 pp 27-33

[Interview with Lieutenant-General V. Vorobyev, chief, Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense: "A Priority: Social Protection for Servicemen"; date and place not given; first paragraph is *ARMiya* introduction; following the text of the interview is a biographic sketch]

[Text] Questions submitted by the editors of *ARMiya* are answered by the chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

[*ARMiya*] The Directorate you head has been renamed. What changes have there been in the kind of problems with which you deal?

[Vorobyev] The processes occurring in the various areas of the public arena—in politics, economics, the social sphere—are exerting a substantial influence on the resolution of tasks related to the logistical and financial aspects of the Armed Forces, requiring new and unusual approaches. Under these conditions, the activity of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance cannot proceed unchanged.

Our directorate is facing newer and newer tasks, in addition to the previous functions, which are permeated by the "rich market" concept. For example, without the participation of the directorate, there could presently be no resolution of major problems relating to construction

of the Armed Forces and providing the latter with weapons and combat materiel, since everything requires the application of a detailed economic justification. Complications have arisen in our ties to the national economy in the area of supplying the Army and Navy. We are quite concerned about attempts made by certain officials to commercialize the Armed Forces. Or take the problem of the sale of military equipment and property declared surplus as a result of the Army reductions. The directorate in this case is exercising not only a supervisory function, but in addition is quite active in developing the most efficient ways to sell the Army's items of value and how to utilize the resulting revenue.

[*ARMiya*] It would appear that tasks related to providing social protection for Army and Navy personnel have also become more difficult.

[Vorobyev] A glance at just the recent past is sufficient to acquire some idea of the immeasurable extent to which they have become exacerbated. To that I can add that our directorate accords social protection for servicemen priority status. This of course is no accident. The lifting of price controls and effects of inflation necessitate the taking of adequate measures related to raising the pay and pension benefits of all categories of generals, officers, and Army and Navy warrant officers and the making of decisions intended to improve their material well-being. With this in mind, we are constantly occupied with preparing suggestions and drafts of state and other actions and with defending them in the respective agencies. A special aspect of our work is social protection for military personnel on duty in "hot spots." Since those people are located in areas of inter-ethnic conflicts through no fault of their own, they have every right to expect suitable material support for fulfilling the obligations of military service under extreme conditions.

To furnish a graphic illustration of the kind of work our directorate is involved with today, I cite the following example. In the post-war period from 1946 to 1990, Army and Navy pay was increased five times, without encompassing all categories of service personnel; it was increased five times in the present year of 1992 alone. In the recent past, our directorate prepared two or three draft state decisions per year in the area of servicemen's social protection; in the period from October 1991 to the present alone, we have prepared and submitted about 20. That is two drafts per month.

Added to our list of concerns was the incipient privatization, with the governmental decision to issue privatization certificates. Personnel of Russian military units stationed beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, the dependents of officers and warrant officers, and in many cases military personnel serving on Russian soil, do not "fit" into the general picture of the voucher system. We had to set out on an urgent basis to devise a mechanism which would guarantee service personnel—as citizens of Russia—their right to receive certificates.



Also placed onto our agenda were "nontraditional" tasks, such as the organization of work related to state-financed mandatory insurance for service personnel and persons subject to the military obligation and called to training sessions; systematic recomputation of state pensions for "reservists" and "pensioners"; payment of assistance and compensation for children of military personnel and to civilian employees of the Armed Forces; and financing of the withdrawal of Russian troops from East European countries and from neighboring countries.

[ARMIYA] The country's economic situation is extremely difficult. This must exert a definite influence on the budget and on financing of the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, a place for optimism is traditionally reserved in the hearts of Russians. Is this true for military finance specialists as well?

[Vorobyev] Indeed, the financial situation of the Armed Forces is directly dependent upon Russia's state of the economy and budget. If the country is experiencing troubles, the Army cannot fare well. Difficulties in putting together and implementing the republic budget, which constitutes the basis for financing defense expenditures, are constantly felt by the Armed Forces.

Appropriations for all areas were reduced considerably when the 1992 draft military budget was being reviewed and approved. Weapons and military equipment needs were covered only in the amount of 43 percent; NIOKR [scientific research and research and development], 50 percent; the amount for capital construction was cut by 25 percent. Financial needs related to maintaining the Army and Navy were satisfied only in the amount of 86 percent. However, even the amount set aside for the Army and Navy is not made available on a regular basis. The Armed Forces have come to be financed on a monthly basis, that is, at a periodicity observed only during the war years. Many regions are experiencing difficulties with cash. Under these conditions, it is easily seen that the finance service operations are problematic and often quite hectic. Nonetheless, a feeling of optimism still does not leave us.

I can foresee that the reader may have a question: There may be a feeling of optimism, but is it justified? Let me answer that. First, the feeling is based on the certainty that the country will resolve her economic problems, and this not at the expense of combat readiness of her Armed Forces. In this connection, this certainty has nothing to do with passivity or biding our time. Representatives of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance—and this is also something new—are accomplishing a great amount of work in government agencies, in committees and commissions of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. We offer convincing proof with figures right on the spot. And, as a rule, we are met with understanding and support.

[ARMIYA] Pay for military personnel has already been increased several times in 1992. Nonetheless, it is clear

that salaries paid, say, in commercial structures, have for some time far exceeded those of officers.

[Vorobyev] It has become commonplace to compare the pay of military personnel with that paid in commercial structures. However, I believe that that is not the kind of criterion that should be applied. We cannot divorce ourselves from the realities of our ailing economy. All the more since the significance of those persons employed in flourishing commercial structures is negligible compared to the total number of employed persons in Russia. However, in most foreign countries there are individual segments of the population earning high and extremely high incomes, ones considerably greater than the pay of military personnel. That is natural.

There is no doubt that what we must aim for today is providing a material basis for servicemen that would guarantee them and their dependents a decent standard of living, promote the prestige of military service, and make it possible to supply the Armed Forces with highly qualified cadre. It is unfortunate that even the 14 October 1992 decision to provide a 1.5-fold increase in military pay (a measure which incidentally met considerable opposition in certain government structures) did not resolve the problem. The continuing rise in prices and incomes of a considerable portion of the population, especially persons employed in material production, did nothing to improve the servicemen's situation with respect to many categories of citizens.

In a word, a situation in which a train conductor, meat combine worker, or postal service employee earns more than an officer, say, a platoon leader—and this is today's reality—cannot be considered normal. There are already signs in the area of incentives for military service indicating that all is not well here. Of the total number of officers discharged in the first half of this year, more than 40 percent were persons under the age of 30. In a number of VUZ's, especially those of the Air Forces and Rocket Forces, there were almost not enough candidates to compete for admission, in spite of the reduction in number of military schools and total amount of students. This kind of situation can lead in the near future to deterioration in level of professionalism of officer cadre, with an eventual negative impact on the country's defensive capability.

Nonetheless, even under the above conditions, we are optimistic in our approach. We are making a thorough analysis of the situation and the changes associated with it. The directorate has compiled a list of suggestions, which we intend to implement assiduously. Foremost here is providing incentives for attaining mastery in military skills by increasing the amounts of payments, such as for high efficiency ratings.

[ARMIYA] Every pay increase for military personnel implemented in accordance with an edict of the Russian President drew lively responses, including negative ones, from the news media. Why do we not adopt the practice

of many civilized countries of automatically indexing military pay to rises in prices and inflation?

[Vorobyev] You are right when you say that indexing, or, in other words, effecting automatic increases in pay for military labor as a function of growth in the country's consumer price index, would make it possible for us to react more responsively in resolving the problem of servicemen's social protection and allow us to dispense with the difficult task of securing in the various government structures agreement on compensatory increases in pay. That most likely will come about. For the time being, however, we must live by the general rules set for the country. In accordance with Russian Presidential Edict of 18 December 1991, the indexing of incomes of workers in budgetary institutions and organizations, including military personnel, is as of this year to be effected by subjecting to periodic pay review, on the basis of the consumer price index and salaries earned by industrial workers.

Concerning the other part of the question—relative to media remarks—the overwhelming majority are positive. In my view, a negative remark is traceable to people's lack of information on matters of servicemen's material well-being, something which we are attempting to correct. There are all-out attacks, also, of course. They must be dealt with in a suitable manner.

[ARMIYA] What kind of pension benefits will there be for officers and warrant officers who complete their service in the Russian Armed Forces, but take up residence in another CIS state, say Ukraine, where they still have housing? Actually, the heads of the CIS states have already signed a pertinent agreement, but what is being done in practice?

[Vorobyev] Indeed, matters of military pensions were addressed by the signing—by CIS state heads on 15 May of this year in Tashkent—of an agreement calling for each state entering into the agreement to provide social security to Armed Forces servicemen of the former USSR and of CIS member states residing on the soil of each state, in addition to providing pension benefits to armed forces personnel and their dependents of the respective state, with the costs of payments to be paid out of that state's budget. In this connection, pensions for military personnel and their dependents are to be set and paid in accordance with the terms, procedure, and at the rates presently in effect or to be implemented in the future via legislation passed by the respective CIS member state. For example, pension benefits for military personnel and their dependents who move from Russia to take up residence in Ukraine are to be provided in accordance with legislation in effect in Ukraine and at the expense of the latter's budget. In case a pensioner after serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces decides to retire in Russia, he is to draw his pension in accordance with Russian laws and be paid out of Russia's budget.

That is how it should be. And I must say that the agreement is being honored by all the signers. We have received no

appeals or complaints from pensioners regarding the granting or interruption of pension payments.

In this connection, problems have arisen relative to pensions for persons residing in "hot spots." However, even in those difficult situations we are seeking to effect coordinated solutions for assurance of social protection for Army veterans and their dependents. In the case of matters of pension provision for military pensioners in states of the former USSR which did not become a party to the abovementioned signing, the plan is to find solutions on the basis of bilateral agreements. Drafts of such agreements have been prepared for effectuation with the Baltic states and Georgia.

[ARMIYA] Transportation costs are very high. Officers frequently must undergo a change of duty station. This adds to a family's expense budget. Is there something new in the way of paying the costs military servicemen bear when they transfer to their new post?

[Vorobyev] A change of residence is a serious problem for any person. There is a reason why people as a whole equate this with a natural calamity. A person simply cannot escape incurring additional expenses. But how large are these outlays? The increase in costs of transportation services was a factor in this past June's decision to grant military personnel transferred in line of duty additional benefits.

The rule here is that the transportation of household property of officers, warrant officers, and men in extended service to their new duty station, in the case of a family consisting up to and including three persons, is covered for hauling the property in a five-tonne container; if the family is larger, the entitlement is for two five-tonne containers. A new benefit is coverage of the serviceman's property transfer from his living quarters to his point of departure, and from his point of arrival to his living quarters.

We see unresolved problems in this area. The existing practice of the state's paying for transportation of the serviceman's personal property on the basis of size of family alone does not make for flexible handling of all situations encountered in real life. For example, an officer who has served in the Army 25 years and longer and a recent graduate of a military school who has a family of the same size are both entitled to the same privileges of personal property transportation. This in spite of the fact that the person in the first case has devoted the greater part of his life to the service and has accumulated quite an amount of property, while the person in the second case is just entering the service with "only two suitcases," so to speak. For this reason, military personnel of the older generation having a family no larger than three persons (since grown children have left home) and slated for transfer to a new duty station are each time facing a dilemma: What to do with property which "does not fit" into the five-ton container provided for by the norm? Present transportation costs being what they are, there is no easy solution to this

problem. This question is being taken up; we hope to resolve it in the near future, with the help of government agencies.

[ARMIYA] One of the most pressing social problems facing the Armed Forces, the same as before, is that of housing. Are there any plans to relieve the expense burden borne by military personnel who are forced under these conditions to resort to private rentals?

[Vorobyev] That is quite a burning question. With the considerable price rises taking place in the country, including those of housing rental, the existing housing allowances for military personnel (150 to 350 rubles, depending upon the area and family size) have virtually ceased to cover the extra costs. The going rental rate in Moscow for a two-room apartment, according to a large number of advertisements, is on the order of 5,000 to 8,000 rubles a month. The situation is similar in St. Petersburg. Analysis indicates that rentals in other regions vary from 600 rubles in remote areas to 3,000 rubles in other populated places. The result is that housing costs military personnel as much as half their pay and even more.

Other countries approach this problem by having the state pay the greater amount of the rental cost. In the USA, the housing allowance amounts to more than 60 percent of the rental fee. To provide social protection in this, the area of most vulnerability for military personnel, we have drawn up suggestions calling for a five- to six-fold increase in housing allowance. The proposed amounts may not cover all rental expenses incurred by military personnel, but they will in some measure facilitate the burden borne by officers and warrant officers who have no housing.

[ARMIYA] The Russian military delegation that recently made a trip to the USA included a military finance specialist. What was the gain here as far as the directorate you head is concerned?

[Vorobyev] For us, the study of foreign military experience always has a practical purpose. The representative of our directorate, who was my first deputy, Major General V. N. Kuznetsov, was assigned the mission of acquiring a familiarity with the compilation and implementation of the USA's military budget, how financing of troops is organized, and the procedure followed to provide military personnel with their material needs. Also of considerable interest to us is the rich experience gained by the USA's Armed Forces in filling the manpower needs on a contractual basis. V. N. Kuznetsov shared the information he acquired and impressions he formed during his trip with leadership personnel and by speaking before directorate personnel. There is no doubt that the results of the visit will contribute to an effective solution to our problems.

[ARMIYA] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, you have been appointed deputy chairman of the Central Commission

of the Ministry of Defense for Issuance of Privatization Certificates (Vouchers). With what kinds of functions is this commission charged?

[Vorobyev] I would say that a major function would be the issuing of privatization certificates to military personnel on duty beyond the borders of the Russian Republic. The point here is that, for well-known reasons, local authority agencies in those areas will not create territorial commissions that would manage issuance of the certificates. Even savings banks in foreign countries—those located nearby and those more distant—cannot be charged with this kind of work. We did not find it feasible to tie military units stationed outside of Russia to Russian Federation territorial commissions, due to the considerable remoteness of those areas.

Under the above conditions, we decided to create our own territorial commissions in groups of forces and in individual large strategic formations, large units, and units of the Russian Army stationed in nearby countries. The Central Commission of the Ministry of Defense was set up to manage the activity of the aforementioned commissions and effect coordination with the Coordinating Council for Implementing the Privatization Certificate System at the Russian Federation government.

The commission is charged with determining needs for certificates of troops stationed outside the country, organizing the receipt of vouchers and their distribution in the respective areas, and rendering troops practical assistance in resolving these and other problems.

[ARMIYA] Please tell us how your directorate is guided by the mood of line officers. How do you find satisfaction in your work?

[Vorobyev] The mood of officers is a sensitive barometer, one which provides an objective indication of the results of our work. If the mood in the Army is good, we also are satisfied, since this means that our work is not for naught. I have always resented statements to the effect that finance specialists have it easy, since they do not become involved with people. In reality, it is finance service officers who are very much in the Army environment, in the thick of things, since they more than anyone else are sensitive to the moods of people, and the material well-being of military personnel is greatly dependent upon their efforts.

I find satisfaction in my work, even though this may be in achieving small victories in the struggle for fairness, for protecting the individual and his interests. I derive pleasure when I see and hear about successes enjoyed by subordinates, especially those whom I have selected, trained, and nurtured, without my suffering any regrets. I experience a bitter feeling when someone does not make the grade.

I, as a professional in financing, in addition cannot but help experience a feeling of deep satisfaction when we stop some kind of swindle in its tracks, eliminate poor

management and waste, and return to the state large sums of money which may otherwise be lost.

[ARMIYA] How did you become a worker in military finance agencies? Was this due to fate, chance, or an objective decision on your part?

[Vorobyev] As is the case in large families, I started to work at an early age. I worked at a plant as a carpenter and studied evenings. Co-workers would often say to me, "Go join the Army, Vasily. You will be able to make something of yourself there." In the military commissariat I learned that there was a military school that trained students to be officers who perform army logistics. I became interested. I saw in my youthful mind's eye a picture of myself supplying troops with tanks and other military equipment. Upon arriving in Yaroslavl, I saw that this was not to be, but I did not change my mind. I started my studies. I increasingly came to the realization, during my training tours of duty in line units, that the Army needs this kind of person. My liking for my chosen specialty grew during the early years of my commission, as I performed my duties in regiment, the division. I never regretted my decision.

That is how I became a military finance specialist. After more than 20 years of service in remote districts, especially in Siberia and the Far East, working in the midst of troops, I believe that I chose a life's work that is not easy, but one that is worthy.

[ARMIYA] What personal qualities do you value above all?

[Vorobyev] Honesty and steadfastness. I also admire people who possess competence, a sense of principle, and a fighter's instincts. I am favorably impressed by a person who shows respect for his subordinates and other persons with whom he comes into contact. Of professional qualities of military finance specialists, especially those serving in an inspector's capacity, most important to me are honesty and genuineness in relationships. A finance service officer lacking these cannot be successful.

[ARMIYA] Vasily Vasilyevich, everyone can see how busy you are in these difficult times. From whom—perhaps your family—or from what—something other than your work—do you draw your strength?

[Vorobyev] I draw strength primarily from the results of my work. I become especially quickly refreshed when I complete some large task in advancing the material well-being of military personnel and their dependents, of military pensioners. Even a small success exerts a beneficial effect on me. This may be an increase in pay for perhaps a small group of military personnel, or the resolution of some long-standing problem that in some manner affects people. In our work there definitely cannot be any other way, since we are working for the benefit of specific kinds of people, with their morale and protection dependent upon our efforts.

The wife and children do help, of course. Then there are activities I do for relaxation. I collect books on cities I have visited; incidentally, during my frequent transfers and tours of temporary duty I have amassed quite a few. I also collect coins, purely as an amateur.

[ARMIYA] It happens that children follow in the father's footsteps. What have your children decided or plan to do as their life's work?

[Vorobyev] My son did not hesitate in making his choice. He decided to become an officer. He must have become conditioned to my serving so long on posts and going on frequent trips. It was his intent to enroll in our finance school. I found it necessary to convince him that it was not a good idea to serve under his father. We finally agreed on a solution: My son is in his second year of study at the military institute; he intends to become a jurist. Our specialties are similar in many ways.

My daughter graduated from university with the specialty of philologist; she is married.

#### Biographic Sketch

Vasily Vasilyevich Vorobyev was born on 11 May 1946 into a worker's family in the settlement of Gidrotorf, Balakhinskiy Rayon, Gorky Oblast. He is Russian.

He started work as a carpenter, attending evening classes in a public school.

He acquired his military finance specialty by completing the Yaroslavl Military School imeni Army General A. V. Khrulev (in 1966, with distinction and name entry onto the school's board of honor), and the correspondence section of the Military Department, Moscow Finance Institute (in 1974).

Since 1966 he served in line units of the Siberian Military District in the following capacities: large unit staff, chief of finance section; regimental finance service chief; inspector-auditor; large unit finance service chief; district finance service senior officer. From 1979 he was large strategic unit finance service chief in the DVO [Far Eastern Military District]. From 1982 his tour was as chief of inspections and deputy chief for finance of the YuGB [Southern Group of Forces]. From 1986 he served as finance service chief of the UrMO [Ural Military District], and in 1987 he became finance service chief of the DVO. In 1990 he took over the post of first deputy chief of the TsFU [Central Finance Directorate]. In 1991 he was designated chief of the TsFU.

Promoted to major general in 1990; assumed the rank of lieutenant general in 1991.

His family consists of a wife, Alla Pavlovna; a daughter, Marina; and a son, Pavel.

COPYRIGHT: "Armiya", 1992

**MoD Nonreimbursable Funds for Housing**

93UM0597A Moscow *FEDERATSIYA in Russian*  
No 59, 29 May 93 (Signed to press 28 May 93) p 2

[Interview with Col Vyacheslav Kritskiy, deputy section chief of the Main Directorate of the Military Budget and Financing of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, by Anatoliy Yurkin under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Uncle Officer's Hut"]

[Text] Many officers are faced with the choice of waiting in line for an apartment, and the line is growing like a snowball, or solving their housing problem on their own. The most energetic of them prefer an apartment in a cooperative or their own house. Their numbers are growing, and each of them faces the problem of obtaining the money. This pressing issue stands out distinctly in letters to various levels of authority, including the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense.

At the request of our editorial board Col Vyacheslav Kritskiy, a Deputy Department Chief of the Main Directorate of Military Budget and Finance of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, comments on these letters.

[Kritskiy] We receive a great many letters about housing, and problems of financing are especially acute. This is due to the fact that many officers, the vast majority, do not have even minimal savings, and it takes a lot of moneys to build a house or a cooperative apartment. Predominant in the mail are questions about who can obtain a bank loan and under what terms, how soon the loan has to be repaid and how much can be borrowed. Finally, we have the common situation in which an officer has an apartment at the garrison but wants to build a house—in a different area, though. And there are those who want to join a housing construction cooperative, but only in Ukraine or in some other Commonwealth state.

[Yurkin] This is truly a broad subject, but let us begin with the legal aspect. What are the basic documents, and where can an officer familiarize himself with them?

[Kritskiy] The basic document as of right now is Order No. 100 signed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation on 13 August 1992. Its complete title is "On Additional Measures to Finance the Construction or Acquisition of Housing for Military Personnel." Any officer can see it at unit headquarters. If this is not possible, a consultation can be arranged with military specialists and finance workers. Attached to the order are instructions on the procedure for providing nonrepayable financial assistance to servicemen to pay for cooperative housing or to pay off a bank loan obtained to build a house. One should also bear in mind the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Status of Military Personnel," which increases the standard amounts of non-repayable financial assistance and also enlarges the group of individuals entitled to receive such assistance from the Ministry of Defense.

[Yurkin] Who specifically has a right to such assistance? Does the law you mentioned stipulate limitations: length of service, for example, or how well that service was performed, let us say?

[Kritskiy] There are limitations of this kind. The order stresses the fact that nonrepayable financial assistance is available only for officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and extended-duty personnel with a length of continuous service of 10 years or more by the calendar. In addition, that service must have been irreplaceable. This benefit is available only for servicemen who conscientiously perform their service duties and who have no infractions of military discipline.

[Yurkin] In order to obtain assistance a serviceman must be in good standing. What specific benefits can he count on?

[Kritskiy] At the present time considerable benefits are available to him: 75 percent, and with a length of service of 25 or more years, 100 percent of the cost of cooperative housing or of a bank loan obtained to build a house, plus interest on the loan. These are considerable amounts at current prices for construction materials and the work.

[Yurkin] You have named the documents defining the procedure for providing nonrepayable financial assistance. It would appear that everything necessary to take advantage of this benefit is in place. Why, then, are so many letters on this matter written to the mass media and administrative structures?

[Kritskiy] There are several causes. In the first place, not enough explanatory work is performed in this area, and many servicemen are incapable of using the governing documents on their own. For example, a significant part of the letters ask the simple question: How do I obtain this assistance? This is of interest to all of them, but instead of reading the order or the instructions, by long-standing tradition they write a letter, assuming that Moscow can provide them with the answers to all the questions of concern to them. Not everything can be seen from the capital, however. It is with good reason that the unit commander is charged with deciding whether non-repayable assistance should be provided. He in turn carefully studies the documents and considers the conclusions of the housing commission. I would mention the fact that, unfortunately, some commanders and officers in charge are not clear on the authority granted them. Particularly of late, when housing costs amount to millions of rubles. This is the second cause of the avalanche of paperwork.

A third cause involves changes in the nation's economic life. Many letters, for example, come from servicemen who sign direct contracts with various commercial organizations involved in housing construction or intermediary operations in this area. Since in this case the serviceman has not actually joined a housing construction (or housing) cooperative or obtained a bank loan to

build a private home, there is no basis for extending financial assistance to the individual.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that Edict No. 796 issued to the Ministry of Defense by the President of the Russian Federation on 21 July 1992 authorizes the purchase of an apartment for a servicemen on the housing market with funds **allocated for capital construction and acquired from the sale of technical military equipment**. Therefore, before solving his housing problem in any way other than joining a cooperative and obtaining a loan for individual housing construction, the serviceman should first determine the possibility of obtaining credit from the Ministry of Defense. Otherwise, experience has shown, problems frequently develop.

[Yurkin] What role is assigned to the housing commissions in determining the expediency of extending financial assistance, when the commander makes the final decision? Is this not just obeisance to trend in the situation of democratization of our lives?

[Kritskiy] No, it is not. The housing commission in fact not only studies the documents submitted to it but also analyzes the situation. Such is the importance of providing servicemen with housing, its quality, the need for better housing and so forth. Questions also arise when it

comes to reassigning housing at a garrison when servicemen who already have an apartment acquire a private home. Conflicts are frequent, and this generates a flood of complaints to various levels of authority. Only after considering all of the factors does the commander make his decision and issue an order indicating the amount of the nonrepayable financial assistance. Participation by the general public in the discussion of the acute housing problem guarantees that there will be no abuses, which are not ruled out when everything is done on the quiet, contrary to the established rules.

[Yurkin] I have another question. Let us say that an officer has obtained financial assistance, built his own grand home, and the service has now become a thing of secondary importance to him. That possibility is also not ruled out. Are there any monetary measures which can be applied to such ingrates?

[Kritskiy] The order issued by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation stresses the fact that assistance is extended to those who serve irreproachably. And this is taken into account by the commander and members of the housing commission. Anything can happen in life, however, and it is therefore stipulated that if a servicemen is discharged from the armed forces of the Russian Federation for conduct unbecoming to a serviceman, he is expected to repay any financial assistance he has received on a nonrepayable basis.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Armenian Advantage in Nagorno-Karabakh Seen

93UM0603A Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL  
in English No 18, Apr 93 pp 6-8

[Article by Aleksandr Iskandaryan: "Nagorny Karabakh: More Stimuli for War Than for Peace"]

[Text] By the beginning of April, the offensive undertaken by the army in Nagorny Karabakh in the Kelbajar District of Azerbaijan had ended in its complete occupation. During the five-year history of the conflict, it was perhaps the biggest operation carried out by the Armenian troops of Karabakh, which Armenians call affectionately "self-defence forces." During this operation Karabakh once again demonstrated to Azerbaijan that it has one of the most battleworthy armies on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

#### Time and Place

The Kelbajar District lies between Armenia and Karabakh. Its area (over 1,000 sq km) is a third of that of Nagorny Karabakh. In May 1992, Armenian troops seized the "Lachin corridor," which links Karabakh with Armenia. After that Kelbajar retained only one, northern border with Azerbaijan, which, moreover, stretches across the almost impassable Murovdag range.

In February 1993, Armenian forces cut off the only road linking the Kelbajar District with Azerbaijan. The district was practically isolated, and 3,000 Azeri troops continued to operate there. (Incidentally, the Nagorny Karabakh army is estimated by experts at 7,000 men.) Their operations were directed mainly against the Lachin corridor vitally important for Karabakh.

Late in March, Armenian troops surrounded an area with 50,000 to 60,000 peaceful civilians in it, not counting home guards. The corridor for an exit from this pocket for the Azeris was opened in about a day, and in several more days the Azeris left the area. The Kelbajar District was cleared of them.

#### War and Policy

In conditions of war and total non-recognition (the republic was not recognized even by Armenia) the military achievements for Nagorny Karabakh outweigh its possible political setbacks. In the face of the threat to the Lachin corridor, the loss of which would mean a hungry death for Karabakh, the possible condemnation of the aggression by the world community recedes into the background.

But while Karabakh enjoys the fruits of victory, Armenia and Azerbaijan are disentangling themselves from its political consequences.

The fruits of the victory are tangible. The military threat to the Lachin corridor has disappeared, and one more, a shorter way from Karabakh to Armenia has been

secured. Furthermore, for the first time in the last five years the Karabakh army has a rear. Previously, the territory controlled by it was shelled by Azeri long-range artillery.

Armenia has had definite success in the foreign-policy field. The Turkish draft of a resolution labelling it as an aggressor was turned down by the UN Security Council. In the resolution adopted by the Security Council, all parties involved in the conflict were denounced, while the recent offensive was described as the "invasion of the Kelbajar District of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces." It was an indirect admission of the fact that Karabakh, not Armenia, is the main belligerent.

In Armenia's political scene, economic problems dominate so much that only defeats exert a more or less noticeable influence on it. Just as in Azerbaijan, the opposition takes advantage of defeats for its aims.

#### Azerbaijan: A Shift To the Right?

The surrender of the Kelbajar District has appreciably destabilized the internal political situation in Azerbaijan. The positions of radicals have strengthened markedly. President Elchibei declared a state of emergency in the republic and curfew in Baku. Men born between 1958 and 1976 are forbidden to leave the republic, and call-up stations are being set up throughout the country.

After the previous defeat in February 1993, Defence Minister of Azerbaijan Dadash Rzayev was accused of treachery and dismissed. The current Defence Minister took up his duties quite recently, and it is senseless to blame him for the setback. The opposition accused the Popular Front whose presidential candidate Abulfaz Elchibei, on coming to power, promised to resolve the Karabakh problem by September 1992.

In general, and this is natural for political life in a belligerent state, defeats inevitably bring about radicalization. True, in the case of Azerbaijan, contrary to the opinion widely spread in Russia, radicalization does not at all mean going over to Islamic fundamentalism.

Even ultra-right organizations, like Boz Kurt (Grey Wolves), are such in the "European" sense of the word, that is, nationalistic, not clerical fundamentalist. There is no question of Azerbaijan's reorientation from the Turkish to the Iranian way by which the Russian readers have often been frightened recently.

#### Kelbajar Card

In the foreign-policy field, the Kelbajar card was played by Azeri leaders rather unsuccessfully. The outright aggression, because the Kelbajar District is indisputably Azerbaijani territory and Karabakh can in no way lay claim to it, and the seizure of the Kelbajar district could have many unpleasant consequences for the Armenian side. The charges of Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry that Russian troops took direct part in this operation did not look very convincing and were easily refuted. Equally

unconvincing was the statement by Nagorny Karabakh that Turkish servicemen had been airlifted to Azerbaijan under the guise of civilians.

Baku's appeal to Turkey for military aid was doomed to failure because Turkey does not have a common border with Azerbaijan or Karabakh. With the purpose of giving such aid Turkish troops would have had to begin military operations against Armenia and on its borders they would have clashed with Russian frontier-guards and Russian troops stationed in that republic.

In general, it is difficult to imagine that a NATO state will openly fight against a country engaged in the collective security system of the Commonwealth of Independent States. No wonder that, following several statements denouncing the Armenian aggression, President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, returning from Baku, declared that Turkey would give Azerbaijan only moral and material support, and there could be no question of military aid.

#### No Peace in the Offing

For both sides the capture of Kelbajar will certainly be a stimulus to war, not peace. The Armenian side is elated by its victory, the strengthening of Karabakh's ties with Armenia, and the emergence of a new springboard. Its troops will certainly try to recapture the Shaumyan District of Nagorny Karabakh, seized by Azerbaijan last May. Baku leaders also need military achievements to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the people and the opposition.

At present, both sides are noticeably exhausted. Though they continue to accuse each other of attacks and shelling, there has been lull on the Karabakh front since the occupation of the Kelbajar District. It will continue until the storm in the mass media and the world community abates. The world community has evidently "swallowed" the capture of Kelbajar, and no sanctions will follow from it. It is not clear how the course of events can be influenced by the sudden death of President Ozal, who was always considered a liberal and West-oriented leader in the Turkish establishment.

#### Not an "Ethnic Conflict," But a War

The tendency observed since the capture of Shusha and Lachin by Armenians was particularly evident after the occupation of Kelbajar. By that time reports about the massacre of peaceful civilians had become usual. Such actions were justified even when new territories were seized. It was argued that one or another town was an ancient centre of Azeri or Armenian culture and that its population was unlawfully deported earlier.

The capture of Lachin and, the more so, Kelbajar was explained by military strategic considerations. The need for curtsies does not arise any longer, and they are made by inertia.

The time of "ethnic conflicts" is over. A sort of crystallization took place. The war between populations has developed into a war between armies. Trained and armed home guards, not shepherds of neighbouring villages, are now fighting against each other. Separate groups gradually become armies with a single command, camps for POWs, and a clear-cut front-line. In conditions of war a belligerent side does not explain its right. It simply follows a logic of struggle.

On the other hand, wars between states always end while national enmity can last for centuries. The talk about justice never ends while a strategic balance can be achieved in principle. In conditions of a "normal" war there are governments which can finally conclude a peace agreement. This cannot be said about dozens of field commanders who do not subordinate to anyone. True, when shepherds were at war there were considerably fewer victims than now, when large-scale operations are conducted by troops.

#### Russian Naval Command: Ukrainian Actions Endanger Black Sea Fleet

93UM0547A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Military Commentator Vadim Solovyev, under the rubric: "'Confrontation: 'The Black Sea Fleet: Is a New 1917 Drawing Near? The Russian Naval Command Warns About the Liquidation of the Fleet'"]

[Text] A real diplomatic war has been unleashed between the Russian and Ukrainian ministries of defense on the eve of negotiations of representatives of the governments of these countries. On 2 April, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, while accusing the Russian military of failing to observe agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, lodged its protest. On 9 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted a counterattack from those same positions. On 10 April, Ukrainian Military Minister Morozov announced a decisive shift to the offensive on the unilateral "privatization" of the Black Sea Fleet. The strict warning of Russian Navy First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Igor Kasatonov—the curator of this direction from the Russian Ministry of Defense, former Black Sea Fleet commander—followed in response to that. And, naturally, like always in such situations, the sides assign the entire responsibility for the consequences to each other.

In Admiral Igor Kasatonov's opinion, a very definite goal is being pursued in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's subsequent actions: "... a policy toward complete destabilization of relations between Ukraine and Russia and the unilateral abrogation of the Yalta and Dabomys agreements. This is actually a question of the physical liquidation of the Black Sea Fleet."

It would seem that an end had been placed to disputes on the Black Sea Fleet, when the two presidents agreed on 3 August 1992 that the fleet is directly subordinate only to



them and that a moratorium on unilateral actions to resubordinate the Black Sea Fleet was introduced during the transition period until 1995. At that time, the conciliation committee should have prepared proposals on how to divide the Russian and Ukrainian ships peacefully and without problems. The subject of the division—are more than 300 military ships, small craft, and auxiliary vessels (the “first line” assets consisted of 45 major surface combatants, 28 submarines, and a little over 200 aircraft and helicopters). They also need to resolve the fate of nearly 60,000 Black Sea Fleet seamen. But this is still not all. A dispute is occurring for the very enormous ship and naval equipment maintenance and repair facility, the hydrographic facility with all of the lighthouses and similar required elements for navigation that was developed over centuries, the maritime ranges, and, finally, the social-cultural facility with its housing.

And now, through its decisions, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is beginning to privatize the fleet's infrastructure. Relying on the Ukrainian President's 4 April 1993 Edict “On Urgent Steps for the Military Structural Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces”, General Morozov is ordering the appointment of garrison commanders from among Ukrainian servicemen at Feodosiya, Kerch, Nikolayev and a dozen other cities, even in those where there were generally no Ukrainian servicemen at all. Ukrainian base commanders are being unilaterally appointed. All of them are being resubordinated to Odessa Military District. The same thing also extends to Sevastopol. Thus, the entire fleet with minor exceptions is being resubordinated, if you obey Kiev's orders, to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. All orders, directives and instructions of the Russian Ministry of Defense with regard to military commanders located on Ukrainian territory are being declared null and void. Attempts are being undertaken to privatize the rear services and coastal facilities in Izmail and in other garrisons.

Naval Main Headquarters calls the Ukrainian side's charges untenable and opposes the involvement of a third party—the Georgians—in the dispute. The Black Sea Fleet has never interfered in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, has never delivered oil to anyone, and has not carried out combat patrols...

According to the Naval Main Headquarter's statement, the charge that Russia is not contributing its share to the maintenance of the fleet does not correspond to reality. During the first quarter of 1993 alone, four billion rubles have been allocated from the Russian Treasury (10 billion karbovanets from the Ukrainian Treasury). But if you consider that the Karbovanets loses to the ruble during a market exchange, this ratio appears to be somewhat different. Furthermore, Russia is paying foreign hard currency in those cases when the ships perform long sea cruises.

The Russian Ministry of Defense leadership is manifesting restraint and is not issuing any orders whatsoever to ships and bases which could be viewed as confronting

Ukrainian privatization. The Russian command authorities are following the letter of the agreements, while proceeding from the fact that the Ministry of Defense has no right to interfere in issues of Black Sea Fleet command and control.

## UKRAINE

### Col-Gen Morozov Fires Personnel Chief for not Halting Bribery

93UM0548A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
26 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service: “Bribe Takers Will Be Brought to Account”]

[Text] A case of bribery has been discovered at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate. The bribe takers forced a Western Group of Forces officer to pay a bribe of money and other valuables for assistance in his transfer to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Main Monitoring-Auditing Inspectorate conducted an investigation of this case. It was established that serious omissions of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate officials became the causes and conditions for the commission of this disgraceful phenomenon. Personnel Directorate leadership did not organize proper monitoring of the observance of the law by directorate officers.

Despite the fact that information about bribery and abuses of power that were flourishing in the Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate had already appeared in October 1992 and that the Ukrainian Minister of Defense had directed the special attention of Lieutenant-General A. Ignatenko to it, no decisive steps were taken to put a stop to these disgraceful phenomena. Moreover, with General Ignatenko's connivance, one of the bribe takers was appointed to the post of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate senior officer in February 1993. Even despite the fact that he did not have any personnel work experience whatsoever and a total of six years service in an officer rank which is a very gross violation of all existing standards and regulations. As a result of that and similar abuses, disgraceful phenomena were permitted that inflicted enormous damage to the prestige of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Based upon the results of the investigation that was conducted, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov decided to transfer materials to the Ukrainian Procurator General. A criminal suit has been filed based upon the cases of bribery that were brought to light.

A Ukrainian Minister of Defense order has relieved Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General A.S. Ignatenko of his duties for unsatisfactory organization of work for the selection, training, assignment and education of personnel that promoted the appearance of protectionism and bribery

and for failure to take timely steps on cases of criminal activities of subordinates which inflicted substantial moral damage to the structural development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The officials who permitted bribery have been deprived of their officer ranks and released from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

**'Ukrainian National Assembly' for Nuclear Ukraine, Arms Capacity**

93UM0548B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
25 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Vladimir Knysh, under the rubric: "Political Palette: 'UNA—Advocates 'Nuclear Muscles' for Ukraine'"]

[Text] Last Saturday the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) conducted a conference on the problems of Ukraine's nuclear status.

The spacious Teacher's Club Conference Hall became the site of this conference. The organizers invited various interested parties, however, there were quite a few empty seats in the auditorium. Why was that?

The first speaker, UNA Adviser S. Artemenko, attempted to convince those present that Ukraine has no other path but to retain its "nuclear muscles". Why? Because, first of all, "a partner's readiness to compromise attests to his weakness and leads to an escalation of demands". In other words, having yielded to the demands of the United States and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons, Ukraine will be compelled to resort to even further concessions.

Secondly, the United States is as before aggressive because it professes a "strategy of selective deterrence and geographic escalation". And Ukraine, faced by a militarist, is simply obliged to cover itself with a "nuclear umbrella". And, as if drawing a line under what he had said, S. Artemenko concluded: "American military doctrine clearly attests to the impossibility of a nonnuclear strategy".

The speech abounded with numbers and a comprehensive characterization of the NATO bloc and armies of individual European countries was provided in it. The listeners were persistently brought to the idea that everything is not so calm in good, old Europe. The states (Western, of course) have not disarmed at all but have simply replaced some weapons systems with others—that are more highly accurate. Already not mentioning the United States that has not only not curtailed but is successfully continuing its nuclear programs.

As if continuing that speech, former Nuclear Research Institute Associate and currently working in the Cabinet of Ministers A. Kovalenko talked about the "poverty-stricken state of the Ukrainian VPK [military-industrial complex] and the basic sciences". Having cited the "point of view of scientists", he stated that "in our time, the nuclear complex is the foundation of the growth of a

powerful Ukraine". And then he arrived at the conclusion that with "the destruction of the nuclear complex, which adherence to 'START-1' is, the process of the disintegration of science will gain momentum and Ukraine's scientific-technical potential will be destroyed..."

Is that statement indisputable? As for the "poverty-stricken state of the basic sciences in Ukraine", as A. Kovalenko states, can we unconditionally agree with him? Is that extremity of opinion appropriate? Does it turn out, total collapse? But that is really not so...

Yes, it is difficult to imagine our future as a highly developed European state without the basic sciences. They are the future. And the basis of a powerful economy. The military-industrial complex should not occupy a dominant position in the economic infrastructure but we should also not destroy it.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Avramenko also spoke at the conference. He is certainly well known to our readers based on his statements in the capital press with criticism of the military reform policy that is being conducted. Having begun with the rhetorical question, why are we destroying nuclear weapons and in general do we need to disarm right now, he proposed to "look at our army from within". And, without stopping, he made the most negative conclusions about its present state.

The arguments and facts that Aleksandr Andreyevich cited certainly attest to the fact that he is a persistent opponent of the merger of the Air Defense Troops and the Air Force. His heart aches for our sentries of the sky to have a worthy place in the Ukrainian Armed Forces system. The fact that our army has very many, and very serious, problems does not cause any doubt. Lieutenant Colonel A. Avramenko also placed his primary emphasis on them while shifting from the discussion of the future of Ukraine's nuclear status to the most fashionable topic of late—on the course of reform in the Armed Forces.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Avramenko's speech certainly merits attention. Although many facts of those of which he discussed have already been mentioned in the press. It was interesting, as they say, as the topic of the day. Especially for a civilian audience.

Nevertheless, I sensed that Lieutenant Colonel A. Avramenko could not avoid bias, which many of the facts cited by him "set in motion". Maybe, that is why no constructive proposals were heard in his speech and everything was reduced to criticism alone. It was difficult to immediately determine what the cause of this "irreconcilability" was. But as it followed from the answer to the question posed by me, one of them is the fact that, in the officer's opinion, they did not want to listen to him at the military education directorate, the chief of which also conducted himself too strictly with regard to Lieutenant Colonel A. Avramenko. Thus, the personality aspect played its role.

Now a little about my general impression. If you recall, in the middle 1980's a well-illustrated publication titled "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [What is the Origin of the Threat to Peace] enjoyed great popularity. It nearly became a bestseller among the military. It was cited and abstracted. Of course, this was an obvious product of the Cold War. But its compilers did not go against the truth, having shown through figures that we are also far from being "slouches". Both in the sphere of strategic aviation and types of missiles and in many other things. Of course, times have changed but is it worthwhile to once again engage in such obvious self-reproach, while having an excess of tanks and aircraft, one of the largest armies and territory in Europe, in the bowels of which there are sufficient weapons to inflict a first strike?

### Uneven Pilot Assessment in Air Force

93UM0548C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
30 Mar 93 p 2

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA Post Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nikifor Lisitsa, under the rubric: "The Problem Requires a Solution": "New Buttons for a Threadbare Dress—or How the Proficiency Rating Is Being Assessed Today"]

[Text] "Into the Clouds—for a Bottle of Milk"—that was the title of correspondence published in November 1992. It was about the fact that pilots 1st class were paid a salary increase of 75 coupons-karbovanets and pilots 2nd class were paid a salary increase of 50 coupons-karbovanets per month for the proficiency rating that they held. In our time that is pennies which could in no way be a material incentive to an aviator to aspire to increase his professional skill. Because you can really only purchase one or two bottles of milk with that kind of money.

And here, as they say, the ice began to break up. An order was recently signed, in accordance with which a pilot 2nd class will be paid a salary increase of 5%, a pilot 1st class will be paid 8% and a pilot-expert marksman will be paid 10% of the salary for the proficiency rating that he holds. Increased salary for a proficiency rating has also been stipulated for specialists of other services and combat arms of the Armed Forces. We think that it will play an important role in increasing the level of training of servicemen and in creating a truly professional army.

But are these incentives effective in like measure for everyone? Today it is not that simple to give an unambiguous answer.

A situation has developed when new amounts of material compensation have been laid on the old proficiency rating system. But in it the main thing was the fulfillment of certain tasks and standards on some specialty or other, regardless of the position held. In other words, one and the same requirements were made for a pilot ("pravak" [not found]), a crew commander, a squadron commander, a regimental commander, etc., when a certain rating was awarded. What do we get in that case?

I recently became acquainted with Squadron Commander Major V. Sergiyenko. He is a 1st class pilot. He has carried out many flying missions under the most difficult conditions. But as a squadron commander—he is not among the best. He made a mistake while organizing the subunit's dogfight. He has also not acted very confidently as the leader of flights. Yes and he has had problems while training subordinates. So can we really consider him to be a specialist 1st class? As a pilot, certainly yes. But as a squadron commander...

The situation becomes even more complicated with ratings in aviation support subunits and especially in the Ground Forces. According to existing proficiency rating requirements, a commander of a platoon, company or battalion must fulfill standards in one of the specialties of the subunit entrusted to him. Say, a communications company commander—a radio telegraph specialist proficiency rating, a tank company—a loader or a driver-mechanic proficiency rating. And at times we encounter officers who know how to skillfully operate the telegraph key but who perform their primary organizational and commander's functions in a mediocre manner. However, they are paid a salary increase for a proficiency rating at the highest rate. Is that always just? In an actual engagement, are skills in handling some type of weapon or other required or is the ability to concentrate the efforts of his subordinates on the fulfillment of the combat mission required to a greater degree from a commander of any rank.

Today there is that category of officers to whom a proficiency rating in general is not appropriate. They are technical and rear services specialists—finance officers, military doctors, chiefs of supply services, etc. Therefore, they don't even dream about an material incentive for a professional skill. And since that is so, there is also no aspiration for it.

A similar situation is developing among warrant officers. A large portion of them are entirely justified to be paid a salary increase for a proficiency rating. This is first of all technicians for servicing and repairing aircraft, various types of equipment, communications gear, etc. But there are also those who have a rating in only one specialty and the circle of their responsibilities are much broader. Say, a company first sergeant or a supply platoon commander who has the rating of a driver or cook. And there are quite a few positions filled by warrant officers in which proficiency rating financing has not been provided for. They are depot chiefs, "classified job holders", laboratory workers, and others.

Indeed, warrant officers have another position—they are position categories. A depot chief is sixth, a company first sergeant is ninth. Salaries are established in accordance with that. And a situation frequently develops in units when they cannot select a specialist with a category of six for the post of warrant officer. And if they find one, in two to three years he attempts to transfer to a post where the salary is higher. And a mediocre first sergeant

receives a higher proficiency rating specialist who is involved with the repair of complex equipment and electronic gear everyday.

As we can see—the existing system for determining the proficiency rating of officers, warrant officers, yes and sergeants and soldiers is not effective and, despite the increase of rates, practically do not stimulate the growth of the professional skill of military specialists. In my view, we need a more differentiated and objective approach to the determination of the proficiency rating of servicemen from private to general.

So, any specialist who has just been assigned to a position begins from zero. And only after six months to a year can he compete for the award of 3rd class and then after the same or a longer period for the next level.

Naturally, the readers will have a number of questions: who should determine the level of professional training of specialists and, first of all, of officers? Won't there be abuses and unjust relations toward subordinates here by certain officials? Based upon what criteria will the activities of some serviceman or other be evaluated?

These assessment criteria for the activities of officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers exist. But they need to be significantly improved and made more specific with regard to each position. We need to pay attention to overall military, special and physical training and to a number of other indicators.

It is advisable to determine the level of training at the end of each training period or year. And special proficiency rating commissions can do that. They must be created at battalions for soldiers-sergeants and at regiments for warrant officers and junior officers. Division commissions have the right to assess squadron and battalion commanders and chiefs of combat arms and services. The opinions of the direct supervisors whose subordinates are undergoing these tests must also be taken into account.

And it would be appropriate to establish the following rule: promote only those officers who have attained the highest proficiency rating in the position held to a higher position. That approach will be just and would permit us to exclude or at least reduce cases of protectionism or undeserved rapid promotion in service.

Obviously, we need to be especially concerned about material incentives for the professional training of servicemen whose official growth is restricted by certain limits. This is especially true with regard to aviators. Quite a few pilots, technicians, and engineers, due to objective reasons, even those who have adequately high combat work skills, cannot rise higher than a captain's position. And so that they do not lose interest in service, their efforts need to be directed toward professional self-improvement. And, in my opinion, it is not that hard to do that. Provide for an additional monetary salary increase for those specialists who maintain a proficiency rating at the highest level for several years.

That approach will certainly prompt them to increase their combat skill and will become an important step toward the creation of a truly professional army and will introduce the just principle "from each according to his abilities—and to each according to his work". And the main thing—the combat readiness and combat capability of our Armed Forces will increase.

For now an increase of compensation for a proficiency rating somewhat reminds me of new buttons that have been sewn on a threadbare dress.

#### **Alleged Ukrainian Yalta Breeches Rebutted**

*93UM0598B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 May 93 p 1*

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank Miroslav Mamchak under the rubric "The Black Sea Fleet: In the Glasnost Sight": "Black Sea Bastions Around Yalta"]

[Text] Sevastopol—Sailors know that at sea, even in calm weather, a gale can suddenly burst forth. In approximately the same way a gale, only a political one, has erupted around the Yalta Agreement on the Problem of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol, however, the fleet's main base, could not be called calm in the political sense at all. The passion of certain political circles for meetings on its status and the demand that it be restored to the bosom of Mother Russia could not have resulted in anything else. I believe that this was the intent.

A menacing declaration was the response from the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense to a statement by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine about gross violations of the Yalta Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet.

Without properly analyzing the causes and the situation developing in the Black Sea Fleet, it accuses the Ukrainian side of attempting to free itself from the Yalta Agreement, of taking a course of "dragging out talks between the state delegations of Ukraine and Russia on the implementation of the accords already reached..." and of moving the fleet toward the "disintegration and breakdown of the fleet's combat readiness and attempting to forcibly alter its structure and Ukrainianize it." Such accusations have been made about Ukraine and its navy by Adm Feliks Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Federation's navy, by Adm Igor Kasatonov, his first deputy, and by the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies of the Black Sea Fleet. None of them has indicated specifically which articles of the Yalta Agreement on the principles for forming the Ukraine's navy or the Russian Federation's navy out of the Black Sea Fleet are so "persistently" violated by the Ukrainian side.

I suggest that in order to arrive at the truth, we must recall the articles of the agreement signed and, based on them, analyze the actions of the sides toward their implementation.

Article 1 establishes the fact that the Black Sea Fleet is to be divided up for purposes of forming the Black Sea Fleet of Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, and Article 3 takes the Black Sea Fleet out of the CIS [Joint Armed Forces] of the CIS and makes it directly subordinate to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia. Everything is clear, it would seem. Apparently not to everyone, however, because the position of "striving for cooperation" on the part of Russia's state delegation and its Ministry of Defense with respect to these articles is in complete conformity with the well-known statement made by Adm I. Kasatonov immediately following the signing of the agreement in Yalta: "We shall begin dividing up the fleet on the afternoon of 1 January 1996."

They then wanted to divide up the fleet's coastal infrastructure in addition to the combat ships—that is, that part of Ukrainian territory adjacent to the Black Sea coast, from Ismail to Kerch. Quite recently Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, stated frankly that he could not conceive of any other base for Russia's Navy except Sevastopol.

The Russian side also interprets Article 5, which defines the standards for manning and equipping the Black Sea Fleet, in a peculiar way. For Russia's part the fleet is being fully manned with officers and warrant officers; by 50 percent with respect to seamen and petty officers. Ukraine is "permitted" to assign to the navy only half of its required first-term personnel. Russia is prepared even to use force to retain this situation. Not a single officer who has taken the Ukrainian oath is permitted to join the Black Sea Fleet. Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers who have taken the oath to the Ukrainian people are not allowed to enter educational institutions.

How is Article 6, which states that during the period of transition servicemen are to be given the oath to the state of which they are citizens, being implemented? This is evidenced, better than words, by the quite recent example of the BPK [coastal antisubmarine vessel] *Sposobnyy*, whose seamen were "transferred" to the KU [command ship] *Slavutich* immediately after they took the Ukrainian oath.

Under Article 7 of the agreement the fleet's emblems were to be established for the period of transition prior to 3 September 1992. This is no minor matter. Despite the fact that Ukraine's proposal has long been on the Russian delegation's working table, there are still no symbols. Instead, the Andreyev flag has been raised on many ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which, according to worldwide laws, indicates that they belong to Russia. And so, Russia's Ministry of Defense has actually begun dividing up the combat ships, and it is simply being hypocritical in demanding the return to the Black Sea Fleet of SKR-112, which was removed from that fleet even before Yalta. Article 8 states that during the period of transition the parties to the agreement will use the existing system of basing and material and technical support. Joint use, Article 10 adds, is effected with

proper respect for the parties and without interference in one another's "internal affairs." There is no mention in the agreement of a prohibition on interference in the "internal affairs" of the Black Sea Fleet. And this is objectively valid, since the fleet is not a state formation. They are trying to make it one, totally insulated from the Ukraine's influence. The thwarting by Ukrainian naval forces of an attempt to move boats from Ochakov to the Crimea was therefore not a violation but rather the implementation of Article 10 of the agreement and a reminder of the need properly to respect the laws of Ukraine, on whose territory the fleet is based.

The matter of joint use of the system of basing and material and technical support has to be discussed separately. The reality is that the Russian side takes joint use to mean its own use. The Ukrainian side, on the other hand, naively believes that its requisitions will be handled in the spirit of cooperation, as defined in Article 12. The crew of the first Ukrainian ship, the *Slavutich*, no doubt took the military oath in the old military uniform and were dispatched to the ship in it. History will undoubtedly also judge this incident. Nor did the *Slavutich* receive communication documents for the period of travel from the plant to Sevastopol, and negotiations for its entry into Sevastopol took 3 days. It was something to see, the way in which ships of the Black Sea Fleet were moved to different moorings and how their flag was raised on the wharf of the naval terminal—for the single purpose of demonstrating that there was no room in Sevastopol Bay for mooring the *Slavutich*.

The same thing happened with the SKR [patrol vessel] *Getman Sagaydachniy*. First, at the instructions of the Black Sea Fleet's command element, it was not issued the supplies to which it was entitled. The reason? The authority of the fleet's joint command and the system for dividing up the fleet had not been defined. The matter of ammunition for shipyard testing of the ship was even more difficult to resolve. The filling of requisitions from the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy was deliberately dragged out by the Black Sea Fleet services involved. Some of the material and technical support, including the ammunition, was therefore urgently shipped in from Odessa and other cities of Ukraine. The matter of where the ship would anchor at Sevastopol was resolved in the same way. It was offered a tiny birth not equipped to handle ships of its class, where, incidentally, the *Slavutich* was moored. This was done, as arrogantly announced from Black Sea Fleet Headquarters, for convenience of monitoring and controlling them. In fact, however, it was done to force them to use up their engine life.

A total of 2.5 billion karbovanets was demanded of the Ukrainian Navy for these "conveniences" in the use of the Black Sea Fleet's base and for the means of testing the SKR *Getman Sagaydachniy*. This is triple the amount it cost to build the ship. Quite naturally, questions were raised as to the legality of these costs. And Ukraine, incidentally, honorably offers an opportunity for the testing of ships of Russia's other fleets in

exchange for support for the testing of its own naval ships under construction. As we can see, however, this is not taken into account.

The examples cited are nothing other than contrived delay in implementing the bilateral agreements reached at Yalta. Russia's Ministry of Defense, however, and the press center and Coordinating Council of Officers Assemblies of the Black Sea Fleet prefer to remain silent about this. They pretend that all of their efforts are directed toward strengthening fraternal friendship and mutual understanding with Ukraine and its navy, and that their actions have a legal basis.

Russia's Ministry of Defense "resolutely protests" attempts by the Ukrainian side to achieve a reformation of the fleet's combat ships in agreement with the former. Is the only alternative not clear? They cannot report to Kiev from Moscow or Sevastopol about how, during "peacekeeping" campaigns to the Caucasus, they sell the fuel which is in such short supply in Ukraine or how they demanded 800 rubles each from refugees on the BDK [combat landing ship] Krymskiy Komsomolets to deliver them to Novorossiysk. Or how the "peacekeepers" plundered the training center at Poti and attacked warehouses with grenades, how ship commanders acquired automobiles on one campaign to the Caucasus or how people profited from the tears and sorrow of people they were supposed to have been sent to help. "Serving in the Black Sea Fleet is like a sideline for some," they say with an arrogant smirk and waving packets of Russian rubles on the PSK [coastal patrol vessel] Baskunchak following its latest "peacekeeping" action in the Caucasus....

Sadly, there is not a word of indignation about these things. They are all "internal matters" of the Black Sea Fleet, in which one should not interfere.

I believe that this is enough facts. Anyone wanting to see, will see who is playing a dishonorable game and erecting bastions around the agreements reached at Yalta and will understand who is paying lip service to and who is actually striving for cooperation based on the agreements signed to normalize the situation in and around the Black Sea Fleet....

### **Ukraine 'Not Cause' of Black Sea Tensions**

93UM0598A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 Jun 93 p 1

[Interview with Col-Gen Konstantin Morozov, Minister of Defense of Ukraine, by a NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent under the rubric "The Black Sea Fleet: In the Glasnost Sights": "We Are Prepared for Dialog"]

[Text] The situation in the Black Sea Fleet has intensified, but not through Ukraine's fault.

[Correspondent] Comrade Minister, the situation in the fleet has been exacerbated once again with the raising of the Andreyev flag on some ships. Although there are almost no military personnel on these ships, they are still

a part of the military fleet subject to division. We are aware of your order calling for a halt to financing for ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet which have raised Andreyev flags. Could you comment more extensively on these events. How might things end?

[Morozov] Recently, the attention of the public inside and outside of Ukraine has been drawn once again to events in Sevastopol and in the Black Sea Fleet.

This was caused by an increase in the activity of political groupings in the Crimea known for their anti-Ukrainian objectives. Their inflammatory actions have resulted in symbolic acts by certain crews, expressed in the raising of the Andreyev flag on ships of the auxiliary fleet.

Attempts are being made to erase the political tinge from this action, disguised under economic demands, but everyone understands that this is a continuing play of the so-called Crimean card by players holding foreign residence permits.

The crude perpetrators of the inflammatory efforts and authors of the adventuristic slogans encourage people to do things without thinking, with possible consequences which are a long way from just a game.

[Correspondent] Nonetheless, how do you assess what has occurred?

[Morozov] First of all, it is a gross and extensive digression from the well-known Yalta Agreement. In signing it, Ukraine demonstrated good will and went halfway to meet a friendly state, agreeing to help it build its own fleet in the Black Sea. In whose interest, may I ask, did we agree to these terms and constantly adhere to them? Why would the fleet's command element and the Main Staff of the Navy begin to depart from these interests? Who, if not these authorities, sanctioned the actions of the captains who deceived their subordinates.

If this was not the case, and the command element knew nothing about the planned act, then one has to conclude that command and control in the Black Sea Fleet have been lost. For now this affects only the auxiliary part of the fleet. Who knows, however, what the emissaries of the so-called Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies, who politicize officer collectives and entire garrisons, inciting them to engage in unlawful actions, are planning? In the end it is people who suffer: officers, warrant officers, blue- and white-collar workers, and their families. Their lives—and this is also one conclusion—are becoming more difficult.

A ship, no matter how small, is a place of service, a work station. And a ship flying a foreign flag in Ukrainian territory is an absurdity. Furthermore, it is a violation of international law. Those who work on the ship encountered a problem with their wages and, considering the fact that the ship belongs to the Russian navy, also a problem with citizenship. Probably not all of those

serving on the ship knew about this when they supported their irresponsible captain. Or were they perhaps simply not asked?

We cannot continue to pay the wages of these crews or permit the ships to remain within our territorial waters. If they reconsider their decisions, this will alter the situation.

People were misled. If their actions were indeed motivated by dissatisfaction with their wages, during exactly that period the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and the government were considering plans and adopting decisions on new social protection measures for citizens, and the Ministry of Defense was submitting proposals on the procedure for extending these to cover military personnel and blue- and white-collar workers in military formations.

After this there will probably be a real motive for taking down the banners designating a mutinous ship and for us to rescind the order.

[Correspondent] What do you think? Is it possible to establish in Ukraine rates equaling the Russian ones?

[Morozov] The whole problem stems from the fact that we have to make comparisons with Russian rates and scales. There are many reasons for this, including a desire better to provide for our lives. I believe that we will strive to achieve this and to seek ways to help the servicemen and their families in these extremely difficult conditions of economic crisis. I know that the Supreme Soviet, the president of Ukraine and the government are all concerned about this.

Incidentally, it is not just the people in the Black Sea Fleet who need an increase in pay, but also those in the Navy of Ukraine and the military districts and at VUZ's. We simply do not know where the money will come from, and we endure along with everyone who needs help in Ukraine today. Unfortunately, there are many groups of citizens who are provided for far more poorly than we. This is a good excuse for profiteering today. Sadly, it is exploited mostly by those who have not yet joined our armed forces. One should not be led by those for whom "the worst, the better," so as not to create tensions or disturb the people. We owe them a debt which cannot be repaid. We are more tempered, however, and it is easier for us to endure.

[Correspondent] What do you see as the solution to this situation?

[Morozov] We probably need to consider the causes of violations of the Yalta Agreement in the Black Sea Fleet on the level of a special commission from state structures. We are prepared to suggest representatives of the Ministry of Defense to be on the commission. We could draw conclusions and adopt a decision for further action on the basis of its findings. If we meet with understanding and support for our efforts to relax tensions, we

shall in turn understand and support all good proposals contributing to the achievement of this goal.

## BELARUS

### Col-Gen Chaus on Belarusian Problems with Unit Manning

93UM0490E Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 23 Feb 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Col-Gen Petr Grigoryevich Chaus, deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus, by Vladimir Rudenko: "You Do Not Have To Drive Them into the Army, But It Cannot Get by Without Patriotism"]

[Text] The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are being created. The problems which must be resolved without delay are growing like a snowball. One of them involves manning units and subunits.

We talked about this with Col-Gen Petr Chaus, deputy minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus.

[Rudenko] Petr Grigoryevich, the scheduled call-up into the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus has concluded. What are the results?

[Chaus] There are two issues with particular concern both the Ministry of Defense and many other state bodies. The first is the reduction of officer personnel and discharge of a considerable portion of them. The second involves manning the troops with soldiers and sergeants. It was necessary to call up 20,000 young men for compulsory service. More than 90 percent of this number are in the army system. Everyone will serve one and a half years on the territory of Belarus. No one is being sent even to training units outside the republic. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense is in favor of the lad serving close to home and having the opportunity to socialize more often with parents, friends, and labor collectives. Of course, this cannot be done everywhere; military units are not located in all cities and villages. But today's principle differs radically from previous ones, when they believed: the farther, the better.

[Rudenko] Despite such a humane approach by the state to the young person and his concerns, we still have so-called "refuseniks."

[Chaus] Unfortunately, more than 1,500 inductees did not show up at the military commissariats and evaded the draft. Meanwhile, the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service states directly: "Protection of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Republic of Belarus." Further in this most important legal document it says that universal military service obligation is the constitutional obligation of citizens of the Republic of Belarus.

[Rudenko] The law, it seems, has not really worked. It is no secret that some people are not averse to evading



service in the army and obtaining a deferment by hook or by crook. It seems there should be liability for draft evasion.

[Chaus] All the "refuseniks" are known by name. The police are looking for them. The procurator's office will also have its say. It will be fair if the guilty parties suffer punishment. One must answer for violating the law.

[Rudenko] Petr Grigoryevich, what is the matter here, where are the roots of this problem? Before it did not exist at all. On the contrary. It was shameful and embarrassing when a young man was exempted from the draft, say, for illness. He tried to hide his ailment in order to get into the Army and serve honorably.

[Chaus] The times are changing, as we can see, not for the better. As a result of that moral decline that has occurred in recent years, the social and psychological reference points of young people have changed. Egoism, a craving for enrichment, and emotional callousness are crowding out patriotic feelings from the conscience of young men. Some do not even recall their civic and constitutional duty. Apparently, we need to re-examine the entire system of educating the rising generation. There is almost no talk in schools and secondary educational institutions today about the homeland, love for the fatherland, and the need to protect it. Small-arms ranges and rooms intended for physical education of young people are being closed. Local authorities are transferring them to enterprise structures. Money and practical considerations are coming out on top.

[Rudenko] The problem is probably not just in this. Some draftees are afraid of "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts by conscripts with more seniority] and so-called "hot spots."

[Chaus] None of our compulsory service soldiers will serve in "hot spots." Conscripts are not being sent there now. Henceforth, everyone will serve on the territory of Belarus.

Now about military discipline. The necessary steps are being taken to establish and maintain order in the barracks in order to eliminate completely instances of relations that are at variance with regulations. Virtually all soldiers and sergeants from other CIS countries will be discharged in the spring, and only compulsory-service personnel who are citizens of our republic will be left in units and subunits.

Measures of an educational nature which are being conducted in the troops are helping to consolidate military collectives and increase their cohesiveness and responsibility.

"Dedovshchina" is an evil that we must fight mercilessly. Even isolated instances of malicious insults, physical assaults, and other improper manifestations must

not go ignored and unpunished. The Ministry of Defense takes such a stand that this is required of commanders and supervisors of all ranks.

Service in the Army was always a school of courage, physical hardening, and civic development. Who will replace us, and to whom will we pass on the traditions of patriotism, love for the homeland, and its reliable protection? A little more, and such concepts will disappear altogether. That is what is particularly bothersome and alarming.

[Rudenko] Indeed, sad prospects. However, there cannot be interruptions in military service, we cannot wait, and so we are forced literally to drive young men into the Army.

[Chaus] We do not have to drive them. The Army will not gain from forced measures. There must be responsibility here, that which is specified by law.

[Rudenko] Maybe it is time to introduce new forms of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces? For example, service under contract.

[Chaus] Such a statute is being drawn up. Of course, a mixed system of manpower acquisition, when contracts exist in addition to compulsory service, is rather attractive. Let us say, a soldier serves six months in the barracks and then concludes a contract. His Army routine changes and becomes the same as for officers and warrant officers. But beyond the outward attractiveness, big problems hidden below the surface like underwater rocks.

[Rudenko] Just what kind of problems?

[Chaus] Huge amounts of money are needed, but our republic is not that rich. We must consider material and financial capabilities. Take housing. Each serviceman who has concluded or extended a contract must be provided space in a dormitory or an apartment. But we do not even have enough for the present officers and warrant officers. Apparently, it is still too early to talk about service under contract. We should not be in a hurry.

[Rudenko] All the same, Petr Grigoryevich, without a sense of patriotism, the Army will hardly be reliable under any form of manning...

[Chaus] Patriotism is a specific concept. It cannot be separated from the overall culture of a person or society as a whole. What we have here is sheer regression. The prestige of military labor in general depends on a purposeful system of material and moral incentives. Much is being done by the parliament and the government in this respect. But there is much that still has to be accomplished for service in the Army to become a matter of honor for each young lad, each real man.



### Belarus Military Personnel Take Oath

93UM0490D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "The Belarusian Army Is Administered the Oath"]

[Text] A ceremony of taking the oath of allegiance to the Belarusian people was held in the republic on the last day of 1992. Generals, officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, compulsory-service soldiers and sergeants, and officer candidates of military schools took the oath. Thus, virtually all personnel on active duty in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Committee for Security [KGB], the Border Troops, and the Civil Defense Service have been administered the Belarusian oath.

As the deputy chief of the Directorate for Educational Work of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, Colonel Anatoliy Bakum, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, according to preliminary data, 92 percent of the officers and warrant officers took the oath. Of those not taking the oath, 35 percent could not do this because they were on leave, undergoing treatment, or on alert. Another 15 percent did not take the oath in connection with an impending discharge into the reserve. About half of those not taking the oath expressed a desire to serve in the armies of other CIS countries. In Bakum's words, a very insignificant number of officers and warrant officers refused to take the Belarusian oath because they did not agree with this action. According to preliminary data, about 1 percent of all those who refused plan to continue serving in the Belarusian Army, but do not want to take a new oath. The deputy chief of the Directorate for Educational work stated that the Ministry of Defense will study the possibility of using these officers under contract.

Thus, on the final day of last year the Belarusian armed forces became official and their breaking away from the former Soviet Army was completed. In the words of Anatoliy Bakum, the ethnic composition of the officer corps has changed in the last six months. The percentage of non-Belarusian officers has decreased from 80 percent to 50 percent. The chief of the Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel Vladimir Zametalin, said that of the 13,000 Belarusian officers who had submitted applications indicating their desire to serve in Belarus, 5,000 have already been transferred to the republic from CIS countries. At the same time, the Army is being reduced. Having dragged out these painful procedures in time and having given officers the opportunity to make a conscious choice, the leadership of Belarus has avoided undesirable social and political consequences.

### Belarusian Servicemen's Group Seeks 'Slavic Democratic Forum'

93UM0490C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 29 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "Proposal to Slavophiles To Unite, Without Panslavism"]

[Text] The military-patriotic organization, Belarusian Association of Servicemen, known for its social activeness, has come forth with a new initiative, proposing to public figures and sociopolitical organizations to create an international body—the Slavic Democratic Forum. In its initiative, the group states: "Nearly all Slavic states are now in a state of political and economic crisis, caused by the collapse of the totalitarian communist regimes on their land. The state of crisis is helping to revive in some Slavic countries chauvinistic and fascist forces which, hiding behind slogans of Slavic unity, are striving to divide up the borders with neighboring states and even to annex them in form of forced 'unification.' The aggressiveness of these forces, despite the well-known history of decades of bloody wars between the Slavic peoples, is increasing. In Yugoslavia, they have already managed to provoke a massacre among Slavs. As a result, the Slavic world, which possesses an enormous potential, including nuclear, has now become one of the most explosive regions of the planet. The conflict between the Slavic peoples threatens to blow up peace throughout the world.

The objective of the proposed Slavic Democratic Forum is to strengthen an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among Slavic countries, prevent conflicts between them, develop economic cooperation of Slavic states, share experience of political and economic reforms, and revive and develop the cultures of all Slavic peoples.

"Distrust and hostility towards one another are increasing in Slavic countries," says the leader of the organizational committee, Nikolay Statkevich. "Political forces exist which profess ideas of Slavic superiority. We believe that there is a potential for cooperation of patriotic organizations on principles of sovereignty and equality of Slavic peoples, inviolability of existing borders, priority of individual rights, support of reforms aimed at establishing democracy and a market economy, the rights of Slavic peoples to preserve their cultures, protection of the cultures of ethnic minorities, and development of good relations with non-Slavic countries. Before coming forth with the Slavic Democratic Forum initiative, we held consultations with many parties and movements in Belarus, Russia, Poland, and Ukraine. They liked and supported our idea."

### Significance of Associate Membership in NATO Viewed

93UM0490B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 19 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Rozanov, doctor of historical sciences: "Is Belarus Going NATO's Way?"]

[Text] On 10 March 1992, the Republic of Belarus, together with nine other CIS member-states, was accepted into the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Thus, the first noticeable step was made in rapprochement with the bloc which is the primary instrument of the countries of the West in safeguarding security.

Two months later, Belarus and Ukraine were given the status of associate members of the North Atlantic Assembly—the parliamentary body of NATO. This same status was granted to Russia earlier. In this connection, interest in the North Atlantic alliance and its guidelines in the area of defense and maintaining military stability naturally increased.

The concept of the two functions of the bloc—military and political—is at the foundation of NATO's long-term policy. This concept was originally set forth in the document "Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Armelle Report). First of all, maintaining an adequate military force in the interests of deterring aggression and other forms of pressure, defense of the territory of the member countries in the event of aggression. Second, promoting progress in the direction of more stable relations, in which basic political problems can be resolved. The final objective of NATO is the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Europe.

The North Atlantic alliance is called upon to safeguard the security of its member countries on the basis of "Atlantic solidarity" and a "strategic coupling" of the United States and Western Europe. Hence the emphasis on the "indivisibility of risk" and the American nuclear guarantees to its West European partners. The need to tie the United States to Europe, even with the growing trend towards the "Europeanization" of NATO, is not subjected to doubt. At the same time, the new international political situation after the end of the cold war is making them adjust the ideas about ways of strengthening security and stability.

NATO officials emphasize that the political measurements of security are becoming central. It is their belief that the best guarantee of peace is open and democratic societies with efficient economies. Therefore, it is advisable to support reformist forces in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.

A quite positive aspect is the NATO countries' expression of readiness to actively strive for closer coordination of efforts of countries of the East and West in the area of security. Back in November 1991, at a session of the NATO Council in Rome, at the level of heads of state

and government the document "The New Strategic Concept of the Alliance" was approved, which proceeds from the fact that there no longer exists a threat of massive invasions from the East. They confirmed the desire to safeguard freedom and security by combining political and military means. A new component was added to "Armelle's formula"—a policy of rapprochement with former adversaries from behind the "iron curtain."

The Rome Declaration on Peace and Security was adopted, calling for development of extensive contacts and cooperation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the three Baltic states, and the republics of the former USSR. In the interests of formalizing the new relations with them, it was also decided to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Today, many foreign and domestic specialists in international affairs and military experts believe that NATO will become one of the main support structures of the future European architecture of security. The Republic of Belarus has to work out a long-term policy with respect to NATO, taking into account this outlook and other possible variants of military-political integration in Europe.

It must be said that for the time being the former Warsaw Pact members have no chance of becoming full-fledged participants in NATO. This also applies to the new independent states that have emerged on the territory of the former USSR.

At the same time, the idea of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council looks promising. It can be turned into a forum of constant revelation and coordination of the military-political interests of NATO members and post-socialist countries, including states of the "post-USSR." The council is able to partially fill the "security vacuum" that has emerged in Eastern Europe after the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Creation of the council, without changing the structure of NATO, forms a system of additional ties with the countries of Eastern Europe (it is not by chance that western analysis call the North Atlantic Cooperation Council a "supplement to NATO").

For Belarus this problem of possibly becoming a party to NATO in some form or other is not vital by virtue of its declared (not totally substantiated, however) orientation on a neutral status. But membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in a certain sense, is an ancillary insurance mechanism in the sphere of security.

Of interest for the republic are such forms of "dialogue, partnership, and cooperation" defined at the meetings of the council as an exchange of information on military issues, working out defense industry conversion projects, joint scientific research of security problems, and discussion of key aspects of defense strategy, relations between military and civilian structures of society, methods of putting together military budgets, and the procedure for their approval by parliaments.

One must also look at the prospects of cooperation between Belarus and NATO in terms of further politization of NATO. Remember that besides the military organization, NATO has a developed and extensive nonmilitary infrastructure—various committees, groups, parliamentary and other institutions dealing with problems of economics, science, technology, information science, and ecology. The alliance has a well-rounded system of political consultations at various levels. The consensus principle, operating in all stages of decisionmaking, has enabled the NATO allies to amass unique experience in coordinating positions and searching for compromises that could have been used in establishing qualitatively new relations between the foreign policy and military departments of the CIS states.

At the same time, the hasty recipes about paths of interaction with NATO following the example of the Baltic countries ("assistance" in speeding up the withdrawal of Russian troops, "internationalization" of solving problems in relations with Russia) expressed in our press will hardly do any good. Some or other controversial issues and misunderstandings that have come to light in Belarusian-Russian relations, it seems, can be resolved through bilateral contacts without involving NATO advisers.

The North Atlantic alliance, in the opinion of its ardent supporters, is not a "personage in search of a role;" it is the "only exemplary model of collective management of the security of free countries." The Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], as is reported, even in the future will not be able to replace NATO as a tried and tested instrument of maintaining military stability. Should Belarus share such a position?

Disregarding the CSCE process with all its detected flaws (the decisions are not binding in the strict international legal sense of the word, lack of a procedure for implementing agreed upon measures, limited capabilities in the military sphere, and so forth) would be unjustified. The CSCE has potential for further development. Therefore, in my view, efforts to improve the CSCE mechanism should be at the center of the European policy of Belarus.

It is necessary to strive for more effective work of the CSCE council, the committee of senior officials, the secretariat, the center for prevention of conflicts, the bureau for democratic institutions and human rights, and the forum for cooperation in the area of security. The idea of concluding an all-European treaty on collective security as a supplement to the Final Act, adopted in 1975 in Helsinki, is seen as quite promising.

As far as NATO is concerned, we must not forget that this bloc is, in essence, a product of the cold war, of dangerous confrontation, and as such retains certain vanishing signs. It emerged and exists as a mechanism of collective defense, intended primarily to repel an external threat, as a military-political alliance oriented

outward. An all-European system of collective security must be structured on a different basis.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that NATO is a powerful, influential, and viable organization. The concepts of NATO and the changes in the alliance's strategy in any case should not remain outside the field of view when determining the contours of the defense policy of Belarus.

## BALTIC STATES

**Structure, Aims of Latvian Armed Forces Detailed**  
*93UM0547C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
*in Russian 5 May 93 p 2*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev, under the rubric: "National Armies: A Commentator's View": "Inheritors of the Spirit of the 'Ayzsargi'"]

[Text] Today, 15 new independent states exist on the territory of the former USSR. The national Armed Forces are a very important state attribute of each state. Armed Forces are also being formed in Latvia. Last year, Latvian Republic Embassy to Russia Military Advisor Gunars Alksnis talked about the principles of the formation of a national army on the pages of our newspaper. Has the military structural development advanced since that time? That was the topic of our discussion—in the published notes.

On 7 February 1993, Latvian Honor Guard soldiers at the Freedom Monument in Riga appeared in new uniforms—in 1930's Latvian Army uniforms. They carried carbines instead of Kalashnikov assault rifles. Through this step, the Republic Ministry of Defense demonstrated to everyone that the Armed Forces that are being created are called upon to inherit the traditions of the army that was born after Latvia acquired its independence on 18 November 1918.

The Latvian Republic began Armed Forces structural development in 1991 when it finally set out on the path of independent development. That process is proceeding with difficulty as a result of the complicated economic situation and difficult political situation. According to the predictions of Russian and Western military experts, the creation of a national army will be totally completed only by the year 2000. Let's note that Latvia is calculating on assistance from the Western countries and it has officially expressed its readiness to join NATO.

The army's first orientation points were defined at the beginning of 1992. In an interview published in the newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in February, Latvian Minister of Defense Talavs Jundzis noted that a small professional army is needed to guarantee sovereignty and protection of the border. At that time the first military formations totaled several thousand soldiers and one hundred officers. Among them were

also citizens of Latvian ancestry from foreign countries, including Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. However, already at that time the Latvian military made a prediction that the number of servicemen would be brought to 6,000 by the beginning of 1993.

In 1992, and in the first quarter of 1993, emphasis was placed both on the direct formation of military units, command and control organs, and also on the development of a legal basis of a defense nature. In 1992, the laws "On Compulsory Military Service", "On the Popular Opolcheniya [Untrained Voluntary Military Force]", and "On State Defense" were adopted in succession. Statutes on military service, regulations that regulate the procedures for internal and sentry services, a number of documents for organization of training and personnel training were also approved.

As of today, military doctrinal views, the principles of organization of defense and structural development of the Armed Forces, the competence of the highest organs of power in the defense sphere, and the organization of the highest military command and control have largely been defined in the republic.

The National Armed Forces, the nonmilitary organs of state defense and the structure of the state's national economy belong to the system of state defense. According to law it must guarantee: the inviolability of land territory, the maritime water areas, and airspace with the utilization of international assistance if necessary; prediction, detection, elimination and neutralization of an internal or external threat. The state defense system provides for participation in the adoption of security measures outside Latvian territory in accordance with international legal acts and international treaties.

The National Armed Forces are the primary element in the state defense system. They consist of the Defense Forces, the Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force, the Security Services, and—during wartime or during any other emergency situation—also of Ministry of Internal Affairs independent armed formations.

During peacetime, the Defense Forces are tasked with guarding the state border and with carrying out defensive tasks on the entire territory of the state and also participation in the elimination of accidents and natural disasters, and with the elimination of their aftereffects. They plan to bring their strength up to 9,000-10,000 men. According to data of independent experts, today there are actually 6,000-7,000 servicemen.

Structurally, the Defense Forces consist of border guard forces, mobile rifle forces, air and air defense forces, naval forces, and also special purpose units and subunits. Organizationally, they are structured according to the classic scheme: battalion-brigade.

Up to 5,000-6,000 men will serve in the border guard forces in the future. By the beginning of this year, nearly 2,000 servicemen were in subunits.

The mobile rifle forces are tasked with the missions for defense of republic territory. They can be utilized to carry out monitoring on the borders. They plan for this branch of troops to consist of motorized infantry battalions. However, today it is still impossible to call the subunits that have been formed that. There are no armored vehicles in the subunits.

Air and air defense forces are at a rudimentary state and today cannot carry out proper control of the airspace and foreign aircraft flights.

The naval forces will carry out the missions of guarding the 500-kilometer long maritime borders and the maritime economic zone. The Latvian Republic flag was raised for the first time in April 1992 on a ship that previously belonged to the fishing surveillance service and on which a large-caliber machinegun has been installed. They assume that a division of ships will be formed at each of the primary port cities—Riga, Ventspils, and Līvepaya. They have decided to utilize approximately 11 vessels to outfit them that previously conducted supervision of the observance of fishing regulations and rescue work in the Baltic Sea. The proposed strength is approximately 1,000 men.

The commander, who is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, will carry out operational command and control of the Defense Forces. According to a State Defense Council decision, he can also command other National Armed Forces components in peacetime and during emergency situations.

The Defense Forces practical structural development largely depends on the country's economic state and also on the opportunity to acquire arms and equipment from other states, first of all in the West and in Russia. The Scandinavian countries and France are manifesting a great deal of activity in supplying military equipment to the Latvian Army... So, Sweden delivered over 10,000 military uniform sets and Norway supplied approximately 800—free of charge. In January 1993, France began the delivery of light combat equipment that is intended for equipping one battalion (with a strength of 500 men). However, on the whole, the countries of the West and the North Atlantic bloc are displaying care on the issue of giving Latvia (just like Lithuania and Estonia) arms and military equipment. They fear a deterioration of the political situation in the Baltic Sea Region.

It has not been excluded that a part of the arms of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet will be purchased from the Russian Federation—in exchange for the construction of housing for Russian servicemen.

Latvia is also seeking other ways to acquire equipment. So, in March 1992 information agencies disseminated the report that an aircraft with automatic weapons and ammunition had landed at Riga Airport. The cargo had arrived from "one of the European countries". Private Latvian organizations and firms of an unnamed state had become intermediaries in the arms acquisition.

High-ranking military personnel explained that the Kalashnikov assault rifles had been acquired not in the former Soviet republics. It was asserted that the Ministry of Defense is also purchasing weapons on the black market, while taking advantage of the services of intermediaries.

The Latvian Republic Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force is an important component of the National Armed Forces. It is considered to be a social self-defense formation that participates in the planning and execution of defense missions. It is subordinate to the Defense Forces commander on mobilization issues. Soldiers and officers who have served their terms of service are part of the Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force. They form a sort of mobilized reserve according to the territorial sign. The Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force numbers over 10,000 men and its composition will be increased to several tens of thousands of men. All trained manpower can be part of territorial military formations. The Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force is in part being formed on the principles of military "organization of defense" (Ayzsargi) which existed in the 1930's and had up to 30,000 men in its ranks.

We must point out that in general interest is high in the concept of total defense in the Baltic countries. Here they understand that cadre military units in and of themselves are not worth much due to their low number (and today also due to the fact that they have not been supplied with arms). Latvia's Popular, Untrained Voluntary Military Force is nothing other than a reserve that has a command and a precise structure.

The ideology of total defense prompted Latvian legislators to create a nonviolent defense system. What is the

essence of it? Civil disobedience of illegal authority is organized in the event of violent actions against the constitutional state order. The Supreme Soviet is creating a special center to lead it. They have provided for teaching republic residents nonviolent defense methods.

Let's note: the entire state defense command and control system changes in wartime. The Supreme Soviet Chairman, who appoints the commander of the National Armed Forces, becomes the highest leader of the National Armed Forces. The commander operates independently and is responsible to the State Security Council and to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. He commands military operations, drafts citizens for service, and provides the Defense Forces with required equipment, materiel and financial resources.

In a word, much has been done in military structural development in Latvia. Obviously, a new spiral will follow immediately after the total withdrawal of Russian troops from republic territory. The Council of Ministers 10 June 1992 decree specifically states that: "On the withdrawal of the armed Forces that are under Russian Federation jurisdiction and the accounting and acceptance of the military facilities that are within their jurisdiction". The Latvian military want to operate for the national army the numerous buildings, structures, and the infrastructure system developed for the troops of the former Soviet Army. And the main thing—they are anticipating that the Western countries' specific steps on the issues of the delivery of modern arms to Latvia, of which there is such a large shortage in the units that have been created, will follow after that.

The political and military leadership is associating both an increase of Latvian servicemen's national pride and their psychological stability with the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic.

## ARMS TRADE

### Rubin Designer Makarov on Arms Sales

93UM0549E Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian  
No 2, Feb 93 (signed to press 22 Feb 93) pp 62-65

[Interview with Gennadiy Dmitriyevich Makarov, associate of St. Petersburg Rubin Central Naval Equipment Design Bureau, by MORSKOY SBORNIK correspondent Captain 1st Rank B. Tyurin, occasion, date and place not specified: "If a Ship Goes for Export..."; photo of Makarov included]

[Text] *In the period from 14 through 18 February of this year Russia will take part in the first IDEX-93 ("International Defense Exposition-93") international military equipment and weapons exposition for the near-eastern region, which will be held in Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates). It is planned to set aside a special place in our exposition for models advertising our naval equipment (combatant ships and craft, weapons, and various technical equipment). One of the next issues of MORSKOY SBORNIK will tell how this exposition will go for our country and what it will bring to Russian military export. But for now our correspondent's questions are answered by G. D. MAKAROV, a member of the Russian delegation at the Abu Dhabi exposition and an associate of the St. Petersburg Rubin Central Naval Equipment Design Bureau.*

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Gennadiy Dmitriyevich! Tell us if only briefly about what we will be exhibiting as applied to the naval theme.

[Makarov] Fine, but first I wish to emphasize that I am going on TDY to this exposition as part of a group of specialists of a number of planning and design organizations and production enterprises of our defense complex working in the field of creating combatant ships and naval weapons. Our basic task will consist of technical assistance to heads of the Russian delegation in holding talks with foreign partners, both those wishing to purchase models of our finished naval equipment being offered as well as those wishing to place an order for its specific technical modification as applied to specific conditions of use. Earlier at similar expositions our delegation heads as a rule did not resort to "services" of the creators of domestic export military products, because of which our side largely lost out with no opportunity to decide questions involving "unplanned" requests of foreign clients promptly and on a qualified basis.

Regarding the exposition itself: by using advertising brochures, video films and full-scale displays it is planned in particular to tell there about latest achievements, including of our naval shipbuilding. It was decided to present ocean minesweepers (Design Project 266-ME), coastal minesweepers (Design Project 1265-ME) and harbor minesweepers (Design Project 1258-E); small ASW ships (Design Project 1241-PE) and small air

cushion landing ships (Design Project 12061); and missile craft (Design Project 1241-RE) and patrol craft (Design Project 1400-ME and 14006), as well as missile, torpedo, and border guard craft based on Design Project 02065. All of them basically already were built and exported earlier.

In addition, submarines, combatant ships and craft will be exhibited FOR THE FIRST TIME for possible sale to foreign partners. Among them is the Design Project 1239 (Sivuch-Class) small air cushion missile ship and Design Project 12322 (Zubr-Class) air cushion landing ship, Design Project 14310 (Mirazh-Class) patrol craft, as well as the Design Project 11661 patrol ship (Gepard-Class) and Design Project 11356 patrol ship (based on the Bditelnyy-Class patrol ship), Design Project 11551 large ASW ship (based on the Udaloy-Class large ASW ship), and one variant of a Sovremennyy-Class destroyer. In addition, it is planned to demonstrate the Rubezh anti-ship missile system; the Shtil, Rif and Klinok SAM systems; gun systems with the AK-100-MR-145 (100 mm), AK-176-MR-123 (76.2 mm) and AK-630-MR-123 (30 mm) control systems; certain models of torpedo, mine and mine countermeasures weapons and equipment; ASW, EW and RTV [radiotechnical] equipment; naval simulator equipment and so on. Ships of design projects 877-EKM, 636, 865 and Amur will represent the submarine exposition.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] The state's interest in increasing the sale of military equipment is understandable at the present time against the background of a reduction in export volume, save perhaps of raw materials. What are we pursuing here in addition to an influx of currency into Russia?

[Makarov] It is no secret that an extremely serious situation has taken shape today both in our Navy as well as in the defense industry caused by destruction of the USSR. Everyone knows about this and I will not repeat it. I will stress only the real need for purposeful use of a portion of currency earnings to support Russian naval shipbuilding, considering the length of time and continuity of creation of weapons and equipment for the Navy. Otherwise we may lose our entire defense complex, lose the positions we have reached and interrupt the upgrading process, which will throw us backward and require considerably greater expenditures for eliminating the natural lag which will take us more than a single decade to overcome. Most important, we are depriving our Motherland of the potential of a reliable defense of her borders and protection of her own interests.

There also is another political aspect: the United States and its allies even now are intensively impeding restoration of our positions lost in recent years and especially since December 1991 in Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean zone and in the Arab world in the Near East. We must get them back for Russia, but this time in a different capacity. Therefore at the Abu Dhabi exposition it is necessary to show Russian "military goods to

good effect," as they say, while emphasizing our defensive concept in creating them.

Now the next point. Near-Eastern countries, whose representatives definitely will take part in the exposition, are very familiar with Soviet weapons and combat equipment (including naval weapons and combat equipment) which previously came into this region and so we also should show what has been done in our country in the most recent times and emphasize the continuity of our best traditions in this area.

Based on the above and also considering our own negative experience when, carried away with building primarily nuclear powered submarines toward the mid-1970's, we largely lost the practical-science reserve in the area of creating modern technical equipment for diesel-electric submarines, particularly electrical equipment and surface propulsion engines, now the development of new advanced submarines with conventional power engineering is under way. Advertising documentation for one such submarine, Design Project 636, which is being put "into the development" of Design Project 877-EKM submarines, will be exhibited in Abu Dhabi.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** In my opinion, the advantages to Russia from such activity are obvious from the standpoint of the world weapons and equipment trade. But just why does our press comment so coolly on facts of the foreign sales of those same Varshavyanka-Class diesel submarines?

**[Makarov]** Our industry and naturally the designers of our Rubin Central Naval Equipment Design Bureau who created this submarine are constantly upgrading their ships' combat and operating characteristics. But if we are speaking specifically about Design Project 877-EKM submarines, which absorbed vast experience and the latest S&T achievements both of Russian as well as of the best foreign (including nuclear powered) submarine shipbuilding, attention to them abroad is great to this day. By the way, for the first time technical advertising documents, mock-ups and models of this submarine were demonstrated at a naval exhibition called PRIDE-90 in Manila in November 1990. It was there that lively interest was shown in the Soviet naval equipment display on the part of representatives both of military as well as of business circles. And as deputy chief designer of the Design Project 877-EKM submarine for export, I was given an opportunity to present a souvenir model of this submarine to Secretary of National Defense (Minister of Defense) of the Philippines General F. Ramos, the present president of this republic, recognizing the great attention and interest he showed in this ship.

But the merits of Varshavyanka export submarines had been assessed even earlier in the naval press by specialists of leading world naval states, including the United States, where it was especially pointed out that "...with

the appearance of the new Soviet submarine (KILO-Class according to NATO classification), American submarines LOST THE ADVANTAGE OF CONCEALMENT (QUIETNESS) which they possessed for a number of years!" Moreover, a specific descriptor was conferred on her in the West—a "black hole in the ocean"—due to the difficulty of determining this submarine's position by ship sonar equipment...

The Varshavyanka's high qualities surprised and delighted not only our recent "probable enemies," but also naval specialists of countries that are exporters [sic] of Soviet combatant ships. Thus, during the solemn ceremony of hoisting national flags on two submarines of this class (for the Polish Navy and Indian Navy), both foreign crew commanders gave high praise to these submarines ON ALL POINTS, noting especially their COMBAT AND MANEUVER QUALITIES. And still earlier, at the ceremony transferring the first submarine of this design project to the Indian Navy in September 1986, the Indian Minister of Defense remarked that "...acquisition of this submarine marks a great technical leap in Indian Navy development..."

In concluding the conversation about this submarine, it should be emphasized that for various reasons our naval equipment has not taken part in international naval expositions held abroad. We limited ourselves only to official and courtesy visits to certain countries, where specialists could become acquainted with our ships (primarily surface combatants) or auxiliary vessels, with great restrictions on the information presented. So we were able to show our achievements in the area of naval surface and submarine shipbuilding rather openly FOR THE FIRST TIME only at the Manila exposition. And it was there, having "stewed in the pot" of an exposition for the good of the cause, that among other things we became convinced of the truth of the expression that "advertising is the engine of trade," especially in weapons and military equipment markets...

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** Gennadiy Dmitriyevich! It probably is no longer a secret how many Varshavyanka submarines of the export design we transferred or sold abroad?

**[Makarov]** According to my estimates, 14 beginning in 1986: one each to Romania and Poland, two each to Algeria and Iran and eight to India.

**[MORSKOY SBORNIK]** One more question. MORSKOY SBORNIK already has contained information regarding surface ships and craft which were transferred or sold abroad, but this information was more than scanty about submarines. Could you illuminate this question briefly?

**[Makarov]** The first submarines transferred or sold abroad from the USSR were diesel-electric submarines of design projects 613, 615 and 633. They were transferred to navies of Warsaw Pact countries and to our other partners without modernization, i.e., in the form in which they were used in the Soviet Navy. The Rubin



Central Naval Equipment Design Bureau (TsKB-18 was its predecessor in part) began to engage in creating submarine design projects which took into account our foreign clients' wishes already after the appearance in our Navy of Design Project 641 diesel-electric submarines, which were very successful in combat and operating characteristics. They and Design Project 641-B submarines—a Design Project 641 modernization (the chief designer for both design projects was Z. A. Deribin)—can be categorized as the “second” generation of our postwar diesel-electric submarines. Design Project 641 submarines surpassed in quality the Design Project 611 submarines having a similar purpose (ocean-going, torpedo-carrying, diesel-electric) which were in the USSR Navy inventory before this. It was on the basis of Design Project 641 submarines that under Deribin's direction we began modifying their design project for the first time in accordance with wishes of the naval commands of Libya and India. Their refitting was accomplished in particular at the Vladivostok Dalzavod—joint decisions on making export modifications were the basis of modernization and repair work. In principle, they differed slightly from each other on a technical plane. The differences concerned only radiotechnical and sonar equipment as well as the size of the torpedo unit of fire.

It was then or somewhat later that special training centers were set up on USSR territory for training foreign crews and transferring to them the submarines being exported and where navymen of the navies of Cuba, India, Libya, Poland, Romania and Algeria underwent appropriate training (also including a study of Russian). In addition to Vladivostok, mentioned above, there also were centers in Riga and Odessa. It must be added that export orders were created not only in the course of refitting and modernizing “series” submarines, but also under special design projects which accomplished the very same missions. That is how the export Varshavyanka submarines were “born.”

In addition to specialized auditoriums and simulator equipment, the Riga training center (its first chief was Captain 1st Rank F. Martinson) also had a Varshavyanka submarine especially built for training purposes in order to train foreign seamen on Soviet military equipment. The main point for training and for transferring our ships to allies and foreign clients was in Riga. Submarines created for export were purposefully brought here to the Center's waters from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) and from Gorkiy (now Nizhniy Novgorod). And before this they would undergo acceptance trials at one of the Leningrad Admiralty Association's yard delivery bases near Tallinn.

The number of diesel submarines which we transferred or sold abroad up to December 1991 generally numbers in the tens. The experience acquired in this matter must not be lost. Therefore participation in the Abu Dhabi exposition opens up new opportunities for us to consolidate and expand Russian naval export.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Many thanks for the conversation. We wish the display at the Abu Dhabi exposition success!

COPYRIGHT: “Morskoy sbornik”, 1993

### X31 and X35 Anti-Ship Missiles for Export

93UM0517A Paris AIR & COSMOS/AVIATION  
MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French  
No. 1417 15-21 Mar 93 pp 36-37

[Article by Pierre Langereux: “New Russian X31 and X35 Air-to-Sea Missiles To Be Exported Beginning This Year”]

[Text] Zvezda is ready to sell its latest anti-ship missiles: the X35 “Harpoonski” and the X31—a copy of the ANS [supersonic anti-ship missile]—whose anti-radar version can attack AWACS aircraft.

Zvezda has provided fuller details about its airborne, “air-breathing” X31 and X35 anti-ship missiles, which were shown in late February at the Abu Dhabi exposition. The Muscovite firm “Star” also announced the two missiles would be available for any warplane on the export market this year. The X31 air-to-sea missile, in anti-ship version X31A and anti-radar version X31P, is being mass produced for the Su-25T and TK, the Su-27M and IB, and the MiG 29K (see A & C No. 1389). The sea-to-sea anti-ship version of the X35 (NATO code designation SSN-25) was already in service in the Russian Navy (and in the navy of the former GDR). The air-sea version (without booster) was developed for the Su-27TK and MiG 29K naval fighters and the ship-based Kamov Helix helicopter (KA-27). According to Zvezda, “the X35 can be integrated into any warplane coming out this year” and “retrofitted beginning in 1994.”

The X35, unveiled (without comment) last summer at the MosAeroShow in Joukovski, was introduced in Abu Dhabi as a “multimission, anti-ship stand-off missile” designed for “fighters, helicopters, ships, and coastal defense vehicles current and future.” The missile thus exists in airborne and naval or land-based versions, which are distinguished by the absence or presence (on the rear) of a hefty additional (solid-fuel) booster that adds 0.78 meter [m] to the overall length. The air-sea version (without booster) measures 3.7 m in length and 0.42 m in diameter and weighs about 480 kg, whereas the sea-sea or land-sea version (with booster) measures 4.48 m in length and weighs 600 kg with (in both cases) a 145-kg explosive charge.

At first glance, what is striking is the Russian missile's extraordinary resemblance, not accidental, to the U.S. anti-ship “Harpoon” missile; the silhouette, performance characteristics, and certain other features are the same. Zvezda even openly claims that the X35 can serve as a target in defensive training “by simulating the Harpoon!”



The "Harpoonski" (so-called after its western counterpart) is preguided by an inertial system and then controlled by an active-radar homing head. While cruising, it is powered by a turbojet (internal) and fed by a large fixed (ventral) air intake that boosts speed up to about 1,000 km/hour.

According to Zvezda, the missile has a range of 5 to 130 km depending on speed and firing altitude, which can vary from 200 to 5,000 m. The "Harpoonski" then flies "nap of the waves" at an altitude of only 5 to 10 m above sea level. By comparison, the Harpoon has a range of up to 120 km.

#### Russian ANS

The X31 in turn bears a striking resemblance to the ANS. Abandoned last year, the supersonic anti-ship missile with its Euromissile ramjet thus already exists... in Russia. According to Zvezda, it is a "supersonic, stand-off, all-weather air-surface missile for attacking diverse targets: ships and radars on the ground or in the air (airborne radars).

"Star" says the two versions of the airborne missile weigh 600 kg with an explosive charge of 90 kg. But other Russian sources say it is a bit heavier, 650 kg (!). Another uncertainty regarding the exact dimensions, which Zvezda did not specify. The X31 is probably about 4.5 m long with a diameter between 0.5 and 0.6 m. The two versions are propelled by the same liquid-fueled ramjet rocket with solid-fuel booster integrated into the combustion chamber and fed by four fixed air intakes (circular) like the ANS. Except that the X31's ramjet was developed, like the X35's turbojet, by NPO Soyuz of Turaevo (TMKB). According to Zvezda, this ramjet will drive the X31 to "about 1,000 meters/second" (3,600 km/hour).

The differences between the two versions of the Russian ANS relate to mission and performance characteristics, as well as terminal guidance (after the initial phase of inertial preguidance). According to Zvezda, the anti-ship missile is guided on final approach by an active-radar homing head and has a range of 5 to 50 km (like the Exocet AM39); while the anti-radar missile with passive-radar homing head can go 15 to 110 km. The disparity in range (one twice the other) results among other things from the different trajectories of the two missiles, which can be fired from altitudes up to 15,000 m.

According to Zvezda, "thanks to its wideband radar homing head, the X31P can destroy the guidance radars of all medium and long-range surface-to-air weapons systems, including those for the Patriot." For air defense training, it can also "simulate an anti-radar missile" (not named). Or again, it can serve as a long-range air-to-air missile for attacking AWACS-type radar aircraft. As for the X31A, it is advertised as being able to attack ships weighing up to 8,000 tons. That is slightly smaller than the largest targets against which Vympel's X29TE can be effective; the builder claims the X29TE "can destroy ships weighing 10,000 tons."

## MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### Profile of AH-64A Apache Helicopter

93UM0513B Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*  
in Russian Mar 93 (signed to press 3 Jan 93) pp 39-41

[Article by Colonel I. Serdyuk: "The AH-64A 'Apache' Combat Helicopter"; based on materials in the foreign press]

[Text] The AH-64A began being sent to the ground troops of the United States in 1984. The helicopter is intended for destroying armored targets, including mobile ones, along with enemy manpower, as well as for making massed strikes against area targets. It may be used to escort assault-transport helicopters or motorized-infantry and tank columns. The foreign media assert that this is the first craft in the world whose design, armaments and on-board equipment allow the crew (pilot and copilot/gunner) to interact with ground troops in performing combat tasks, in bad weather conditions at any time of day.

The Apache is designed with a single-rotor configuration and a three-strut non-retractable undercarriage and main and tail rotors. The "semi-monocoque" fuselage has a relatively small cross section, which allows it to reduce its radar signature. It is manufactured of aluminum alloys using materials of enhanced strength and viscosity. Its reliability is ensured through the use of increased dimensions for the load-bearing elements of the body. There are flaps on the wing. They can be inclined downward at an angle of up to 20° depending on the flight speed, and upward to 45° when landing in autorotation mode.

The cockpit design uses a solid bearing frame (as in race cars). Its forward portion contains the copilot/gunner's station, and the rear holds the pilot. His seat is 0.5 meters higher for better view. There is Kevlar armor on the bottom and sides of the cockpit to protect the crew. Special shields also extend at the level of the pilots' shoulders. Flat glass is installed in the cockpit in order to reduce glare formation.

The helicopter uses a main rotor with a fully unburdened shaft and elastic attachment of the four blades. They are rectangular in shape, pointed at the ends and have the new HH-02 shape, which possesses a high lift factor and less frontal resistance. The blades are helical with a geometrical swirl angle of 9°. The spar, made of stainless steel, consists of five sections. The tip of each blade is clad with a metallic plate in order to reduce erosion. The tail unit is made of composite materials. A package of high-strength plates is used as the elastic element, taking up the load from the centrifugal forces and providing for the smooth, flywheel movement and axial displacement of the blades. Four blades are attached to the hub of the tail rotor with torsion shafts. They are placed at angles of 55° and 125° relative to each other, which reduces the noise levels

considerably. That is also facilitated by their comparatively low (193 meters/second) speed of rotation.

The craft employs a three-strut non-retracting undercarriage with a tail wheel. That design provides for landings at vertical speeds of up to three meters/second and, in heavy landings, up to 13 meters/second. Landing and takeoff may also be executed from a site that has an inclination of up to 12° in the longitudinal direction and 15° in the transverse direction. Wheels with hydraulic brakes are mounted on the main trailing-arm struts. The struts are fitted with a mechanism that allows them to be inclined back in order to reduce the overall height of the helicopter, which is important when it is being transported by air.

The working pressure of the fluid in the main and auxiliary independent hydraulic systems of the AH-64A is  $210 \times 10^5$  Pa. The hydraulic pumps are driven from the transmission. The systems are used to control the helicopter rotors, and the auxiliary is also used to control the braking of the main rotor, the armaments system, the additional power plant and the flaps. The drive for the

main rotor control is redundant—hydromechanical (main) and electrical remote control (back-up). A system of rod and cable linkage is used for the tail-rotor drive.

Two T 700-GE-701 engines from the firm of General Electric with a rating of 1,247 kW (1,696 horsepower) and weight of 198 kilograms apiece are installed on the helicopter. Their proportionate fuel consumption in takeoff mode is 0.210 kg/hp-hr, and in emergency mode 0.211 kg/hp-hr. The engines are mounted above the wing on the sides of the fuselage in special motor nacelles in order to rule out their simultaneous disabling by a single shell. The annular engine air intakes are fitted with a de-icing system and centrifugal dust-protection devices. There is forced mixing of the exhaust gases with the outside airstream in the exhaust manifolds of the power plants, in order to reduce the thermal emissions of the spent gases from 540°C to 150°C. The fuel system uses two protected fuel tanks with a capacity of 1,420 liters apiece. One is located behind the pilot's seat, and the other behind the main reduction gearing. Another four tanks with a capacity of 870 liters apiece are hung under the wing.

#### Tactical Performance Characteristics\*

Maximum flight speed, km/hr	300
Non-exceed (rated) speed in helicopter dive, km/hr	365
Cruising speed, km/hr	295
Rate of climb in vertical climb, meters/second	12
Maximum range with fuel reserves in internal tanks, km	435
Ferry range with fuel reserves in external tanks, km	2,000
Static hover ceiling without regard for effects of ground, meters	3,400
Dynamic ceiling, meters	6,100
Geometric parameters, meters:	
—length with rotating rotors	17.76
—maximum height	4.65
—width of fuselage	1.2
—wingspan	5.23
—diameter of main rotor	14.63
—diameter of tail rotor	2.79
Main rotor solidity ratio	0.092
Normal (nominal) takeoff weight, kg	6,670
Maximum takeoff weight, kg	9,400
Weight of empty helicopter, kg	4,810
Weight of fuel in internal tanks, kg	1,160
Weight of fuel in four external fuel tanks, kg	2,525

\*—Flight characteristics given for nominal helicopter weight.

The helicopter transmission consists of reduction gearing (main, intermediate and tail rotor), angular reduction gearing of the engines, coupling shafts and clutches. The main reduction gearing has two autonomous lubrication systems. They are able to operate in the absence of oil for an hour through the use of special wicks. Lubricating grease is

used in the intermediate reduction gearing and the reduction gearing for the tail rotor.

The arms system consists of 16 Hellfire PTUR [antitank guided missiles] with a laser homing system. The missiles (with a launch weight of 43 kg and a range of up to six

kilometers) are placed under the wing on four pylons that can be turned 5° upward and 28° downward. The TADS airborne system is used to aim them, and the launch is executed by the copilot/gunner. Another version of the helicopter has four launchers with 76 70mm aerial rockets (NUR). The launch weight of the NURs, depending on the type of warhead, is 8–10 kg, and the range is 4–6 km. The rockets are launched either singly or in salvos (2, 4, 8, 12, 24, 76) by either crew member. The pilot uses a helmet sight, while the copilot/gunner uses the TADS system. One Sidewinder air-to-air missile can also be hung on each end of the wing.

All of the helicopters have the single-barreled M230A-1 Chain Gun 30mm cannon (ammunition load of up to 1,200 rounds). It is attached to a turret mounted under the fuselage between the main landing-gear struts. The copilot/gunner can fire the cannon using the TADS system, and the pilot using a helmet sight. The rate of fire is 800 rounds/minute, with a sweep of 110° on the horizontal and 10° to -60° on the vertical.

The sighting and navigational system includes the TADS/PNVs systems for identification and night vision, as well as the JHADSS [as published] sighting system. The TADS/PNVs equipment is mounted in the nose portion of the helicopter (the TADS in a barrel-shaped cowl and the PNVs in a separate turret over the TADS). It combines five subsystems that make it possible to detect (PNVS) and identify (TADS) targets with high precision in bad weather conditions at any time of day. The distance to the target and its coordinates are simultaneously determined and one or several of the PTURs are aimed at it automatically. The subsystems transmit signals for display on the pilot's and copilot/gunner's television indicators and on their head-up displays. The copilot/gunner can orient the TADS subsystem within a range on 120° by azimuth and from 30° to -60° by elevation, and the PNVs subsystem within the limits of 90° and from 20° to -45° respectively. The JHADSS system includes helmet-mounted sights for the pilot and copilot/gunner and an information-display device. The remote control of the TADS/PNVs system is accomplished with its aid in the process of aiming.

The helicopter has the AN/ANS-128 airborne radar set, by means of which the location of the helicopter, its rate of speed, drift angle and other parameters are determined. The AH-64A Apache is equipped with two radar sets, a radio compass, a radar transponder for the IFF system, low-altitude radio altimeters, means of detecting laser illumination and electronic jamming, a receiver warning of radar illumination and automatic chaff dispensers. An on-board signals system is employed in order to reduce the labor-intensiveness of maintenance and to find flaws quickly.

Work is currently underway on the creation of the new AH-64B helicopter on the basis of the AH-64A (it is planned to be sent to the field in 1994). The principal attention therein is being devoted to raising its combat effectiveness, reliability and ability to withstand

damage, and improving the tactical-performance and operational characteristics of the craft. One of the most important tasks is considered to be providing for the reliable defeat of aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles. The helicopter is equipped for that purpose with AJM-9 [as published] Sidewinder missiles and a 30mm cannon with more effective firing indicators against aerial targets. A rise in the survivability of the helicopter and an expansion of its capabilities in fighting ground targets are proposed through the use of Hellfire antitank missiles with television and combined (passive-radar and infrared) seekers, as well as FGM-122 Sidearm guided missiles with radar homing heads. The electronics and the avionics equipment are also being improved.

Work is underway on the creation of a helicopter for the Navy and the Marines. The naval version of the craft will be able to perform the search and destruction of enemy ships, as well as cover an assault in landings. The installation of a target search and identification radar above the turret is being proposed for this purpose. The set of armaments is also planned to include the Harpoon and Penguin antiship missiles. The helicopter for the Marine Corps will be armed with TOW antitank missiles, 127mm non-guided rockets, AJM-9 Sidewinder, Stinger and Sidearm missiles and an automatic rapid-fire cannon.

COPYRIGHT: "Tekhnika i vooruzheniye", 1993

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Federal Courier Chief Gen Andreyev on Work of His Service

93UM0546B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 30 Apr 93 p 2

[Interview with Russian Federation Federal Courier Communications Directorate [FUFCS] Chief, Internal Service Major-General Valeriy Valentinovich Andreyev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Nikolay Poroskov: "A Package for the President: Our Interlocutor is Russian Federation Federal Courier Communications Directorate Chief, Internal Service Major-General Valeriy Andreyev"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's dossier. He was born in 1941 in Moscow. He graduated from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Academy Law Department. He has been in the courier service since 1968 and in his current post—since November 1991. He is chairman of the Commonwealth States Courier Services Subdivision Chiefs Coordinating Council. He is married and has a daughter and two grandchildren.

"I am sorry to say that in our country you can't do anything without couriers," A. Pushkin wrote to his female acquaintance P. Osipova after he was delivered to an audience with the Czar from Mikhayovskiy while accompanied by a courier. If one omits the irony contained in the sentence, the great poet is correct in the

rest: since ancient times, runners, who were vested with a special trust of the state's leading officials, guaranteed the reliable and rapid delivery of the most important news that affect policy and history. As we see, they also fulfilled other functions.

They were called different things in various times: heralds from the princes' *druzhina*, couriers and "reliable heads" [*vernnye golovy*] under the czars and emperors, and the state post under Peter I. But they always selected military people for these matters.

Indeed, Pavel I, who formed a specialized paramilitary courier corps in 1786, put the military courier service in order organizationally for the first time—to perform communications service and to carry out special errands for the emperor. For example, the delivery of unreliable people. Subsequently, both Pushkin, the Decembrists, and Petrashevets Fedor Dostoyevskiy ended up among them. The corps existed for more than a century, until May 1918, and was disbanded.

[Poroskov] Valeriy Valentinovich, obviously they thought that the need for couriers had declined with the appearance of the telephone and the wireless telegraph?

[Andreyev] The question on their expediency is not new. It was already being raised in the State Duma in 1909 and twice in Soviet times—in 1922 and in the 1960's. Yes, in the electronic era there is the capability to rapidly transmit information via encrypted communications circuits. But, you will agree, if a man has figured out how to encrypt text, he can also figure out the reverse. The only method to preserve a secret—is to transmit information from hand to hand. We need to consider the strength of "paper" that has been valued in all times. If after a telephone conversation which, incidentally, is not being recorded, one can say that "you didn't understand me", then a document provides an unambiguous interpretation.

[Poroskov] In a word, the service was not ordered to live long with the disbanding of the corps.

[Andreyev] The external communications service within the military department was organized based upon it. Since 1921, the departmental courier service was organized in parallel in the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage] system.

In 1924, both services were merged into a single, strictly centralized statewide courier service. Its functions included the delivery of secret correspondence of all state, Party, trade union and cooperative organizations, the transfer of monetary sums, state treasures and even arms and explosives—to the most remote villages in Russia and Central Asia. That is a dangerous business, 45 couriers died from 1933-1935 alone.

Since 1939, our service began to transport only secret correspondence of the highest and central state and Party organs and of certain of the most significant Narkoms

[People's Commissariats]—to the oblast center. Below that the so-called real communications operated—regional, departmental.

[Poroskov] Was the structure changed somehow during the war years?

[Andreyev] Courier Communications Flying Subunits officers and sergeants performed the most responsible work during that period—they delivered secret documents and special cargoes to the headquarters of the fronts.

Our people were at all of the Anti-Hitler Coalition conferences of the Allies, served union control commissions, etc. The Federal Directorate in its current form was created in 1991 based on the USSR Ministry of Communications Courier Service Directorate.

[Poroskov] Well, Valeriy Valentinovich, that is certainly a rich history but let's talk a bit about today. What is the Federal Agency's primary mission?

[Andreyev] The delivery of state documents from the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government to the capitals of the republics that are part of Russia, kray and oblast centers, and also immediate information to the ministries of defense, security, internal affairs, the CIS Unified Armed Forces Main Command, and other central departments.

[Poroskov] How does this look in practice?

[Andreyev] One or two of our officers are constantly with the first officials of the state, prepared at any moment to accept and deliver on assignment packages with documents. The scheme does not change on temporary duty assignments, including foreign assignments. There is a FUCS [Federal Courier Communications Directorate] department or group at the Kremlin, at the White House, at the government building on Staraya Ploshchad, at all departments and at capital city hall.

[Poroskov] What is the effectiveness of your couriers?

[Andreyev] Everything that was signed, say, by the president in the evening turns up at the executor's offices in the morning. If we look wider, then the algorithm is as follows: documents arrive at 26 administrative centers by 10 a.m., at another 32 by 3 p.m., and at yet another 11 by 6 p.m.

[Poroskov] But these are enormous distances. Do you have any statistics?

[Andreyev] Every day, agency officers rush along 84 routes—50 air, 29 rail and five motor vehicle routes. Their total length is 247,482 kilometers. Up to 300 courier communications officers are in the air every night.

[Poroskov] Obviously, you need a far-flung structure with such distances.

[Andreyev] Besides the "headquarters" in Moscow, we have six Russian regional directorates, departments in each oblast center and sections at some locations—Nakhodka, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, and the Black Sea Fleet.

[Poroskov] And do you deliver correspondence to nearby foreign countries?

[Andreyev] On 22 January 1993, the Agreement on Intergovernmental Courier Communications was signed in Minsk. So, the former single system has been preserved. Only Vilnius and Tallinn became an exception but even they are being drawn to the former structure. The flow of documents to the CIS countries' capitals is constantly increasing.

[Poroskov] Therefore, we can consider you to be a monopoly in your sphere?

[Andreyev] Yes, and this is that case when a monopoly is a benefit.

[Poroskov] But the Ministry of Defense has its own similar service.

[Andreyev] We deliver correspondence to the military district and fleet headquarters level, but below that are Major-General Vladimir Durnev's subordinates from the Ministry of Defense.

[Poroskov] Your missions are differentiated only by level?

[Andreyev] Army couriers are not weighed down by strict regularity, they can ship mail and cargoes as they accumulate.

[Poroskov] But do your paths somehow cross with diplomatic mail?

[Andreyev] No, but sometimes the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] takes advantage of our services—we often drive.

[Poroskov] How can you characterize the importance of the documents that you deal with?

[Andreyev] Suffice it to say that some of them have been executed in a single copy and are subject to eternal preservation.

[Poroskov] How do you guarantee the secrecy and security of these messages? I think that there are people who would like to utilize the contents of the package.

[Andreyev] The officers who deliver the mail are escorted to the aircraft hatch, they are the first to enter the aircraft and the last to depart, they sit in strictly defined seats, and they don't place mail in checked baggage. The escorts leave the airport only after the aircraft has taken off, they report to the destination where the courier will be met while entering the terminal. Then, on the aircraft while standing near the entry hatch. They don't go anywhere.

Motor vehicle routes are scheduled to the minute. There is a reaction to any delay. Routes are periodically monitored. The vehicles are equipped with special signals and radio telephones. An armored vehicle is assigned for special cases.

[Poroskov] And what about transport by train?

[Andreyev] The entire compartment, without neighbors, is assigned to the officers, the escort and meeting system is the same.

[Poroskov] Do you get involved in skirmishes while protecting the mail? In the Courier Communications Museum of History, I saw photographs of Junior Lieutenants V. Zubovich and A. Raschesov who prevented an aircraft hijacking.

[Andreyev] Yes, at that time, one of them used a weapon. Another example: Internal Service Senior Lieutenant N. Kachuyev detained a criminal on an aircraft after the criminal had stabbed a passenger with a knife. In October 1992, Driver V. Tripakov used an official vehicle to block a hijacker's path at Vnukovo Airport.

[Poroskov] But do losses of documents still occur?

[Andreyev] During all of my years of service, I remember one case. About 15 years ago in Tashkent. But the information in the package was not of any particular importance.

[Poroskov] With what is a person who has lost a document threatened?

[Andreyev] He bears criminal liability.

[Poroskov] Can you learn about the contents of a package without "losing" it?

[Andreyev] It is impossible to light up the package's special paper. If the outer wrapper has been violated, the matter is transferred to the state security organs. Some departments entrust materials to us in an open form but we oppose that and we protect ourselves from possible suspicion. A courier has spare empty packages in that case.

[Poroskov] Valeriy Valentinovich, excuse me for an unpleasant parallel, but even intelligence agents have traitors and turncoats...

[Andreyev] I understand that we have not had a single man desert with a package.

[Poroskov] Is that the result of a carefully thought out delivery algorithm or the selection of people?

[Andreyev] Both. We select specialists up to 35 years of age who have served in the army—those desiring to join can turn to their military commissariat. First of all, a strict background check awaits them, then six months of training, the program of which includes military disciplines, special training, printing, ethics...

[Poroskov] And ethics?

[Andreyev] Why not? Officers, as a rule, deal with the country's highest leadership and ministers. The ability to interact with people and tact are required.

[Poroskov] Your officers are constantly subjected to risk and experience financial hardships—say, what does one flight to Kamchatka cost. Do they have benefits?

[Andreyev] No, salaries are at the level of MVD officers, with apartments, like everywhere else.

[Poroskov] To whom is your department subordinate?

[Andreyev] Since 1960, courier communications has been part of the Ministry of Communications system and I am subordinate to the minister but we are part of the MVD cadres and the Ministry of Finance directly forms our budget.


I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to congratulate my colleagues who perform this difficult duty and to veterans on the 75th Anniversary of Russian Courier Communications which we celebrate on 2 May and to wish them all the best.

NTIS  
ATTN PROCESS 103  
5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

BULK RATE  
U.S. POSTAGE  
PAID  
PERMIT NO. 352  
MERRIFIELD, VA.

22161



This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.